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**Ethnic Identity, Grievance and Political Behavior: Being  
Palestinian in Israel**

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**Ethnic Identity, Grievance and Political Behavior: Being  
Palestinian in Israel**

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## **Dedication**

Dedicated to my family: to my parents, who instilled in me a desire to learn; to my sons, Raumsie and Youssef, who I hope will acquire the same desire; and to my husband, Tarek, who encouraged this undertaking from the start. May its completion be not the end, but the beginning of a new era.

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# **Ethnic Identity, Grievance and Political Behavior: Being Palestinian in Israel**

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This dissertation explores system-challenging political behavior in Israel among the non-Jewish Israeli Palestinian minority. System-challenging behavior (SCB) includes protest action and protest intent, as well as participation in “national action” days that commemorate important events in Palestinian history. Based on the protest literature, one would expect that the greater the grievances, the more system-challenging behavior one would find. However, I find that this grievance – SCB is conditioned by the kind of identity held. Using survey data from Israel, my study shows the importance of not only grievance but also identity to participation in SCB such as protest and national action. Individuals with an identity favorable to the state are less likely to engage in SCB even when they have a significant level of grievances. Thus, the effect of grievances is reduced by pro-state identities. For those who hold an anti-establishment identity,

however, the impact of grievance is intensified. Thus the state can promote ethnic stability by cultivating identification with it, a difficult task in ethnically-based states such as Israel. The results of this study are relevant to the many multi-ethnic states in the world seeking to improve ethnic relations.



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## **Chapter 1: The Scope of the Study**

With the end of the cold war in the 1990s, optimistic observers predicted that the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1989) would make ethnicity irrelevant. They argued that liberal democracy had triumphed over its primary alternatives, namely communism and fascist nationalism. Globalization had made states increasingly interdependent, they argued, which was thought to pose an obstacle to the nation-state.

The jubilation did not last long, however, as ethnic conflicts broke out and nationalist politics revived worldwide. Even western democracies, like Canada, Belgium, and Italy, long considered bastions of tranquility, have shown evidence of simmering ethnic tensions. Virulent nationalism, political fragmentation and intermittent violence have characterized new (and some old) democracies instead of the hoped-for stability. Millions have been displaced, wounded or killed as a result of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, for example, while continuing ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Cyprus, and Palestine/Israel, to name a few, appear to have no end in sight.

For the developing world, liberal optimists prescribe democracy as a remedy to ethnic turmoil, though the jury is still out on its curative ability (Chua 2003; Snyder 2000). Thus faith in democracy as a stabilizing agent – its many other virtues notwithstanding – may have been misplaced. As a result, the euphoria of the Third Wave has been replaced by disappointment, confusion, and resignation in the face of persistent ethnic conflict.

In the current environment, it is tempting to ask: is ethnic conflict inevitable? Few states are ethnically homogenous; despite the frequent demand that political borders coincide with ethnic boundaries, realistic assessments conclude that such arrangements are impossible (Cardenas and Canas 2002; Roberts 1999).

The mere coexistence of different ethnic groups with differing identifications may not inevitably cause ethnic conflict. Instead, a number of preconditions must be met for ethnic conflict to arise. Perhaps the most important of these preconditions is the development of a politicized ethnic identity. People must first “imagine” (Anderson 1991) themselves as members of a distinct cultural group with common goals and interests, for which political mobilization is deemed necessary. It is this mobilization that often evolves into ethnic conflict.

The degree to which ethnic “imagining” leads to mobilization depends on a number of factors, but the perceived need for mobilization constitutes a major contributing factor to ethnic mobilization and conflict. The perception that the group deserves more symbolic or material goods than it currently receives can provide a salient cause around which to mobilize the group. Particularly when the state is identified with a single ethnic group, ethnic dilemmas with considerable mobilization potential may be particularly acute.

This project addresses the challenges of predicting and controlling ethnic conflict. More specifically, I consider the consequences of ethnic identity for political behavior, particularly system-challenging behavior (SCB), like legal and illegal protest, and participating in nationally oriented actions, most of them



protest-related. The role of the state in identity-formation and its consequences for ethnic conflict figures prominently in the analysis.

Notably, not all members of the same ethnic group hold the same kind or degree of ethnic identification. Similarly, not all members perceive their interests and goals in the same way, nor do they all choose the same mobilizational strategies – or even to mobilize at all. Thus individual level analysis is required to understand the individual variations within an ethnic group, which can have important consequences for the outcome of ethnic mobilization.

This dissertation aims to answer a number of questions:

1. Who conducts system-challenging political behavior among Israeli Palestinians? Not all members of this community do in fact participate in SCB given the same environment, so explaining the individual variation in participation helps us understand the factors that promote SCB. Thus, uncovering the determinants of SCB is one of the main goals of the dissertation.

System-challenging behavior is important to political scientists and policy-makers for several reasons:

- SCB is related to the issue of regime stability. As a mass-based form of political behavior, too much SCB may be considered destabilizing, as may be violent and/or illegal activities.
- Protest, a major component of SCB, is sometimes thought of as a “stepping stone” to more serious activities, such as terrorism, assassination, or other forms of political violence.

- Since SCB is uninstitutionalized political behavior, it may be considered to be analogous to a “canary in the mine,” sort of an indicator that the institutionalized channels of participation are not functioning optimally.
- SCB may in fact succeed, that is, to actually change the system by confronting it. From this point of view, it may actually lead to beneficial changes.

2. What are the implications of individual identity for SCB? Although grievance is generally thought of as the leading candidate for promoting SCB and protest in particular (Gurr 1970), today’s protesters are not always motivated primarily by tangible benefits. In fact, the expression of identity has emerged as a major factor in post-industrial political participation (Inglehart 1990). Furthermore, even when motivated by the redress of grievances, identity may alter the grievance-behavior relationship, since identification with an entity, such as a state, may induce individuals to act in accordance with the entity’s goals (Tompkins and Cheney 1985). Thus state-friendly identification may reduce the tendency toward SCB.

3. What are the implications of grievance for SCB and identity? By giving individuals a motivation to act, grievance can be a powerful inducement to political action, as suggested by Gurr. Grievance may also be a factor in individual identity choices; high grievances may lead to anti-establishment identities.

The findings of this project highlight the importance of identification with the state for ethnic stability. Residing within a state does not mean that all

individuals feel belonging to it. Those with a weaker sense of identification with the state are more likely to challenge it.

Empirically, I focus on the case of Israel, but my theoretical concerns are with the role of ethnic identity in system-challenging behaviors. Within its internationally-recognized 1967 borders, Israel is widely considered a well-established, relatively high-quality democracy (e.g., Lijphart 1993), though this characterization has been challenged (Ghanem 1998; Smootha 1990; Smootha 1997).

Less widely investigated is the importance of Israel's Palestinian minority in shaping the country's ethnic relations. Almost 20 percent of Israel's citizens are of Palestinian origin, occupying the lowest rungs on the socioeconomic ladder in Israeli society. Until the 1980s, Israeli Palestinians have been relatively quiescent, but recent decades have witnessed an increase in Israeli Palestinian mobilization and a concomitant upsurge in identification as "Palestinians," rather than "Israeli Arab," the term favored by the Israeli establishment. Most recently, Israeli Palestinians have provoked concern for their participation in the October 2000 riots, in which 13 Israeli Palestinians were killed by police, and for their widespread boycott of the February 2001 elections.

My primary data come from two surveys I commissioned in Israel during early 2001. The larger data set consists of approximately 1200 face-to-face interviews with Israeli Palestinians, and the smaller of about 500 telephone interviews with Jewish Israelis. I wrote the questionnaires, and the sampling and interviewing were conducted by professional survey organizations. Givat Haviva

Center for Peace Research conducted the survey of the Arab sample, and the University of Haifa's Survey Consulting Center performed the interviewing of the Hebrew sample. The surveys measure various attitudes towards the majority and minority in Israel, the political system, and measurement of demographics, subjective identity, and political participation.

Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of the historical and political context of ethnic relations in Israel. Israel's "nationalizing" policies (Brubaker 1996) and their role in the creation of identity and citizenship dilemmas among Israeli Palestinians constitute a major theme of this chapter. I explore the extent Israeli Palestinians consider themselves and are considered "Israeli" and the difficulties they face in adopting this identity. I contend that Israel's nature as a Jewish state and the resulting policies inevitably distance Israeli Palestinians from affective attachment to the state in which they live.

Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of ethnic relations, identity and collective action. The chapter focuses on the social psychology of group identification: how and why individuals identify with a group and how group identification may facilitate collective action. I also examine the consequences of group identification for political behavior that challenges the state. My hypotheses focus on the extent of identification with the state or the Palestinian nation – where it comes from, and what are the resulting outcomes for system-challenging political behavior – which I can then test using my survey data.

Chapter 4 provides the broad outlines of a simultaneous equation model of system-challenging behavior. The model has three equations, one each to explain identity, grievance, and SCB. I describe the methodological complexities of the model as well as its substantive meaning and implications. The next three chapters present and interpret estimates of the effects implied by each of the model's three equations in turn.

Chapter 5 investigates the occurrence of SCB among Israeli Palestinians. The results of the empirical analysis show that those with greater Palestinian identity engage in SCB at a greater rate. Multivariate analysis indicates that Palestinian identity increases the likelihood of engaging in SCB even when taking other factors that may impact political action into account. Since Palestinian identifiers lack an identification with the Israeli state, this finding suggests that a lack of identification with the state may be an important factor in ethnic instability.

Chapter 6 attempts to explain the sense of ethnic grievance among Israeli Palestinians. Ethnic grievances identify the Israeli political system and society as responsible for the low status of Israeli Palestinians. My estimates suggest that Muslims, Palestinian identifiers, and those who affiliate with non-Zionist parties hold the strongest grievances.

Chapter 7 attempts to explain identity choice by Israeli Palestinians. Israeli Palestinians use several distinct self-identifiers to describe themselves and to indicate their orientation towards Israeli state and society. I show that their identification form an ordinal scale from Israeli identification to Palestinian

identification. The estimates from my model demonstrate that a number of factors, most notably the extent of criticism of Israeli nationalizing policies, are associated with the propensity to identify as Palestinian.

Finally, chapter 8 sketches the implications for the study of global ethnic conflict and directions for future research. I make the argument that a lack of affective identification with the Israeli state is associated with system-challenging behavior that may be destabilizing. The nationalizing nature of the Israeli state is implicated in both causing the lack of identification as well as politicizing the growing Palestinian identification among Israeli Palestinians. This finding does not bode well for the future of ethnic relations in Israel or in similar nationalizing polities.

## **Chapter 2: The State, Identity and Action in Israel: *The Historical Context of Israeli Palestinian System-Challenging Behavior***

“I’m caught in the perfect paradox – I have to be a loyal citizen of a country that declares itself not to be my country but rather the country of the Jewish people.”

-- Azmi Bishara, Israeli Palestinian MK

Although it is nearly universally accepted that “nation-states” act to embody the desires of a particular nation for self-determination, only recently has the dilemma of minorities outside the privileged nation garnered significant attention. Particularly if the nation is defined in ethnic or cultural terms, as has often been the case in the past century, non-dominant ethnic minorities may be faced with distressing dilemmas of citizenship and identification.

The case of Israel aptly demonstrates the complexity of the issue. Israel’s Palestinian minority, constituting nearly 20 percent of Israel’s citizenry, encounters great difficulty integrating into Israeli society and finding acceptance as bona fide Israelis. Economic, social, and political discrimination – justified by the Jewish majority as acceptable expressions of the state’s Jewishness – hinder the development of a meaningful Israeli identity among Israeli Palestinians. Despite the fact that the Israeli political system is widely considered to be a well-developed democracy (e.g., Lijphart 1993), its treatment of its Palestinian minority has gained some academic attention for potentially violating the

important democratic principle of equality (Ghanem 1998; Rouhana 1998; Smootha 1990).

This chapter focuses on the Jewish-Zionist nature of the Israeli state and its implications for its non-Jewish citizens. I argue that the policies implied by the state's Jewish character distance Israeli Palestinians from affective attachment to the state, which in turn may render them more susceptible to participation in system-challenging political behavior.

## **CITIZENSHIP, THE STATE, AND IDENTITY**

The academic controversy over Israel's political system centers around minority rights. Although prevailing procedurally minimal definitions of democracy focus on the electoral institutions that allow for citizen control over the government and its policies (Dahl 1971), an underlying principle of democracy is the equality of all citizens (Braybrooke 1968). Liberal democracy institutionalizes the principle of equality not only through elections, but also through minority protections, usually as enshrined in a constitution or other foundational document (Diamond 1999).

Sammy Smootha (1990; 1997) argues that Israel is a democracy of a new type, called "ethnic democracy." This form of democracy, he argues, has all the necessary institutions and practices to qualify as a democracy. It has free and fair elections, and enough color-blind civil liberties to allow what are normally considered democratic processes to operate. However, it institutionalizes the



dominance of a single ethnic group within the democratic structure. Smootha's argument in many ways echoes that of Fareed Zakaria (1997), who describes "illiberal democracy" as a form of democracy that holds competitive elections but otherwise circumscribes individual freedoms.

Several other scholars opposed to Smootha's position contend that Israel's institutionalized ethnic dominance and poor treatment of its Israeli Palestinian minority disqualify it as a bona fide democracy. In their view, Israel is an "ethnic state" (Ghanem 1998; Rouhana 1998; Rouhana and Ghanem 1998) disempowering its non-Jewish citizens. Oren Yiftachel similarly argues that Israel's status as a biethnic state composed of two rival "homeland" ethnic groups makes it comparable to unstable countries such as Northern Ireland and Cyprus, and that political violence is likely to erupt if Israel does not move to include Arab citizens in power-sharing arrangements (Yiftachel 1992).

More recently, Alan Dowty (1998; 1999a; 1999b) has disputed this critical view of Israel, arguing that Israel is an imperfect democracy on par with democratic nation-states in Western Europe. Dowty argues that Ghanem, Rouhana and Yiftachel's (1998) criteria for classifying states as democracies are too restrictive. Such European nation-states are also guilty of mistreating minorities to some extent or another, since the mission of the nation-state is to be the instrument of the (dominant) nation's self-determination. Thus Israel, as a democratic nation-state, is no less democratic than countries widely accepted as democracies.

It is important to note that none of the authors claim that Israel's Palestinian citizens are treated equally or fairly. Some, like Dowty, defend Israel's self-definition as a Jewish state as relatively benign and at least potentially in harmony with democratic principles. But even they acknowledge that non-Jews are not treated equally.

### **The Nationalizing State**

The academic debate over Israel's Jewishness and democracy highlights the importance of a state's "nationalizing" policies towards ethnic minorities. Some states, called "nationalizing" by Rogers Brubaker (1996) and "organic, programmatic" states by Nils Butenschon (2000), are ethnically non-neutral in character. These states, according to Brubaker, hold in common a number of characteristics: The existence of a "core nation" or nationality is "imagined" and defined in ethnocultural terms. This nation is thought to "own" the state, and the state exists as the polity of and for the core nation.

Despite having its own state, however, the core nation is thought to be embattled by an outside force and is therefore in a weak cultural, economic, or demographic position within the state. This legacy of discrimination is used to justify the "remedial" or "compensatory" project of the state by promoting the specific (and heretofore inadequately served) interests of the core nation. This compensatory aim justifies the nationalizing policies of the state, which are generally aimed at strengthening the economic, political, or demographic position of the core nation at the expense of other ethnic groups in the state.

Slovakia provides one of many possible examples. Hungarians constitute just over 10 percent of the population of Slovakia and form a majority in some Slovakian provinces. Hungarians were formerly dominant under the Austro-Hungarian Empire but encountered a reversal of fortune upon the formation of Czechoslovakia in 1918. The new nature of the Slovakian state, formed in 1993 upon the breakup of Czechoslovakia, together with the past privileges of the Hungarians cause the Slovakian majority to pursue nationalizing policies to make up for insufficient Slovakian character in the state. Thus the 1993 constitution makes no mention of minority rights, and no official acceptance or proclamation of multicultural coexistence has taken place. Instead, the state has embarked on a compensatory project of “Slovakisation,” through territorial reorganization and a language law that discriminates against the Hungarian language (Bacova 1999).

Such nationalizing states stand in sharp contrast to civic states, where the “nation” is the body of legal citizens and citizenship is tied to territorial, not ethnic considerations. Even states like France and Germany, which have varying degrees of ethnocultural stipulations attached to citizenship (Brubaker 1990), lack the “compensatory” project of the state and incorporate greater minority rights into their legal systems. They exemplify the “hybrid model of minority rights” in which the state is national, but not nationalizing (Brubaker 1996 ).

## **Citizenship**

Citizenship acts as an important institutional link between an individual’s identity and the state in which he or she lives. Citizenship has been described as

“a scarce public good that is distributed by the state, a source of collective identity and an instrument of political control ... that regulates the distribution of rights and obligations in a country” (Butenschon 2000 ). Thus it is of great importance to individual identities and the distribution of power in a society whether national citizenship is implemented as ethnic or civic.

Citizenship can refer to two different concepts: one’s status as a legal citizen, and one’s identity as a member of a community, usually referring to membership in a political community such as an internationally recognized state (Butenschon 2000). When these two concepts overlap, that is, when legal citizenship and identification with the political community are distributed to all residing within the boundaries of the state, the state’s inhabitants are said to enjoy civic citizenship. All are able to enjoy equal access to the resources of the state (Davis 2000) as well as equal opportunity to consider oneself as “belonging” to the state. If any legal citizens are excluded from identifying with the political community, such exclusion is considered an aberration. Claimants can refer to the contradiction between principle and practice in their attempts to rectify the grievance.

When identification with the political community is reserved for a single ethnic group, excluding significant communities of legal citizens, an ethnonational conception of citizenship prevails. Legal citizens who are not members of the core nation are excluded from full membership in society and may not enjoy full access to the resources of the state.

As citizenship also acts as a form of identity that links the state with the individual, thus disjuncture between legal and national citizenship may create confusion in identification. Members of a national minority find it difficult to identify with the state that reigns over their homeland when that state is not *their* state. How can a Hungarian in Slovakia feel Slovakian when the state proclaims itself to be for Slovaks and is openly hostile to Hungarians? Affect, an essential part of identification and belonging, may be noticeably reduced or absent in such cases, when minorities are excluded from membership in the state's primary political community.

Under these circumstances, collective identities of national minorities may be "incomplete" or unbalanced (Rouhana 1997), thus provoking a psychological search for balance. The cognitive dissonance that results from living as an outsider in one's own land may be reduced by engaging in political activity aimed at correcting state-imposed conditions of imbalance.

## **IDENTITY AND THE NATIONALIZING STATE: THE CASE OF ISRAEL**

Israel, like Slovakia and others, is a nationalizing state. The early Zionists, who first conceived of a Jewish state, were predominantly from Eastern European countries such as Poland and Russia. They were highly influenced by ethnonationalist thought based on the nationalizing projects there, as well as a mature conception of democracy and citizenship. Their state-building efforts in Israel were understandably influenced by these theories.

Motivated by Enlightenment ideas of the nation-state and the prevalence of anti-Semitic violence in Eastern Europe, Zionist pioneers began moving to the area called Palestine at the end of the nineteenth century. They established proto-state institutions but were not prepared for the reality of Palestine. How could Zionists create a Jewish state in Palestine when Palestinian Arabs comprised the overwhelming majority of inhabitants? Zionist thought had not given much thought to the answer to this question, displaying instead mostly avoidance or denial of the issue (Dowty 1998).

During the war of 1948 that established the state of Israel, the majority of Palestinians were expelled or fled. Those remaining comprised about 19 percent of the population of Israel and were eventually made Israeli citizens. Most of the Palestinian leadership and economic elite remained in exile, so Palestinians in Israel found themselves leaderless under harsh military rule. Unaccustomed to Jewish politics and institutions, as well as to Hebrew, Israeli Palestinians were largely unequipped to seriously negotiate with the new government about their plight. For their part, Jewish Israelis largely ignored the Israeli Palestinian minority and went about the business of state-building and nation-building.

As the Israeli Palestinians comprised a relatively small numerical minority, their Israeli citizenship was not thought to constitute a threat to Jewish state and nation building activities, particularly since they were controlled by a tough military regime. Thus the Israeli government was able to clear the borders of Israeli Palestinian villages – thought to be a security threat – and confiscate

large amounts of land with little reaction from the demoralized and disorganized minority. These Israeli actions remained largely uncontested until the 1970s.

The nationalizing policies of the Israeli elite were colored by the East European background of most of the elite membership. Influenced by late nineteenth and early twentieth century conceptions of ethnonational self-determination as well as the experience of brutal pogroms and severe discrimination at the hands of Eastern European nationalizing elites, Israeli policy-makers shaped a nationalizing polity that embraced both majoritarian democracy and ethnonationalism with a compensatory color.

Israeli policy-makers created policies meant to serve Jewish interests in the state of Israel and to solidify Jewish demographic, economic and political predominance in the formerly Arab-majority territory. Thus Israeli elites were able to use the democratic legitimacy of the Jewish majority to create policies that favor Jewish Israelis at the expense of the Palestinian minority.

### **Israeli Policies and Ethnic Discrimination**

According to the Israeli Declaration of Independence, Israel is the state of the Jewish people, but non-Jewish citizens are to be considered equal citizens of the state. In theory at least, they should therefore enjoy equal rights with Jewish citizens. The wording of most Israeli laws is ethnically neutral and appears to be non discriminatory at first glance. The effects, however, are far from equal. These laws often employ non-neutral criteria, like military service or geographic

location, for the distribution of benefits. Most Palestinian citizens do not serve in the military and tend to live in geographically concentrated areas, and therefore the laws are detrimental to their interests.

As a result of Israeli policy, Israeli Palestinians suffer considerable economic deprivation. Israeli Palestinian localities receive only a fraction of what Jewish municipalities receive from the government. For example, the 1999 budget for Arab local authorities comprised only eight percent of the regular budget for local authorities in Israel, which represents an expenditure of only two-thirds of the per capita expense for residents of Jewish local authorities (Ghanem, Abu-Ras, and Rosenhek 2000). Additionally, Israeli Palestinian localities are generally excluded from designation as “national priority areas,” which receive additional development funds from the government, even though Palestinian areas are among the poorest in the country (Adalah 1998).

Housing and land discrimination further compounds the Israeli Palestinian economic plight. Israeli Palestinian lands have been expropriated at a dizzying rate since 1948. Today, 93 percent of all land in Israel comes under direct state control, whereas the Jewish community owned just six to seven percent of the land prior to 1948, by some accounts (Adalah 1998) and up to 12 percent of cultivable land by others (Stein 1984). Much of the land that remains in Palestinian hands is restricted in use, which limits the growth of Palestinian localities. State lands are off-limits to Israeli Palestinians, as they are managed by the Israeli Land Administration in conjunction with the Jewish National Fund, a



quasi-governmental entity with the declared purpose of serving the Jewish people and the goals of the Zionist movement.

Many pre-existing Israeli Palestinian communities were left out of state development plans, rendering the communities “unrecognized.” State law prohibits the delivery of services such as water, electricity, sewage disposal, road access, health clinics, schools, and other essential development infrastructure to unrecognized villages. The inhabitants suffer from health and educational handicaps as a result of this policy, but they remain determined to live on the land that in most cases they display undisputed ownership.

In large part due to housing and land discrimination, Israeli Palestinians experience considerable economic deprivation. Land expropriation and displacement have reduced their collective wealth, leaving a legacy of economic disadvantage from the outset. Furthermore, inferior education in Israeli Palestinian localities inadequately trains them for high-paying jobs (al-Haj, Abu-Sa'ad, and Yonah 2000), while inferior economic and physical infrastructures, combined with a lack of land and state investment provide an unfavorable climate for economic development in Israeli Palestinian centers of population (Sa'di, Shalev, and Schnell 2000). Israeli Palestinians are generally not employable in the “security complex,” which plays a large role in the Israeli economy and provides a large proportion of high-skilled technical jobs but requires security clearance, which Israeli Palestinians find difficult or impossible to obtain.

As a result of these disadvantages, Israeli Palestinian areas head the list of “centers of unemployment.” In the Central Bureau of Statistics ranking of

localities by socioeconomic level, 52 of the 77 lowest-rated localities on the list are Arab localities. In contrast, none of the 84 localities that top the list are Arab (Sinai 2002). Furthermore, Israeli Palestinians occupy a marginal position in the employment hierarchy in Israel. Almost two-thirds of Israeli Palestinian men are manual workers, while Jewish Israelis are concentrated in managerial and professional elite. Twenty-four percent of Jewish men are managers or professionals, but only 10 percent of Palestinian men are members of these elite occupational groups (Sa'di, Shalev, and Schnell 2000). As a result, more than 40 percent of Israeli Palestinian households live below Israel's poverty line (Gurr 1993), and an Israeli government report estimates that 72 percent of those in long-term poverty are non-Jewish (Itim 2001).

Such inequities like these continue to exist in great part because of a lack of Israeli Palestinian representation in decision-making bodies. Israeli Palestinians – as Israeli citizens – have the right to vote in Israeli elections, but they are unable to translate their potential voting power into effective policy-making. One crucial reason lies in Section 7(A) of the *Basic Law: The Knesset and the Law of Political Parties*, which prohibits a party from contesting elections if it rejects Israel's existence as a Jewish and democratic state, or incites racism or supports “the armed struggle of an enemy state or of a terror organization against the state of Israel” (Alon and Segal 2002).

According to Supreme Court interpretation, the definition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people means that Jews form the majority in the state, and Jews are therefore entitled to preferential treatment. A political party that rejects

these principles may be disqualified, according to this interpretation. Thus a political party that calls for equality between Arabs and Jews conceivably could be disqualified from elections, leaving the Arab parties in a precarious state of legal limbo (Adalah 1998).

Furthermore, the provision prohibiting supporting armed struggle against Israel potentially bans Israeli Palestinian expression of support for the uprising in the Palestinian territories against Israeli occupation. This limitation on political expression may curb the ability of Israeli Palestinian leaders to represent their constituencies in the Knesset.

No Arab political party has yet been successfully disqualified on this basis, however. Attempts were made during the 2003 parliamentary elections to outlaw the nationalist Balad/Tajamu' party and to prevent several Israeli Palestinian MKs from standing for re-election through the new amendments, but intervention by the Israeli supreme court restored the party and candidates' ability to contest the elections.

The Israeli Central Election Committee's decision to ban the party and two candidates and the widespread support for this action among the Israeli Jewish population was interpreted by Israeli Palestinians as an attempt to undermine Israeli Palestinian representation in the Knesset and silence their political leadership, despite the Supreme Court's reinstatement of the candidacies (Ettinger and Bana 2003). If the Supreme Court had failed to reinstate the candidates and party, according to Nadim Rouhana, it could have irreparably damaged relations between the state and the Palestinian minority by "threatening

the legitimacy of citizenship... and erase the sense of identification Israeli Arabs have with the state's political, legal and cultural institutions" (HRA 2003b).

Perhaps the most damaging aspect of Israeli democracy is the habitual exclusion of Arab parties from governing coalitions. Israel's parliamentary system concentrates most state power in a coalition cabinet and prime minister. Exclusion from the coalition effectively means exclusion from any decision-making power at all. The most powerful position the Arab parties have ever reached was as part of a "blocking majority" that kept the rightist Likud party from forming a government between 1992 and 1996. Despite their status as a blocking force, the Arab parties could not point to any concrete achievements benefiting Israeli Palestinians (Ghanem 1997).

Furthermore, Arab parties have never been part of a governing coalition in Israeli history and have only cooperated with the government from outside. They are not likely to be included in future coalitions because of the widespread opposition to inclusion of Arab parties in governing coalitions. Although Israeli Palestinian members of Zionist parties have been included in coalitions, their influence within the party is quite limited, and they have been unable or unwilling to express non-Zionist viewpoints. By and large, Israel sees itself as concerned with Jewish issues with which non-Jews should have no part in influencing. Thus, many Jewish members of the Knesset have vehemently opposed participating in any coalition that includes Arab parties, and as a result, any coalition negotiations that include Arab parties have been doomed to failure from the start.

The platforms of Arab parties lie outside of the Zionist consensus that is institutionalized in the Israeli state. According to this consensus, Israel is the “state of the Jewish people,” and thus it exists to benefit Jews and to rectify the legacy of centuries of antisemitism. Thus it is no surprise that Arab academics such as As’ad Ghanem conclude that “...Arabs have never had any real opportunity to participate in decision-making, whether on domestic or foreign policy issues” (Ghanem 1997).

As the Israeli political system is highly centralized, most policy is made at a high level, leaving few points of access for interest groups to influence the process. There are no institutionalized checks and balances, as there are in the United States, and the executive is not separate from the legislature, thus reducing horizontal accountability. The political system is considerably majoritarian and resembles the Westminster model, with the notable difference of a proportional representation electoral system, rather than the single member districts found in Britain.

There is no constitution or bill of rights to protect the Palestinian minority from the excesses of majoritarianism. Palestinian citizens are thus left vulnerable to legal and extralegal discrimination and the use of Emergency Regulations, Absentee’s Property Law, and other laws used to the detriment of their interests. They have limited options for legal recourse when discrimination is directed toward them.

This political system renders Israeli Palestinians vulnerable to nationalist policies supported by the Jewish population. The overwhelming majority of

Israel's Jewish population strongly supports the Jewish nature of the state, which in practice means favoring Jews over Arabs in many policy areas. For example, a 1988 survey reveals that 74 percent of the Jewish public in Israel believes that Israel should prefer Jews to Arabs, while decisive majorities supported Jewish preference in specific arenas, such as admission to universities, jobs in the civil service, and social security benefits (Smootha 1992).

More recently, a survey by Haifa University indicates that only 27 percent of Jewish Israelis favor military intervention against Jewish demonstrators, but 61 percent accept military intervention against protests by Israeli Palestinians (Halaby 2001). In a poll conducted just days after rioting broke out, on October 8, revealed that 60 percent of the Jewish respondents wanted Israeli Palestinians "transferred" outside the state's borders, and close to 78 percent thought that the police were either light-handed or acted appropriately in dealing with the disturbances ( for similar poll results, see Sultany 2003; Zureik 2001).

These attitudes prevail among the Jewish public despite the fact that thirteen Israeli Palestinians were killed as a result of police intervention during rioting that was no worse than that which has occurred among Israeli Jews. Jewish demonstrations, however violent, are not met with weapons, only tear gas (ACRI, Adalah, and HRA 2001). In short, the Israeli Jewish consensus remains unchecked by the political system, potentially subjecting Israeli Palestinians to considerable abuse as well as discrimination.

## **SELF-IDENTIFICATION**

Before the 1948 war that resulted in the establishment of the state of Israel, Palestinian Arab inhabitants of historical Palestine constituted the overwhelming majority of the area, but their identity as Palestinians was still relatively undeveloped. Identification with broader categories such as religion or the Arab nation was widespread, as was identification with the family, village, and clan. Nevertheless, awareness of a unique status as inhabitants of Palestine was found particularly among the educated and upper classes in the early twentieth century, and this awareness spread and deepened as conflict with the Zionist settlers intensified (Khalidi 1997).

A number of factors have combined to inhibit the development of Palestinian identity among the Arab population (Khalidi 1997), both before and after the establishment of Israel. First and foremost is the absence of a Palestinian state to internally and externally propagate Palestinian nationalism and identity through the media, schools, and official discourse. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian “government in exile,” attempted to disseminate Palestinian nationalism, but without the territorial basis of a state, a recognized government, and state institutions, its success has remained limited. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in areas evacuated by the Israeli Army in 1995 and 1996, Palestinians in the occupied territories have gained a platform for propagation of Palestinian nationalism, but Israeli Palestinians of Israel still lack a national legitimizing institution.

In fact, Israeli policy towards the Palestinian minority since the establishment of the state has been described as designed to thwart the development of a unified Palestinian identity. In the domain of education, for example, Israeli educational policy and curriculum are repeatedly described as aiming to educate Israeli Palestinians for control and subservient status in Israeli society, to separate them from their Palestinian identity, and to inculcate separate, politically meaningful identities such as Christian, Druze or Bedouin (al-Haj, Abu-Sa'ad, and Yonah 2000; Coptly 1990; el-Asmar 1978; 2001; Lynd, Bahour, and Lynd 1994).

Israeli education of Israeli Palestinians is directed by the Ministry of Education, with little institutionalized input from the Palestinian minority as to either curriculum development or implementation. The main purpose of Israeli education is to inculcate Zionist values, even in Arab schools. Mandatory history texts and lessons – “ideologically laden and revisionist” (Coptly 1990) – make great efforts to show the significance of the Land of Israel for Jews and to prove that only in historical Palestine could the State of Israel arise, while at the same time portraying the connection between the Arabs and Palestine as purely incidental (el-Asmar 1978). In all the books of the mandatory curriculum in Arab schools, “the emphasis is put on the historical rights of the Jews to Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel)... The Arab child is not taught that he too has the right to this land, a land his ancestors have cultivated for decades” (Caspi and Weltsch 1998).

Literature study has been similarly oriented towards Zionist portrayals of the land of Israel:



“The material chosen for Arabic literature for the Arabic examination lacked any patriotic feeling and had no national tone. Moreover, it was as if the Palestinian authors did not exist; they were completely ignored... while the Jewish work gave expression to a live and conscious people ...the Arab works that we were taught did not concern themselves with any nationalist ideals but were mostly works describing nature and lyrical moods...we felt deprived because of the total absence of national patriotic poems, especially since the Hebrew curriculum was full of them. In addition to this, it hurt us to see the total absence of Palestinian authors from the studies of poetry, and we could not see any reason for this except as a way of suppressing our national feelings.”(el-Asmar 1978 )

History study is fragmented among Christian and Muslim history, but very little Arab history and no Palestinian history is included (Coptly 1990). In short, the education system among the Arab citizens of Israel has been described as a tool used by the Israeli establishment “for ideological control, manipulating it to divide the Arab population in a manner that clouds their Palestinian identity” (al-Haj, Abu-Sa'ad, and Yonah 2000) and to destroy Palestinian memory.

In general, Israeli policy towards Israeli Palestinians has been described as a “divide and rule” system of control that not only aims to prevent the emergence of Palestinian identity but also to prevent the emergence of an Arab or Palestinian nationalist movement among the Palestinian minority. Lustick’s comprehensive survey (1980) outlines a number of methods by which Israel has maintained a “system of control” over its Palestinian Arab minority. Most relevant for this discussion of Palestinian identity is the encouragement of religious, clan/tribal, and geographic segmentation as a means to discourage Palestinian identity and nationalist activity. Many of Lustick’s conclusions have been confirmed and elaborated by later authors (e.g., Firro 2001; Meir and Zivan 1998; Yiftachel and Segal 1998).

Israeli encouragement of competing micro-identities aimed to retard the growth of broad, nationalist identities such as the Palestinian identity and to channel energy into sectorial conflict rather than national cooperation. Israeli religious segmentation is a case in point. Arabs in Israel have been historically divided between Christians and Muslims (including Druze and Bedouin); however, Israeli policy has emphasized these divisions, treating the groups differentially and encouraging disputes between groups.

The military administration also encouraged geographic segmentation by dividing Palestinian areas into separate districts and restricting travel between districts only to specified holders of travel permits. In effect, this prevented all but the most essential travel between villages – except for travel by friends of the ruling Labor party, who could often obtain permits. This policy was meant to prevent “nationalistic organizing” (Lustick 1980 ), the return of Palestinians to their confiscated lands, and autonomous economic development. With the end of the military administration in 1966, these travel restrictions ended, but nearly twenty years of fragmented social, political, and economic development in Arab areas allowed integrated Jewish development to surpass Arab efforts. Geographic segmentation thus made it more difficult for Palestinians to become aware of common experiences, a necessary step for common identity.

Some of the Israeli policies designed to reinforce divisions between different Palestinian groups are no longer actively pursued, as the Israeli government lost some of its leverage over Israeli Palestinians with the abolition of the military administration in 1966. Nevertheless, Israeli Palestinians continue to

be divided by the legacy of previous fragmentation efforts as well as contemporary policies. The development of politicized identity among Israeli Palestinians, therefore, has been handicapped by political, social, and economic fragmentation that inhibits Palestinians' ability to join efforts and minds in a unified political identity.

Zionist discourse has historically aimed to delegitimize Palestinian claims to nationhood. Both the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations Mandate, heavily influenced by Zionist considerations, referred to Palestinians only in the negative sense, as "the non-Jewish communities in Palestine," despite the fact that Palestinian Arabs comprised the overwhelming majority of inhabitants until 1948 (Khalidi 1997). Similarly, David Ben Gurion, considered the founding father of Israel, refused to recognize "two nations" in historical Palestine. He recognized only the Jewish nation, while Palestinian Arabs were considered merely part of the larger "Arab nation." This tactic freed Zionists to argue that Palestinian Arabs could easily relocate to other Arab countries, and to claim that all of historical Palestine should be the Jewish homeland (Lustick 1980).

Since the founding of the Israeli state, Israeli leaders continued their discourse of delegitimization, both internally and internationally. Perhaps most well-known is Golda Meir's famous statement in the 1950s: "There was no such things as Palestinians...they did not exist" (Khalidi 1997). In recent decades, however, Israel has grudgingly acknowledged the existence of Palestinians as a nation, influenced by the favorable climate created by the 1987 Intifada and the post-Gulf War peace talks. Nevertheless, the term "Palestinian" refers only to

those Arabs living in the occupied territories, not inside Israel. Today, Israeli Palestinians are referred to as “non-Jews,” “the minorities,” “Arabs and Druze,” “Arab Israelis” or “Israel’s Arabs” in official discourse, not as Palestinians.

Despite the formidable Israeli policies opposing the development of Palestinian identity, it has nevertheless survived and persisted. Collective memories of shared events have provided opportunities for group solidarity that in part transcends Israeli policy. According to historian Rashid Khalidi, the Nakba (disaster) that befell the Palestinian people in 1948 when Israel was established acts as the key event that unifies Palestinians. “If the Arab population of Palestine had not been sure of their identity before 1948, the experience of defeat, dispossession, and exile guaranteed that they knew what their identity was very soon afterwards: they were Palestinians” (Khalidi 1997 ). Thus the shared trauma of the Nakba solidified a common identity as Palestinians among those who remained inside Israel as well as those who were out.

Since 1948, Palestinians in Israel have suffered many injustices and indignities because of their status as non-Jews in a Jewish state. Land expropriation, job discrimination and housing discrimination are just some of the daily humiliations that remind them that they are Palestinians. Some reminders have been deadly, such as the Kafr Kana massacre in 1956, Land Day in 1976, and the uprisings of 2000, and have thus turned into important dates of commemoration in Palestinian collective memory. Like the Nakba, these events have acted as potential activators of Palestinian identity in Israel, to be used by nationalist entrepreneurs when opportunities present themselves.

The commemoration of important dates in Palestinian history has also been part of this trend. Events such as Nakba Day and Land Day provide opportunities for people to learn about Palestinian history and to take pride in their Palestinian origins. Shared experiences such as the 1948 Nakba, Land Day, and day-to-day discrimination have provided the foundation for Palestinian identity in Israel despite official policies aiming to thwart its growth.

It is important to note the opportunities provided by the Israeli Communist party in organizing Israeli Palestinians to assert their identity and mobilize for their rights. The Communist party has been legal since its inception over twenty years before Israeli statehood, though it has never been allowed to join government coalitions. Throughout its colorful history, the Communist party – under various names and forms – has acted as a joint Arab-Jewish forum for progressive politics, including, most notably, an outspoken stance in favor of Palestinian rights both inside and outside Israel. Communists have fought for the rights of Palestinian citizens, opposed Jewish privilege in Israel, criticized Israeli domestic and international policies, and demanded that Israel allow Palestinian refugees to return, stop expropriating land, and make peace with the Arab states. It has acted as a thorn in the side of the Israeli establishment and has thus been ostracized by mainstream political elements. Nevertheless, it has remained a legal participant in Israeli politics, electing several representatives to the Knesset in most elections (Ghanem 2001).

Its status as a legal party has not prevented the Israeli establishment from discouraging Israeli Palestinian participation in Communist politics, particularly

during the years of the Military administration, when the government's leverage over Israeli Palestinians was greatest. Activists would be frequently be harassed, denied travel permits, or put under administrative detention, as nationalistic organizing was considered a threat to the Israeli regime (el-Asmar 1978; Lustick 1980). Such harassment was effective in preventing Israeli Palestinian participation in Communist activities on a wide scale, though the activities of party activists who withstood the harassment provided an important outlet for nationalist expression.

Communist publications, such as al-Ittihad, al-Jadid, and the literary supplements, allowed Palestinians to voice their opinions against the regime and its policies as well as sustain Palestinian identity through literary works and alternative histories (Caspi and Weltsch 1998; Elad-Bouskila 1999). Though military censorship imposed some obstacles before Communist and other nationalist publications, Communist publications and activities allowed the expression of nationalist Palestinian Arab identity to openly exist during the times when Israeli pressure on the Palestinian community in Israel was strongest.

### **Contemporary Trends in Identity**

In the previous two decades, the available evidence indicates that self-identification as Palestinians has increased among Israeli Palestinians (Rouhana 1997), despite the Israeli establishment's efforts to mold them into "Arab Israelis." Israeli Palestinians are active in reconstructing their national history and challenging the official Zionist version. The revival of national pride includes

publications in the Arabic press intended to teach about the Palestinian homeland, visits to ruins of Arab villages destroyed in 1948, efforts to rebuild destroyed mosques, churches, and cemeteries, attempts by students to retrace family histories, and demands to revert street names back to the pre-state names based on Palestinian, not Zionist, history (Grossman 1993; Nir 2001b; Shavit and Bana 2001).

For Israeli Palestinians, the Nakba and other historical events can shed light on current events. Israeli Palestinians thus can draw upon historical grievances from their collective history as Palestinians as well as their own experience in Israel to politicize their identity in a way that facilitates political action. The Israeli component of their identity, however weak, provides them with a venue – the Israeli political system – for their action, while their identity as Palestinians provides them with a heritage of dispossession and resistance that provides a motivation to target the political arena in an effort to improve their situation.

## **POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND BACKLASH**

In 1948, Israeli Palestinians found themselves leaderless, as most of the political elite had fled. They were placed under a harsh military administration that severely curtailed their ability to organize politically or develop their growing Palestinian identity. Since the Israeli government cultivated relations of economic dependence, leaving Israeli Palestinians unable to act autonomously on political,

social or economic matters of importance to the community. Thus, they were relatively quiet for the first twenty-five years of the state of Israel. They made few demands for equality, while Israeli Palestinians occupied themselves with adjusting to life under Israeli rule.

Since the 1970s, however, Israeli Palestinians have grown more independent and active in asserting their rights. With the abolition of the military administration and the rise of an Israeli-educated generation more acquainted with the Israeli system, Palestinians were able to begin the process of mobilization for equal rights. A number of nationwide organizations were formed in the 1970s, such as the National Committee of Arab High School Students (1974), the National Student Union of Arab Collegiates (1975), and the National Committee of Arab Heads of Municipalities (1974). The latter has been very influential in calling political strikes and mass protests, and was the closest thing to an elected Arab leadership body representing Arabs in Israel until the expansion of the Committee to include Arab MKs and Histadrut representatives in a new body called the Higher Follow Up Committee for Arab Affairs.

The 1970s also witnessed the beginnings of mass mobilization among Israeli Palestinians. The first large-scale protests occurred in March 1976 following word that the government planned to expropriate a large amount of Arab land for the purpose of "Judaizing the Galilee." The national committee established by the Communist party, the dominant party among Israeli Palestinians at the time, called a general strike for March 30. Disturbances broke out March 29 and the following day, resulting in the death of six Israeli



Palestinian youths. Since then March 30 has been observed as Land Day, an annual day of protest and education on the importance of land in Palestinian politics and culture (Nir 2001a).

In addition to regularly held days of protest, such as Land Day and Nakba commemorations, Israeli Palestinians have staged protests and general strikes on other occasions, such as the demolition of illegal Arab housing, the expropriation of Arab land, and international Palestinian events such as the Intifada or the invasion of Lebanon. Such acts of protest have been on the increase since 1976, according to geographer Oren Yiftachel (1996).

Jewish Israelis generally view Israeli Palestinian protest negatively, considering it to be much more threatening than Jewish protest and worthy of greater countermobilization. Thus Israeli Palestinian protests can occasionally involve a degree of direct confrontation and violence, which may be provoked in part by the countermobilization of Israeli forces.

The growing assertiveness and independence of Israeli Palestinians also are apparent in more conventional forms of participation like voting. The Arab vote for non-Zionist parties has increased considerably from the 1950s and 1960s. For example, the Arab percentage vote for Jewish-Zionist and “Arab-sister” parties (sponsored by the major Zionist parties) in the 1950s ranged in the mid-to high eighties, but it dropped to 63 percent in 1973 and to 50% in 1977, when protest and mobilization increased dramatically. More recently, it has dropped even further, to about 30 percent in 1999 (Ghanem 2001) and about 26 percent in 2003 (HRA 2003c).

Non-voting has also been an increasing phenomenon among Israeli Palestinians. As the elaborate political control machinery run by the military administration and the dominant Labor party waned in the 1970s, Israeli Palestinians had more freedom to express their displeasure not only by voting for non-Zionist parties but also by refusing to vote at all. Voting participation usually ranged in the mid-eighty percent range for most elections until the 1970s, when it dropped to the low seventy percent range (Ghanem 2001) and to 64 percent in 2003 (HRA 2003c). The boycott movement is becoming increasingly sophisticated, with its own offices, platform, and leaders (Ettinger 2003). After the 2003 elections, the boycott movement was described as the most powerful political stream in the Arab sector (HRA 2003c).

After the election reform of the 1990s allowing separate voting for Knesset parties and Prime Minister, many Israeli Palestinians cast votes (usually for Arab parties) for the Knesset but boycotted the Prime Ministerial election. When the Prime Minister election was held without a simultaneous Knesset vote, as was the case in February 2001, the circumstances were ripe for a widespread Arab boycott of the election. Thus only about 20 percent of Israeli Palestinian voted in 2001 (Alon 2001).

In 2003, parliamentary elections were held, but the controversy over Israeli Palestinian disqualifications resulted in a relatively low turnout, with only about 64 percent of Israeli Palestinian citizens casting votes for a party list (HRA 2003c). Many interpreted this low turnout as a victory for the boycott movement,

which claimed to represent the largest proportion of Israeli Palestinians in the political arena (Ettinger 2003).

It is feared that the desperation of Israeli Palestinians will find outlet in terrorism against the state. Indeed, one successful suicide bombing was carried out in 2001 by an Israeli Palestinian, while the number of terrorist cells discovered among Israeli Palestinians has dramatically increased in the space of one year, from 2000 to 2001 (Schiff 2003). The development of an Islamic movement inside Israel since the mid-1980s is also viewed with concern, particularly since Israelis fear links with Islamic terror organizations in the territories, but also because the less moderate elements reject participation in Israeli institutions such as the Knesset.

Furthermore, the emergence and growth of the nationalist stream in Israeli Palestinian politics is a source of concern for the Jewish majority, as its representatives engage in inflammatory speech and openly challenge the cherished Jewish nature of the state. The nationalist call for a “state for all its citizens” uses liberal democratic rhetoric to reveal the tension between democracy and a Jewish state in Israel, while the use of the Knesset platform by nationalist MKs to openly champion Palestinian identity and Arab causes – generally identified as encouraging Israel’s sworn enemies – routinely pushes the limits of Israeli tolerance.

Since the outbreak of Palestinian-Israeli hostilities in the occupied territories October 2000, Israeli Palestinian citizens have been subject to greater scrutiny by the Jewish majority. Their links to the Palestinians engaged in a

violent uprising have not been viewed favorably, and new policies designed to neutralize Israeli Palestinians' capability to threaten the Jewish majority and its grip on the state have been instituted.

For example, new laws placing broader restrictions on parties and candidates for election were passed in 2002, which prevented candidates or parties that implicitly or explicitly deny Israel's existence as a Jewish and democratic state or supporting armed struggle against Israel from contesting elections. Another law criminalized incitement to racism, violence or terror by prohibiting calls "for an act of violence for terrorism," expressing sympathy, praise or encouragement for violence or terror, or supporting or identifying with such acts. A third law allows the Knesset to strip an MK of parliamentary immunity if he speaks out against the state, expresses support for armed struggle against Israel, or denies that Israel is a Jewish and democratic state. These laws have been interpreted as prohibiting support for the Palestinian uprising or for equality between Israeli Palestinians and Jews, thereby silencing the Israeli Palestinian leadership and stripping the Israeli Palestinian public of its voice on issues central to the community (HRA 2002; HRA 2003a).

Together with physical attacks on Israeli Palestinian MKs and expensive, time-consuming legal investigations of their activities, the new laws and other developments have come to be called a "campaign of delegitimization" aimed against Israeli Palestinians' potential political power (HRA 2002). This combination of promises of democratic freedoms and influence and more than a

half century of discrimination and disempowerment has made Israeli Palestinians even more disillusioned than ever before.

Many have come to identify the Jewish nature of the state as the cause for their suffering. Indeed, since the nationalizing policies of Jewish state aim to strengthen the Jewish demographic, economic, and political position in Israel, this may probably be at least partly the case. The contrast also feeds the trend towards toward greater Palestinian identification and lack of attachment to the state, and in fact may encourage system-challenging behavior such as vote boycotting and protest action meant to send strong signals of disenchantment to the political establishment.

In sum, Israel's nationalizing policies are hugely unpopular among Israeli Palestinians and are damaging to their interests. They discourage Israeli Palestinians from identifying, acting, and hoping to be accepted as "Israeli," and exacerbate their sense of grievance. Some Israeli Palestinians remain optimistic about their chances for equality, but their numbers appear to be diminishing.

#### **ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY, AND PROTEST BEHAVIOR: DISCUSSION**

The problematic nature of Israeli citizenship has important implications for Israeli Palestinians. Since the state's ethno-national conception of citizenship excludes Israeli Palestinians from full and equal citizenship (Peled 1992), this vital link between individual and state is severely weakened. Identification with the state among Israeli Palestinians is fragile and loyalty to the state

underdeveloped, a potentially significant factor in the volatile Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Under these circumstances, the growth in Palestinian identification among Israeli Palestinians can be understood as a reaction to the lack of availability of a meaningful Israeli identity for many Israeli Palestinians.

Unequal citizenship may also generate ethnic grievances, which are linked to unconventional political behavior aimed at redress (Gurr 1970; Gurr 1993). Although the nature of Israeli citizenship and the implied nationalizing policies are meant to bolster the Jewish population after centuries of discrimination and oppression, the consequences of weak identification with the state and significant grievances derived from unequal citizenship may paradoxically increase a Jewish sense of insecurity by increasing Israeli Palestinian protest actions.

### **Chapter 3: Being Palestinian in Israel: *Ethnic Identity and Conflict in Theoretical Perspective***

#### **WHAT IS ETHNICITY?**

In the social sciences, there is no prevailing consensus as to what constitutes ethnicity. The term is generally understood to refer to unique cultural groupings, but agreement upon the objective features of ethnic groups remains elusive. One commonly used definition states that an ethnic group is “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members” (Hutchinson and Smith 1996 ). This definition highlights the importance of shared myths and memories, characteristics that may contribute to feelings of group solidarity, and the group’s conception of its own collective past.

Use of the above definition, however, does not provide automatic agreement upon the status of any given group. These characteristics of ethnic groups, according to this definition, rely upon the subjective judgments of individuals to identify groups. For example, how does one determine if a group of individuals share “one or more elements of common culture?” Furthermore, not only ethnic groups share common historical memories. Religious groups – many of which are multiethnic – also display many elements of the above definition.

This distinction is hardly lost on inhabitants of the Middle East, where the lines differentiating ethnic and religious groups can be ambiguous. Contention

still arises over the question of Jewishness – is it an ethnicity or is it a religion? Identity can be context-specific; in Israel, the Arab-Jewish distinction is salient in different contexts than the Ashkanazi – Sephardi distinction. Another ambiguity arises over Palestinians as a unique ethnic group. Zionists have traditionally argued that Palestinians are just part of the “Arab” category; they are merely Arabs who happen to live in Palestine.

Given such ambiguities, subjectivists argue against the use of ostensibly objective criteria for the identification of ethnic groups. Ethnicity is inherently subjective, they claim; it is a way of distinguishing between “us” and “them.” Group boundaries can be fluid, conditional, and circumstantial, and objective criteria can easily miss the mark (Barth 1969). In the most flexible subjectivist approach, anyone who considers him or herself a member of an ethnic group is a member of that group. Group members can manipulate group boundaries to reject attempts at affiliation, but this is only partially successful. In any case, attempts by outsiders and marginal individuals to affiliate are not a widespread phenomenon. In effect, according to this approach, the group is who it says it is.

If group identification and affiliation are so problematic, how is it that millions of people worldwide can readily identify with ethnic categories? How can such categories evoke such intense emotions and extreme behavior? A partial answer to these questions focuses on the function of group membership.



## **THE UTILITY OF GROUP AFFILIATION**

People affiliate with groups because groups fulfill a psychological or instrumental need. First of all, categorization into groups allows for the simplification of an infinitely complicated universe. Without filtering input through simplifying categories, our minds would be unable to process all the information. People are “cognitive misers” (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Taylor 1981) who require a simplified version of reality to function. Categorizing ourselves and others into groups imposes structure on an otherwise incomprehensible world. Judgments, evaluations, predictions, and stereotypes, unfortunately, often are based on group-based shortcuts.

Distinguishing between social groups and attaching positive value to one’s ingroup helps people to attain a positive social identity: the part of the self that is defined by interaction with society. Social identity includes social roles, membership in various groups, and a structure of values and priorities (Baumeister 1995). According to social identity theory (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979), individuals have a fundamental desire to attain positive self-esteem; affiliation with a group that is positively valued in society or at least by oneself helps to achieve positive self-esteem. Ethnic identification is no exception; it can contribute to self-esteem.

Belonging to a group also fulfills other needs, like the need for a feeling of belonging (Horowitz 1985; Scheff 1994). Being a part of something larger than

oneself, particularly when the group claims lofty goals and a grandiose vision of the past and future, can be a powerful inducement for group affiliation and even collective action. Other needs, which can only be fulfilled in a social setting may be fulfilled within rather than by the group. People with a need for dominance, for example, will find it rewarding to be in the company of others with more submissive personalities (Turner et al. 1987).

Belonging to a group can fulfill other, more instrumentally oriented, needs. The categorization of people into groups creates expectations that allows for predictability of behavior among strangers and can impose normative obligations on transactions. People fulfill roles based on their position in society, their occupation, or their ethnic, social, or kin group. Thus in situations where interaction with strangers is imperative, people can know what to expect, even in an unfamiliar setting (Horowitz 1985).

The reason why ethnic identifications may be preferred over others may be related to the resemblance of ethnicity to family (Horowitz 1985). In a rapidly modernizing world, where labor mobility is essential and family relations are contracting from the extended model to the nuclear model, ethnicity can act as a substitute for kinship. Ethnicity can provide family-like ties, emotional support, reciprocal help and dispute resolution, all traditional needs met by kinship ties. Members of an ethnic group need not face the world alone.

Ethnic affiliation can resemble family relations in several ways. Both ethnic and kinship ties are based on common descent, whether real or imagined. The idiom of family is used to justify ethnic group behavior, using references to

“brotherhood” or “family quarrels” to characterize events. Ethnicity can also create bonds of obligation or a sense of familiarity between members. Just as distant cousins can claim to have a common bond, members of the same ethnic community – perhaps meeting for the first time in a far away, impersonal setting – also may feel a sense of commonality or mutual obligation.

In Israel, real or imagined ties of kinship take on great importance for the social and geographic mobility of the Palestinian minority. Israeli Palestinians frequently need to move from their villages and towns to find work in the cities, where the Jewish majority speaks a different language and views Israeli Palestinians with suspicion and hostility. In this context, emotional support and community self-help may take on the traditional family roles as Israeli Palestinians struggle to overcome the many challenges they face.

## **ETHNICITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION**

The mere existence of ethnic social identities does not ensure that political mobilization will take place. Some aspects of ethnic identity, however, may facilitate collective action on behalf of group goals. For example, the ability of social groups – ethnic groups included - to create feelings of solidarity, mutual cooperation, and unity of values makes the attainment of shared goals more likely (Turner et al. 1987). Social groups also create norms of behavior; fear of rejection

or criticism by the group can affect individuals' perceptions and actions (Asch 1952; Asch 1956; Turner et al. 1987).

It is the ability to impose and enforce social norms that allows groups to limit the problem of free riding in collective action. Selective material incentive solutions (Olson 1965) have declined in popularity in recent years as explanations of how free riding is overcome. Other kinds of incentives and conditions may be involved (Hechter and Okamoto 2001). Monitoring individual behavior through extensive social ties facilitates collective action by discouraging free riding. Groups may provide social rewards and impose social penalties for conformity or nonconformity to norms of political action.

Because ethnic ties approximate and potentially substitute for family ties, perceived threats to the ethnic group can be treated with the same intense emotions that are usually reserved for the family. This is why "symbolic politics" (Horowitz 1985) can have considerable impact on ethnic political competition. Since the quest for political power determines the status of a group, the political arena can become a symbolic battleground between ethnic groups jockeying for relative advantage. It only intensifies the fact that symbolic claims articulated in absolute terms, evoking images of good versus evil and moralistic depictions of "the way things should be" often resist compromise. Thus obsession with national or group honor can serve as a motor for continuous conflict (Scheff 1994).

Relations between Israelis and Palestinian citizens are fraught with mutually exclusive symbolic demands. As the dominant ethnic group, Jewish Israelis have imposed their vision of Jewish national goals without regard to the

symbolic and tangible effects on the Palestinian minority. Legislation regulating Kosher establishments and permissible activities on the Sabbath, for example, often work to the detriment of Israeli Palestinian businesses. While some Israeli Jews view such legislation as an essential expression of the Jewishness of the Israeli state, Israeli Palestinians tend to view them as an intrusion or handicap. To illustrate, the revocation of Kosher certification from a number of Israeli Palestinian businesses in the wake of the October 2000 disturbances was seen as a form of collective punishment by many Israeli Palestinians.

Language legislation and use also involve the contestation of symbolic demands. Both Hebrew and Arabic are legally endowed with official status in Israel, but in practice Hebrew is dominant. Once again, Jewish Israelis see this fact as a normal consequence of the existence of a Jewish majority, while Israeli Palestinians view it as a blow to their national pride as well as an obstacle to social mobility.

On a very basic level, the very definition of the state is a contested symbolic domain. The Israeli declaration of independence defines Israel as “the state of the Jewish people,” not the state of all its citizens, thereby excluding Israeli Palestinians. Jewish Israelis argue that the Jewish people need a state specifically defined as Jewish given millenia of anti-Semitism and dispersion. The Knesset has thus rejected proposals to define Israel as the state of the Jewish people *and* its citizens, regarding such efforts as subversive and potentially dangerous to Jewish national existence.

Israeli Palestinians, on the other hand, argue that their exclusion from the definition of the state constitutes not only a symbolic affront to their national honor, but also a tangible source of discrimination in many fields. For example, the Israeli Supreme Court has interpreted the Jewish definition of the state to exclude Arab political parties from electoral contestation due to their opposition to the exclusive Jewish nature of the state (Adalah 1998; Kretzmer 1990).

## **ETHNIC IDENTITY AND CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF THE STATE**

The state can have a decisive impact on identity formation through its control over resources involved in ethnic competition. An important goal of ethnic competition is to gain group prestige and power, both symbolic and material, which allow positive comparative evaluations that bolster individual self esteem. As an important marker of prestige and power, citizenship is a potent weapon in ethnic competition.

The dominance of the state by one ethnic group can impose distressing identity dilemmas among minority groups. For example, the nationalizing state (Brubaker 1996) excludes the minority from “belonging” to the state in a fundamental way. Since nationalizing states are said to exist for the purpose of fulfilling the self-determination aspirations of a particular nation, the citizenship of minorities is symbolically diminished. They are not generally accorded equal cultural, economic, or political rights, since the minority often represents a threat to the core nation. They must suffer not only the cultural humiliation, but also the

tangible harm to their interests that the compensatory project of the state represents.

What often ensues is a cycle akin to the classic security dilemma (Collins 1998; Harlig 1997; King 1997; Posen 1993). What the dominant group sees as compensatory, the minority may see as threatening to its very existence or its vital interests. The minority frequently mobilizes out of a fear of cultural extinction, which in turn provokes greater threat perception in the majority and further compensatory actions. The contest for ethnic power and prestige, then, can spiral into an uncontrollable cycle of tit-for-tat, as each group struggles to retain “national honor” and ensure its cultural survival.

Lost in the struggle is the minority group’s sense of belonging to the state, which has purposefully excluded them from meaningful membership in the public community. It becomes difficult for a Hungarian in Slovakia to identify as Slovakian, and an Israeli Palestinian finds it difficult to claim to be an Israeli. Both the minorities themselves and the dominant majority find the state label inappropriate.

The Israeli case illustrates the problem of identity. For Jewish Israelis, expressing their nationalism is relatively simple. The overlap between Jewish and Israeli identities allows them to identify with both state and nation. Israeli Palestinian citizens, however, face the dilemma of deciding between or combining Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian identities. Over 93 percent of Jewish Israelis but only 45 percent of Israeli Palestinians consider the term “Israeli” to be an appropriate self-description. Jewish Israelis are similarly reluctant to identify

Israeli Palestinians as “Israeli;” only 45 percent of the Jewish public considers the term “Israeli” applicable to Israeli Palestinians (Smootha 1992).

The orientation of the state may thus impose restrictions on the identity choices of the various ethnic groups within the state’s borders. Because identification with the dominant ethnic group creates the conditions for group comparisons that enhance one’s self-esteem, it also creates incentives to reinforce group boundaries and to preserve the state’s ethnic institutions. The ethnic institutions help perpetuate the conditions necessary for group comparisons, so individuals who benefit from these institutions are less likely to challenge them.

The above discussion reveals several important implications for ethnic political action in Israel. Those who identify with the dominant group in Israel will be less likely to threaten the state or its nationalizing institutions since they can achieve a positive self-esteem through the state’s role in differentiating groups and bestowing privileges on the core group.

Those who identify with the non-dominant group – Palestinians – will be more likely to choose an alternative strategy. They may attempt to redefine the core group to include themselves or otherwise blur group boundaries to their benefit. The effort to define Israel as “the state of all its citizens” and to include Israeli Palestinians in a meaningful “Israeli” civic identity appears to be one of such alternative strategies. Alternatively, Palestinian identifiers may attempt to influence the state for the benefit of their group through the use of confrontational tactics such as protest, riots, political violence or terrorism.



## **SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND IDENTITY**

Ethnic groups mobilize in the political arena to achieve power, status, and security. This mobilization often takes the form of civil rights or social movements, in which identity can play a large role. In fact, “new social movements” are characterized by their emphasis upon fostering a new kind of identity (Clemens 1996; Klandermans and Tarrow 1988). Identity, then, can not only facilitate political action, but political action may also influence identity.

Social movements create a secure space for the expression of identities that may not be viewed favorably among mainstream society, and may indeed have the expression of alternative identities as a primary goal (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Radical gay and lesbian identities, for example, may flourish under the mobilizing conditions of gay rights social movements, but such identities are likely to be less freely expressed in a society at large seen as hostile to these identities. The Palestinian identity in Israel, likewise, is not viewed favorably by the dominant Jewish-Zionist society, which views Palestinian nationalism as a dangerous rival in the competition over controlling historical Palestine.

Similarly, changing identities may also serve as an important movement goal (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Self-help or religious movements may enshrine identity change as a primary goal, but many other movement types have it as one goal among many. Similarly, the development of group pride – the strengthening or change of previous identity – is another form of movement identity work.

Whether identity change is an express movement goal or not, it may in any case result from intensive social activism (Calhoun 1991).

Israeli Palestinian mobilization is not highly structured by traditional social movement organizations. Political parties carry the bulk of the mobilizing burden in Israel, reflecting Israel's proportional representation electoral system. The Arab parties in Israel are thus acting similar to social movements, analogous to the role the Green party plays in American and European politics.

The Arab parties do in fact aim toward increasing their vote share and achieving political power. But they attract only a small number of Israeli voters. Few Jewish Israelis vote for Arab parties, while a significant Israeli Palestinian minority vote for non-Arab parties. The Arab parties therefore have little hope of achieving their electoral goals in the immediate future.

Thus they have turned to non-electoral goals, mobilizing Israeli Palestinians for direct action on issues relevant to the community. Direct mobilization probably serves several purposes: it may serve the interests of the party as it works in the Knesset for positive changes in the status of Israeli Palestinians, it may solidify group pride and a specific Palestinian identity, and it could strengthen the party's institutions of mobilization that can be called into use during elections. At least one Arab party (Balad/Tajamu') specifically aims towards the strengthening of Palestinian identity (Ghanem 2001), though other parties and movements may also be favorably inclined.

## **STRATEGIES OF DEPRIVED ETHNIC GROUPS**

Why do some members of deprived ethnic groups collectively organize and engage in system-challenging behavior and other do not? The answer, I suggest, is linked to the issue of identity. Merely identifying with a deprived group alone is not likely to provoke action. The identity must be politicized. Injustices must be seen and the blame must be placed on the political system (Miller et al. 1981; Shingles 1992). People who perceive injustice and place the blame for their plight on the government will be more likely to act in the political arena for a redress of grievances. Motivation to act and a target for action established through individual perceptions of the state and society.

A primary assumption of social identity theory is that people are motivated to value themselves positively. Inasmuch as they define part of who they are as a member of a group, they will be motivated to evaluate that group positively. That is, people seek a positive social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987). Groups, however, are evaluated in comparison with other groups. That means that some groups will be more positively evaluated than other groups. When a person belongs to a group that does not compare favorably with other groups, members may have an unsatisfactory social identity. In order to obtain a positive social identity, individuals may employ one or more of the following strategies (Brewer and Brown 1998; Hechter and Okamoto 2001; Turner et al. 1987):

1. *social mobility* – the “exit” option (Hirschman 1970). People may choose to dissociate themselves from the negatively valued group and affiliate with a positively valued one. In ethnic terms, a member of an oppressed minority may choose assimilation. This option is seen as more likely in more open social systems characterized by high opportunity for upward mobility (Brewer and Brown 1998).

2. *social creativity* – People may reinterpret negative evaluations as a badge of pride. “Black is beautiful” changes a negative evaluation of black heritage into a positive one. It does not, however, challenge the existing social relationships between groups (Brewer and Brown 1998). This option is more likely to be used when group boundaries are relatively impermeable (Jackson et al. 1996).

3. *social change* - Individuals may engage in collective action meant to change the group’s status in society. This strategy appears most common where the potential for social mobility is limited (Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam 1990) and on the part of those who perceive “fraternal deprivation” (relative group deprivation). Individual deprivation is associated with individual psychological reactions, such as depression, but group-based deprivation is often correlated with support for nationalist movements and a desire for social change and militancy (Brewer and Brown 1998).

These three strategies are not mutually exclusive, especially over the course of a lifetime. People will not always be completely consistent in their

choice of strategy over time, but it can be expected that an individual will develop a dominant strategy.

These strategies are widely applicable to different places and times. Not only can we see these strategies at work among ethnic minorities worldwide, but we can also see them at work historically. For example, western colonization produced a similar trichotomy of strategies among colonized peoples: liberal assimilation and adoption of western values (social mobility), rejectionism and an affirmation of pre-colonial society (social creativity), and nationalist mobilization meant to drive out the colonists (social change).

In Israel, the opportunity for Israeli Palestinian social mobility is not widespread. It is an option only for a few educated Israeli Palestinians who are willing to abide by the “rules of the game.” An Israeli Palestinian who speaks Hebrew with little or no accent, dresses and lives like a Jewish Israeli, and refrains from openly criticizing the Israeli political system and society can achieve some social mobility. But even then a glass ceiling will prevent him or her from attaining many high level occupations and political positions. This opportunity, modest though it is, makes the social creativity and social change options less attractive to some Israeli Palestinians, since engaging in these strategies makes integration into the dominant society more difficult (Taylor et al. 1987; Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam 1990).

## **CORE HYPOTHESES**

Those identifying themselves using labels accepted or encouraged in the dominant Jewish society – such as “Israeli,” “Israeli Arab,” or “Arab” – are employing the social mobility strategy and are therefore less likely to engage in system-challenging behaviors. This sort of identification label indicates a strong desire to integrate into Israeli society at some level, and they are not likely to jeopardize their prospects for upward mobility through disfavored actions.

Since the “Israeli” and “Israeli Arab” identifiers have cast their fate with that of the core nation, they are not likely to act against the state that enables favorable group comparisons and a positive social identity. They will be less likely to criticize the state and its ethnic institutions, and the criticisms that do emerge from this group will be relatively unthreatening to the state and core group. Thus they will be less likely to engage in confrontational behavior that challenges the ethnic system.

Those who identify with a Palestinian component to their identity – “Israeli Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian Arab – appear to be following the social creativity strategy to some extent or another. Expressing Palestinian identity voices a challenge to the status quo and society’s negative evaluation of Israeli Palestinians. Like saying “Black is beautiful,” proclaiming Palestinian identity constitutes a powerful rejection of the negative social status associated with the group and of the societal norms that produced it. In effect,

Palestinian identifiers are attempting to redefine the core nation to include themselves.

The Palestinian identifiers may also follow the social change strategy. Expressing a counter-establishment identity is not mutually exclusive from collective change. In fact, the two may go together. It was the civil rights activists of the 1960s who popularized the slogan “Black is beautiful,” suggesting that social creativity may accompany collective action.

Therefore, Palestinian identifiers can be expected to engage in collective action, particularly system-challenging behaviors, at a much higher rate than the “Israeli” identifiers. To some extent, merely expressing Palestinian identity can be seen as a system-challenging behavior, as it challenges powerful societal norms. Furthermore, social movement activity may in fact reinforce group pride – as evidenced in expressions of Palestinian identity. Thus both social creativity and social change strategies are likely to be associated with system-challenging behavior.

Among Palestinian identifiers, the state acts as a mechanism to perpetuate a negative social identity. Targeting the source of these negative group comparisons through political action may help limit some of the psychological incongruence inherent in negative social identity. Palestinian identifiers are more likely to express greater criticisms of the state and its ethnic institutions, and they may place greater emphasis on these criticisms when evaluating their choices for action. Thus their criticisms of the state can become a catalyst for forms of action that target the state and its institutions for change.

Thus the main hypotheses are:

- Having an Israeli or Israeli-leaning identity may be associated with lower system-challenging behavior, and the converse,
- Having a Palestinian or Palestinian-leaning identity may be associated with greater system-challenging behavior.
- Higher grievance leads to higher SCB.
- Israeli or Israeli-leaning identities may reduce the effect of grievance on SCB (conditional, or interaction effect)
- Grievance and Palestinian identity have a relationship of reciprocal causation.

These constitute the primary hypotheses that I test in this project; related ideas and hypotheses will also be examined as needed throughout the work. The next chapter will outline a model of system-challenging behavior that will test these hypotheses.



## **Chapter 4: A Simultaneous Equation Model of System-Challenging Political Behavior**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Political action is embedded in a social and psychological context. Individuals act but they rarely do so in isolation. The reality and perceptions of the social and political environment can therefore play an important role in shaping political participation. Perceptions of inequity, in particular, may be a strong precipitator of political action. Furthermore, individuals act based on a perception of self and others that reflects their highest aspirations. Thus self-identification also has the potential to impact their political behavior.

Personal identity, as an important individual characteristic that both acts and is acted upon by other factors, needs also to be included in a system-challenging behavior model. Not all members of a group, ethnic or other, feel the same kind and degree of identity. Identity, then, is a variable within groups, not a constant, and it can have important ramifications for system-challenging political action.

The model developed in this research is based upon this complex relationship between identity, grievance, and political action. As an individual-level model, it uses survey research to explain individual variation in extent of

political action as a function of two key variables, identity and grievance, and a number of other variables. In the ethnically-charged Israeli environment, it is worth noting that significant variation is found on these three key variables. Since the relationship between these key variables is likely to involve multi-directional causation, a simultaneous equation model is in order.

## **THEORY**

### **Key Variables**

#### ***System-Challenging Behavior (SCB)***

My core dependent variable is System Challenging Behavior. While I will also attempt to explain identity and grievances in this model, it my theoretical interest in SCB that motivates this study. SCB is uninstitutionalized political action that in some way challenges the established political order. Leonard Binder (1962) distinguishes SCB from “legitimizing processes” and “system-maintenance processes” that support the political order. Binder developed these concepts in the context of authoritarian developing countries, but they may also be applicable to mixed systems such as Israel, where significant democratic processes exist but are limited by what some would say are undemocratic practices toward the Israeli Palestinian sector.

System-challenging behavior aims to alter the political system or gain greater influence within it in untraditional ways that avoid directly legitimizing the established political order. Voting, for example, upholds the political order through participation in the system's institutions. Although voters may aim to alter the system or gain greater influence in it through the choice of alternative candidates, the act of voting directly acknowledges an acceptance of the institutions that maintain the political order. The direct political action of SCB bypasses the traditional voting path to influence, indicating either a lack of belief in the legitimacy of the institutions, or a lack of belief in the efficacy of traditional participation.

### ***Grievance***

Grievance refers to perceptions of injustice that provide motivation for complaint or resistance. This project focuses on ethnic grievances, in particular, perceptions of ethnic bias in the political system and society. Grievances are perceptions infused with ideas of right and wrong; inequities are not grievances until individuals perceive those inequities as unjust. In general, the more grievances in a population, the more protest and other SCB we are likely to observe (Gurr 1970). The perception of injustice offers a motivation for political action, often a very powerful one. Ethnic grievance is expected to be particularly powerful, because of ethnicity's ability to evoke powerful emotions (Horowitz 1985).

## ***Identity***

Identity is self-perception, one's real and ideal self-image. Identity is multi-layered, conditional, and situational. People have many kinds of identity, for example, political, ethnic, religious, occupational, etc. This project will focus only on one part of individual identity, the national-political dimension and its repercussions for political participation. In Israel's ethnically-charged environment, it is expected that this dimension would be the most relevant for political participation.

In general, people tend to act in ways consistent with their self-image (Turner et al. 1987). Although the development of this self-image is a complex and ongoing process, its impact on political participation may be considerable. Knowing how one identifies can be a key clue to future political participation. An anti-establishment identity, for example, may predispose individuals to challenge the status quo in unconventional ways.

In addition, identification with a particular entity, such as a firm (or a state), may hinder actions that are not in accordance with the goals of that entity, even where grievances exist (Tompkins and Cheney 1985). A pro-establishment or pro-state identity may not only suppress system-challenging action, but it may reduce the importance of grievances in the action – grievance relationship. Thus a conditional relationship between identity and grievance will be investigated.

An interaction term composed of the product of identity and grievance (described in detail below) will be included in the model to test for a conditional relationship. Two possibilities exist: intensification or substitution. In the case of

substitution, either identity or grievance is sufficient to provoke system-challenging behavior. One can substitute for the other. This is more likely for low-initiative activities, such as national action. In the case of intensification, both identity and grievance work together to facilitate SCB. This is more likely for high-initiative activities like protest action. If identification with the state works to reduce the effect of grievance on SCB, the relationship is likely to be one of intensification. If an identity low on the scale (Israeli) works to lower the impact of grievance, the two factors are working in synergy to lower SCB. Thus I expect to find a synergistic relationship between identity and grievance for SCB.

## **Other Variables**

### ***Demographics***

Education and income are expected to be positively associated with SCB. Although some protest literature argues that the lower income and less educated (the deprived) are more likely to protest and engage in other system-challenging activities (Gurr 1970), individual level analyses in many countries indicates that protest is a high-initiative activity that is facilitated by resources such as education and income (Jennings and van Deth 1990; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Since protest is a major component of SCB, I expect that SCB will be similar to protest in this regard.

Males are more likely to engage in confrontational activities than females, particularly in traditional societies, and being Muslim – seen in Israel as being

more radical than the Christians or Druze – would make one more likely to protest. In most countries, the younger are more likely to engage in system-challenging activities (Jennings and van Deth 1990), although there could be generational effects from high-impact events (Jennings 1987) such as the original Land Day in 1976. In general, however, the older Israeli Palestinian generations have tended to avoid system-challenging behavior. Thus I expect any generational effects to complement cohort effects.

### ***Political Engagement***

Being interested in politics and reading more newspapers is likely to increase one's probability of engaging in SCB, since one's interest or engagement with politics can act as incentive to take action in the political arena (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

### ***Mistrust***

A lack of trust in the government may predispose individuals to undertake behavior that challenges the status quo and the government that upholds it.

### ***Partisan Engagement (PID, Party Membership)***

In the Israeli proportional representation electoral system, interest groups are weak, while political parties carry out much of the political mobilization that goes on. Therefore party membership – irrespective of which party – may positively impact protest through its mobilization structures. For partisan affinity, however, feeling close to an Arab party is more likely to contribute to protest than Zionist

parties among the Palestinian Israeli population. As opposition parties, Arab parties frequently use extraparlimentary tactics in their political strategy. The greatest impact, however, may be the combination of party membership and Arab party affinity. Thus the interaction between the two factors will be investigated through the use of a product term in the model.

### ***Recruitment***

Being asked to protest can be expected to raise one's probability of actually engaging in protest (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

### **Reverse Causality**

System-challenging behavior may not only be the result of the above factors, it may in fact be the cause of some of them. Participating in SCB, for whatever reason, may activate previously latent or unknown grievances. It may also make anti-establishment identities seem more attractive. Just as voting for a political party may (in the long run) make individuals more likely to identify with that party in the future (Campbell et al. 1960), engaging in SCB may make individuals more likely to adopt an anti-establishment identity. Action, in other words, can change attitudes or identity. Thus we must investigate the possibility of reverse causality with a simultaneous equation model. The model will include three equations with three endogenous variables: SCB, identity, and grievance.

The above discussion has outlined the effects on SCB; next we will turn to the effects of SCB and other variables on identity and grievance, in turn.

### *Identity*

Identity is not a fixed phenomenon; it can be altered, depending on the circumstances. The identities found among Israeli Palestinians in Israel are ethno-political identities; that is, they are not purely ethnic or purely political. To call oneself “Israeli Arab” indicates a political position, as well as an ethnic identity. Similarly, to call oneself “Palestinian in Israel” suggests a different, more nationalist political position, but nevertheless indicates membership in the same ethnic group, however differently defined. Changing one’s choice of self-identification label suggests a change in political orientation; this change can be caused by many possible factors, including choices in behavior and changes in attitudes.

### *SCB*

Conceivably, participating in SCB may predispose individuals towards an anti-establishment identity, like the Palestinian identity in Israel. Acting to confront the political system is compatible with anti-establishment identities, and changing a pro-establishment identity to an anti-establishment one may help resolve cognitive dissonance.

### *Grievance*



Perceptions of systemic ethnic bias in Israel may facilitate Palestinian identification. The Palestinian identity is based upon a collective memory of dispossession at the hands of Zionists and Israelis; therefore, when one perceives Israeli discrimination against Israeli Palestinians, it is likely to play into this shared history, thus making Palestinian identification that much more attractive.

#### *Ethnic Distance*

When individuals feel distant from members of another ethnic group, they may be less likely to identify with that group or its institutions (like the state). Israeli identity should be associated with ethnic closeness, and Palestinian identity with ethnic distance.

#### *Cultural Dissimilarity*

Perceptions of cultural dissimilarity may predispose individuals to identify contrary to the distant culture. Since feelings of belonging to the culture are not present, people are not likely to identify with it.

#### *Demographics*

Since the younger tend to gravitate towards anti-establishment identities, age may be negatively associated with the Palestinian identity. It is often those in the higher education categories who lean towards these anti-establishment identities.

College students in particular have generally been at the forefront of contentious, anti-establishment politics. Since Muslims and Christians are thought of as more nationalist and anti-Israeli than Druze, it may be that they are more likely to also identify as Palestinian, rather than Israeli.

### *Political Engagement*

Some of the activities meant to foster Palestinian identity takes place in the media and political arena, those who are more politically engaged may be more exposed to these activities and therefore may be more likely to identify as Palestinian.

### *Grievance*

Perceptions of ethnic bias depend not only on the external environment, but also individual predispositions. Environmental changes are likely to be reflected in individual perceptions, though not specifically one-to-one. Grievance may be affected by several factors, including the following:

### *SCB*

Acting in a system-challenging manner may make individuals more aware of grievances. Since much of SCB is issue-oriented, often regarding issues of a

critical nature, SCB may have the effect of highlighting grievances and raising individual perceptions of ethnic discrimination.

### *Identity*

Having a Palestinian identity, which is by nature built upon a historical collective memory of discrimination, may accentuate perceptions of ethnic bias when encountered. Thus Palestinian identity may be associated with higher levels of grievance.

### *Personal Discrimination*

If someone has personally experienced discrimination as a result of belonging to a particular ethnic group, sociotropic group grievances are going to be more readily visible. Thus personal experiences with discrimination are likely to lead to greater grievances in the long run.

### *Demographics*

The young sometimes are more critical than their elders, according to their position at the forefront of anti-establishment politics. When this is true, age will be negatively associated with grievances. Education, if there is an effect, is likely to be positive, since the more educated are similarly more critical, though this effect is likely to be small. It is possible that the poor could have greater ethnic

grievances, since their economic status may be caused, in part at least, by ethnic bias. Muslims and Christians, who are less accommodating to the Israeli political system than Druze, may be more likely to perceive ethnic bias, since their political cultures are more likely to encourage criticism of Israel.

### *Engagement*

Ethnic grievances dominate the political scene among Israeli Palestinians. Being engaged in politics is thus likely to expose people to messages favorable to grievance issues. The more engaged a person is, the more likely he/she is to have higher grievances.

### *PID*

In Israel, parties are highly active at the grassroots level, and Arab parties in particular are likely to be involved in the mobilization of grievance. Arab parties benefit electorally by playing the ethnicity card; they can thus attract the large numbers of Israeli Palestinian voters who believe that working through traditional politics will help improve the situation of the Israeli Palestinian community. Thus identifying with Arab parties is likely to be associated with a higher level of grievances.


## *Mistrust*

If someone lacks trust in government, then he/she may be likely to perceive ethnic bias or discrimination, at least if the government is involved in perpetuating these grievances. Since much of the Israeli Palestinian population places blame on the government for discrimination (see Chapter 6), mistrust, then, may be associated with higher grievances.

## **MODEL**

Based on the above description, a model of System-Challenging Behavior should include the three key variables (depicted in bold type), SCB, identity, and grievance as endogenous variables, and a number of exogenous variables.

**Figure 1** System-Challenging Behavior Model



The triangular bloc of variables encompassing identity, grievance, and SCB indicates a mutually reinforcing relationship. Each may be a cause and an effect at the same time. Furthermore, it is possible that identity can affect the magnitude of the grievance – SCB relationship, as depicted by the arrow from identity to the grievance – SCB arrow. Since the relationship is symmetrical, grievance also has the potential to affect the magnitude of the identity – SCB relationship.

The model is embodied in a set of equations as follows (endogenous variables in italics):

$$1) \text{ } SCB = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Age} + \beta_2 \text{Educ} + \beta_3 \text{Income} + \beta_4 \text{Gender} + \beta_5 \text{Muslim} + \beta_6 \text{Christian} + \beta_7 \text{Engagement} + \beta_8 \text{Grievance} + \beta_9 \text{Identity} + \beta_{10} \text{Id*Att} + \beta_{11} \text{Recruitment} + \beta_{12} \text{PID} + \beta_{13} \text{Partymember} + \beta_{14} \text{PID*PMEM} + \beta_{15} \text{Mistrust} + \varepsilon$$

$$2) \text{ } Identity = \alpha + \beta_{16} \text{Age} + \beta_{17} \text{Educ} + \beta_{18} \text{Muslim} + \beta_{19} \text{Christian} + \beta_{20} \text{Engagement} + \beta_{21} \text{Grievance} + \beta_{22} \text{SCB} + \beta_{23} \text{EthnicDistance} + \beta_{24} \text{CulturalDissimilarity} + \varepsilon$$

$$3) \text{ } Grievance = \alpha + \beta_{25} \text{Age} + \beta_{26} \text{Educ} + \beta_{27} \text{Income} + \beta_{28} \text{Muslim} + \beta_{29} \text{Christian} + \beta_{30} \text{Engagement} + \beta_{31} \text{Identity} + \beta_{32} \text{SCB} + \beta_{33} \text{PID} + \beta_{34} \text{Pdiscrim} + \beta_{35} \text{Mistrust} + \varepsilon$$

## **Measurement**

### ***SCB***

In this project, I consider three main aspects of SCB: protest action, protest intent, and national action. Each of these groupings was analyzed separately as well as combined into a SCB index.

*Protest Action.* Since protest actions may be legal or illegal, I measure this variable as the mean of two binary variables distinguishing respondents who reported participating in legal protest “such as demonstrations and marches” or illegal protest “such as unlicensed demonstrations and violent marches” at least once in the previous five years. The variable thus takes the value of 0, .5, and 1.

*Protest Intent.* This too may refer to legal or illegal protest. Thus again I average two variables regarding the respondent’s estimate of the chance the he or she “will participate in the future in legal protest actions such as licensed demonstrations and marches” or “illegal protest actions such as unlicensed demonstrations and violent marches.” The five response categories were assigned equal interval scores (0, .25, .5, .75, 1) on a 0 to 1 scale. The resulting combined variable takes nine values between 0 and 1.

*National Action.* This variable measures the respondent’s participation in national action days such as Land Day and Nakba Day commemorations. As noted in chapter 2, these days act as a sort of national days of protest in which participants engage in rallies, protest marches, poetry readings, and consciousness-raising

workshops, for example. Respondents were asked how often they participated in Land Day events in general, and if they had participated in Nakba Day events in the current year. The four-point Land Day variable was projected onto a 0 to 1 scale, while Nakba Day participation was originally a binary variable. I average these two variables to produce a seven-point variable on a 0 to 1 scale taking the values of 0, .165, .33, .5, .665, .83 and 1.

I also consider SCB as a whole. To that end, I average the six component SCB variables, each on a 0 –1 scale (legal protest action, illegal protest action, legal protest intent, illegal protest intent, Land Day, Nakba Day). This produces a SCB variable with 63 points between 0 and 1.

The item SCB index coheres nicely. All load on a single factor in exploratory factor analysis, they are strongly and significantly correlated with one another, and scale reliability is within the acceptable range (Cronbach's Alpha = .7033). Substantively, the six variables do not include traditional institutionalized political behavior such as voting that maintains or legitimizes the political system. In fact, the six variables in some ways challenge the prevailing system. National action days such as Land Day and Nakba Day commemorate events that lie outside the Jewish Israeli consciousness and challenge the Jewish Israeli interpretation of history. They include rallies, demonstrations, marches, and consciousness-raising activities. Protest, particularly the illegal variety, expresses dissatisfaction with the status quo and a sense of urgency about the current state



of events. Protest intent expresses a lack of confidence that current grievances will be addressed through traditional participation. All involve some sort of challenge to the political system and express a desire for change.

### ***Grievance***

The grievance index averages items asking about ethnic discrimination: the degree to which the government considers “Arab citizen opinion in its decision making,” the degree to which “Arab citizens have influence on state affairs,” the degree of “discrimination against Arab citizens in Israel,” the size of the “gap in the achievements of Arab citizens and Jews,” and the degree of government responsibility for the ethnic gap. The items were scaled so that higher numbers reflect greater grievance. (Cronbach’s Alpha = .7250) For comparability purposes, the grievance index was projected to a 0 to 1 scale.

### ***Identity***

The identity variable consists of a single item asking “how would you identify yourself if you had to choose one of the following: Arab, Palestinian Arab, Israeli Arab, Israeli, Israeli Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian.” This question has been asked in several surveys since the 1980s with the same response categories to preserve comparability. None of the other studies have attempted to order the responses in a meaningful scale. As I will show in the following chapters, a meaningful order can be established based on empirical and theoretical arguments. The seven-point identity variable uses this order: Israeli, Israeli Arab,

Arab, Israeli Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian Arab, Palestinian. Thus the lower numbers indicate a stronger Israeli identity and a weaker Palestinian identity, while the higher-valued responses indicate a stronger Palestinian identity. As with grievance and SCB, identity was projected onto a 0 to 1 scale to facilitate comparability.

***Identity\*Grievance (product term)***

The product of identity and grievance is included to test for a conditional relationship between them. The two parts of the variable are constructed as above, then multiplied to make the product term.

***Exogenous Variables***

In addition to the three key (endogenous) variables and the endogenous product term, a number of exogenous variables are expected to directly or indirectly impact behavior. These exogenous variables include demographics, various attitudes, and political involvement measures.

*Demographics.* The demographic variables in the model include age (actual age coded), income (five categories), education (nine categories), gender (dummy variable, male coded 1), and religion (two dummy variables, Muslim and Christian, omitted category = Druze).

*Attitudes.* In addition to the endogenous variable grievance, a number of exogenous attitudinal variables are included in the model:

*PID*: The party the respondent feels closest to, arrayed on a right (Zionist) to left (Palestinian nationalist) scale: Zionist right, Zionist left, Communist, United Arab List, Balad/Tajamu.

*Mistrust*: the extent to which the respondent “has trust in government.”

*Personal Discrimination*: the degree to which the respondent “personally been hurt by discrimination against Arabs.”

*Cultural Dissimilarity*: the inverse (due to coding) of the degree to which the respondent believes that the “cultures of Arabs and Jews in Israel [are] similar to each other.”

*Ethnic Distance*: the inverse (due to coding) of the degree to which the respondent feels “close toward the Jews in Israel.”

*Political Involvement*. These variables capture the extent of the respondent’s psychological or actual involvement in politics.

*Political Engagement*: a summary variable consisting of political interest and newspaper consumption. Each five-point variable was projected onto a 0 to 1 scale and added to create the engagement variable that ranges from 0 to 2.

*Party Membership*: A binary variable coded 1 if the respondent reports being a member of a political party, 0 if not.

*Recruitment*: A binary variable coded 1 if the respondent reports having been asked personally “to participate in a protest action such as a demonstration, a march, or a petition” in the previous five years.

*Party Membership \* PID (product term)*: This is the product of the binary party membership and the interval partisan identification variable, as described above. This product term tests for the possibility that partisan identity could intensify the effect of party membership, and vice versa.

With the exception of age, all variables so coded are expected to have a positive impact on SCB, identity and/or grievance.

### **Identification**

Both identification and estimation are complicated by the nonadditivities (product term) in two of the endogenous variables (identity and grievance) in the SCB equation. This makes the application of the necessary and sufficient “rank condition” prohibitively difficult, but the model does at last meet the necessary “order condition.” We may note, moreover, that nonadditivities of this sort generally make identification easier to achieve and that such models meeting the order condition also likely meet the rank condition, making it likely that my model satisfies the rank condition as well (Wooldridge 2001).

### **ESTIMATION**

Regarding estimation, the nonadditivities noted require the use of an appropriate estimator whose first stage regresses four endogenous variables, SCB, identity, grievance, and the product of the latter two, on the exogenous variables, their squares, and their pairwise crossproducts (Greene 2000). This estimation is

nonlinear two-stage least squares (N2SLS), as first offered by Kelejian (1971) and generalized by Amemiya (1974).

The standard errors for the SCB equation with nonlinearities obtained by this estimation are not corrected for the nonlinearity, so I cannot make strong claims about the statistical significance of a variable for this equation. Nevertheless, the direction and magnitude of effect should be illustrative of the relationships tested in the model. The results of the model will be discussed in greater detail, equation by equation, in the following chapters.

## **Chapter 5: System-Challenging Behavior in Israel**

### **INTRODUCTION**

It is generally assumed that the more aggrieved an individual is, the likelier is system-challenging behavior (Gurr 1970). But other factors also facilitate protest. One is personal identity, which may also act as to condition factor the grievance – behavior relationship. An identity with the relevant outgroup may heighten grievance's effect, and an identity with the ingroup diminish it. Of particular interest are cultural or ethnic-based identities, which may be particularly salient in ethnically conscious countries like Israel.

Ethnic identity can be an important driving force behind system-challenging mobilization and protest. A salient ethnic identity makes it likelier that a person will define his or her interests in ethnic terms and be easier to mobilize by ethnic entrepreneurs (Gurr 2000). Furthermore, group disadvantages provide an important motivation for targeting the political system through protest action.

Minorities may find identifying with the state and its affiliated ethnic group useful since it may facilitate access to state privileges and a level of social and economic mobility unavailable to others (Brewer and Brown 1998). This may make them less likely to challenge the prevailing order through confrontational

action. Thus those who identify with the state may exhibit less system-challenging behavior, irrespective of the extent of grievances they hold.

This chapter investigates system-challenging political behaviors by Israeli Palestinians and the role that grievances and identity play in promoting it. I contend that identity conditions the grievance – behavior relationship by reducing grievance’s effect for those who identify with the state. From the Israeli state’s perspective, then, cultivating state identification is important for promoting ethnic stability.

#### **SYSTEM-CHALLENGING ACTION IN ISRAEL**

Protest – which comprises a major part of what I am defining as “system-challenging behavior” – is relatively high in Israel among both Arabs and Jews, compared to many western democracies. Wolfsfeld’s 1985 survey found that 16 percent of all Israelis had participated in demonstrations, which he argued is second only to Italians among western democratic citizenries (Wolfsfeld 1988). Sam Lehman-Wilzig similarly finds a high rate of Israeli protest: in the early 1980s, almost 22 percent of Israelis reported having participated in a protest event at least once (Lehman-Wilzig 1991). In my own 2001 survey, 23 percent of Jewish respondents and 31 percent of Arab respondents reported engaging in legal protest activities in the previous five years.

**Table 1    System-challenging Behavior in Israel**

	<b>Israeli Palestinians</b>	<b>Jewish Israelis</b>
<b>Legal Protest Intent</b> (great or considerable chances)	29%	13%
<b>Illegal Protest Intent</b> (great or considerable chances)	6	1
<b>Legal Protest Action</b> (yes/no)	31	23
<b>Illegal Protest Action</b> (yes/no)	6	2
<b>Land Day</b> (every few years or every year)	25	_____
<b>Nakba Day</b> (yes/no)	16	_____

Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians, and Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and Ethnic Attitudes: A Survey of Adult Israeli Jews.

A number of factors could account for the relatively high rate of protest in Israel. The most prominent include include a high level of political interest, antipathy toward political parties, and distrust of authority. Observers of Israel generally agree that Israelis are very politically engaged. Political interest and rates of newspaper consumption are high (Arian 1998; Lehman-Wilzig 1990; Wolfsfeld 1988). Yet a 1983 survey revealed that 56 percent of Israelis had no trust or almost no trust in political parties (Lehman-Wilzig 1990). The volatile combination makes it likely that Israelis will not trust political authorities to



implement policies in the public interest and makes the most likely response apathy, rather than action.

To make matters worse, Israeli political institutions are seen as unresponsive to public demands. The strong party system insulates policymakers from the public, which results in citizen frustration. A situation of “blocked political communication” exists in Israel, according to Lehman – Wilzig (1990), who argues that public input is blocked from reaching policy makers through institutional means.

In the case of Israeli Palestinians, the policy-making process is further insulated from public input. The perpetual exclusion of Arab parties from governing coalitions means that many of the concerns of Israeli Palestinians are largely unheard in the corridors of power. When coupled with the high level of grievances among Israeli Palestinians, the situation has the potential to be even more explosive than that of Jewish Israelis. The higher rate of protest among Israeli Palestinians is not completely unexpected.

Aside from protest, Israeli Palestinians participate in other forms of system-challenging participation. National action days, like Land Day and Nakba Day, are widely observed (as shown in Table X) for several reasons. They lack a sense of identification with Israel’s holidays, which are either religious in nature (Yom Kippur, Passover) or Zionist (Memorial Day, Independence Day). Israeli Palestinians feel the need for their own alternative “holidays” which act as

national days of mourning, commemorations of important events, and ritualized outlets for expressing communal grievances. Thus national action days provide annual opportunities for ethnic protest.

### **SYSTEM-CHALLENGING BEHAVIOR: WHO AND WHAT?**

Breaking SCB down into its component parts illuminates the interconnected nature of these kinds of actions. Included in SCB is protest intent, protest action, and national action (Land Day and Nakba Day activities). In general, less than half of the Israeli Palestinian population engaged in SCB, given its high-initiative nature, although rates of participation may still be higher than may be expected for these relatively “difficult” forms of participation.

**Table 2      Protest Action: Legal vs. Illegal    (frequencies)**

	<b>Illegal Protest (no)</b>	<b>Illegal Protest (yes)</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Legal Protest (no)</b>	<b>768</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>772</b>
<b>Legal Protest (yes)</b>	<b>282</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>340</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1050</b>	<b>62</b>	

Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians

The different kinds of participation are mutually reinforcing: those who participate in one kind of behavior are more likely to also have participated in others. In the case of protest action, only a small minority had engaged in either legal or, especially, illegal protest. A similar pattern obtains for legal and illegal protest intent. Most respondents indicated they were unlikely to engage in legal protest, still more so in illegal protest.

**Table 3      Protest Intent: Legal vs. Illegal (frequencies)**

<b>Legal Protest Intent</b>	<b>Illegal Protest intent</b>					<b>Total</b>
	No Chance	Few Chances	Moderate chances	Considerable Chances	Great Chances	
No Chance	389	6	1	2	2	400
Few Chances	199	62	8	5	1	275
Moderate Chances	96	40	28	5	1	170
Considerable Chances	91	43	15	16	4	169
Great Chances	59	43	27	24	15	168
<b>Total</b>	<b>834</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>1182</b>

Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

The two components of National Action, Land Day and Nakba Day, appear to go hand in hand for most Israeli Palestinians. People who participate in one are likely to participate in the other. For example, of the 192 respondents who reported participating in Nakba Day activities in the current (2001) year, 141 of them also say they participate in Land Day activities “every year” or “every few years,” a rate of 73 percent compared to only 25 percent in the Israeli Palestinian population as a whole.

**Table 4      National Action (frequencies)**


Nakba Day Participation				
Land Day Participation		yes	no	Total
	Never	648	21	669
	Seldom	186	30	216
	Every few years	81	66	147
	Every year	70	75	145
	Total	985	192	1177

Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

The different components of System-Challenging Behavior also seem to work together. For example, protesters are overrepresented among national action participators. Eighty percent of the respondents in the highest two categories on the national action scale reported engaging in protest action. In contrast, only 18

percent of respondents scoring on the lowest two categories of the national action scale and 32 percent of the general Israeli Palestinian population reported protest participation.

**Figure 2     Protest and National Action**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.


## **IDENTITY AND SYSTEM-CHALLENGING BEHAVIOR**

An important theme running throughout this dissertation is the differences among the identity groups, their significance, and their ordering. Chapter 6 will show that “Israeli” identifiers differ significantly from “Palestinian” identifiers in terms of the degree of discrimination they perceive in Israel. Chapter 7 shows that

they also differ in terms of political attitudes and voting participation. In this chapter, a similar relationship is discussed for system-challenging behavior. The more Palestinian (and less Israeli) the identity, the more system-challenging behavior is reported. A consistent order of identities is revealed, upon which the identity measure is based.

For example, the mean of the SCB variable increases as identity becomes more Palestinian. The more Palestinian (and less Israeli) the identity, the more system-challenging behavior the group conducts. The mean of the “Israeli” identifiers is almost .5, but the “Palestinian” identifiers’ mean is 2.14, on a 0 to 6 scale.


**Figure 3 Identity and System-Challenging Behavior**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

The same relationship holds for each of the component parts of system-challenging behavior. For protest action, protest intent, and national action, the greater the degree of Palestinian identity, the greater incidence of system-challenging behavior. Though the increase is not always strictly monotonic, the generally increasing pattern is nonetheless readily apparent. For Israeli identifiers, the mean protest action is 0.13 on a scale of 0 to 1, but for Palestinian identifiers, the mean is 0.30.


**Figure 4 Identity and Protest Action**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

For protest intent, the mean increases from 2.77 to 4.83 on a scale of 2 to 10 as identity goes from Israeli to Palestinian. National action likewise increases, from .04 to .37 on a scale of 0 to 1. Like protest action and the SCB index, these measures show a relatively consistent increase as the identity becomes more Palestinian.


**Figure 5 Identity and Protest Intent**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.



**Figure 6 Identity and National Action**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

In short, as identity becomes more Palestinian, system-challenging action increases. The order of the identities is remarkably consistent both here and in chapters 6 and 7, where various attitudes and actions are similarly considered. Based on this and similar findings in the following chapters, the identity measure can be constructed to reflect the order revealed: Israeli, Israeli Arab, Arab, Israeli Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian Arab, Palestinian.

These results aptly describe the phenomenon of the “Arab rights” movement in Israel. Much protest activity among Israeli Palestinians aims towards securing their rights in a hostile environment. Those who identifying wholly or partly as Palestinians, can be expected to engage in collective action at

a higher rate, since they appear to be rejecting social mobility strategies and are freer to challenge the dominant Zionist ideology that perpetuates their oppression.

## ANALYSIS

The bivariate relationships depicted above are indicative of who is engaging in SCB in the Palestinian Israeli community. Those who are doing so are concentrated among those with more Palestinian identity.


Estimating the model outlined in chapter 4 will shed light on the relationships among identity, grievance, and SCB, and on why some Israeli Palestinians but not others engage in SCB. This chapter focuses on the first equation of the three-equation system, that for SCB. The equation is reproduced below (endogenous variables in italics).

$$\text{SCB} = \alpha + \beta_1\text{Age} + \beta_2\text{Educ} + \beta_3\text{Income} + \beta_4\text{Gender} + \beta_5\text{Muslim} + \beta_6\text{Christian} + \beta_7\text{Engagement} + \beta_8\text{Grievance} + \beta_9\text{Identity} + \beta_{10}\text{Id*Att} + \beta_{11}\text{Recruitment} + \beta_{12}\text{PID} + \beta_{13}\text{Partymember} + \beta_{14}\text{PID*PMEM} + \beta_{15}\text{Mistrust} + \varepsilon$$

The estimation of the above equation illuminates the direct effects on SCB as well as the mediated relationship between identity and grievance, captured in the equation's product term. My expectations about the signs of the coefficients, set out in chapter 4, are that all will have a positive effect on SCB, with the

exception of age. The diagram below illustrates the expected relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable of this equation. (Product terms not shown.)

**Figure 7     Multivariate Analysis: Determinants of SCB**



## RESULTS

The N2SLS estimates are reported in Table 5. The table includes a “first differences” column in order to indicate the magnitudes of the effects. More precisely, the first differences are the change in the expected value of SCB from varying a single explanatory variable from its minimum to its maximum, holding all the other explanatory variables constant:

$$[E(y) | x_k = \max] - [E(y) | x_k = \min]$$

For gender, this would be:

$$[E(\text{SCB}) | \text{gender} = 1] - [E(\text{SCB}) | \text{gender} = 0]$$

According to the results, being male as opposed to female increases one's expected SCB by seven percent (.07 on the 0 to 1 SCB scale). Being a party member, then, increases the expected value by 15 percent, while being asked to protest increases the expected value of SCB by 14 percent, and being engaged in politics, 20 percent.

The first difference for identity is:  $[\beta_9 + \beta_{10} * \text{Grievance}_{\text{mean}}][\text{Identity}_{\text{max}} - \text{Identity}_{\text{min}}]$ . Using this formula gives a first difference of .122, a moderately large effect. For grievance, the first difference is :  $[\beta_8 + \beta_{10} * \text{Identity}_{\text{mean}}][\text{Grievance}_{\text{max}} - \text{Grievance}_{\text{min}}]$ , which reveals a first difference of .480, the largest effect on SCB.

**Table 5      N2SLS: Determinants of System-Challenging Behavior**

	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>First Difference</b>
Constant	-0.021	
Age	0.001	.061
Education	0.002	.014
Income	-0.011	-.044
Gender (male)	0.071	.071
Muslim	0.042	.042
Christian	0.029	.029
Political Engagement	0.086	.196
Grievance	0.062	.480
Identity	0.001	.122
Griev*Identity	0.004	---
Recruitment	0.143	.143
PID	-0.006	-.011
Party Member	0.042	.154
PartyMem*PID	0.029	---
Mistrust	-0.018	-.072

“R squared” = .364

Range SCB: 0 to 1

Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

These results show grievance as having the strongest direct effect on system-challenging behavior. Increasing grievance from its minimum to its maximum increases SCB 48 percent of the way from its minimum to its maximum. The literature on protest and grievance is correct to stress the importance of individual dissatisfaction with the status quo for political action, but these results also indicate that other variables have relatively strong effects. Political engagement, party membership, recruitment, and identity show first differences of .196, .154, .143, and .122 respectively.

Analyzing the parts of SCB reveal similar results. In all cases, grievance has the largest effect. After grievance, other factors with strong effects are, as with the index SCB, political engagement, party membership, recruitment, and identity. Party membership has the strongest effect for national action (.204), which probably reflects the role of political parties in organizing Land Day and Nakba Day events. Party membership has the weakest effect for protest intent (.099), as is also the case for recruitment. The mobilizing role of parties and individual recruitment could be expected to be weak for protest intent, which involves less action than other components of SCB. Organizing action, rather than action-oriented attitudes, is the specialty of mobilizing structures.

Interestingly, identity has the weakest effect for national action (.11), and indeed has almost no effect for Land Day (.003), a part of national action. This is a relatively surprising result given the association of these events with Palestinian solidarity. It could be that mobilizing efforts are more effective with Israeli and Israeli Arab identifiers than with Palestinian identifiers, who are likely to attend regardless of mobilizing efforts. Identity has the strongest effect on protest intent (.199), and a moderate effect (.133) on protest action.

**Table 6      Protest Action**

	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>First Difference</b>
Constant	-0.038	
Age	-0.001	-.075
Education	-0.001	-.006
Income	-0.001	-.004
Gender (male)	0.080	.080
Muslim	0.011	-.011
Christian	0.020	.019
Political Engagement	0.049	.170
Grievance	0.010	.466
Identity	0.056	.132
Griev*Identity	0.017	---
Recruitment	0.172	.172
PID	-0.006	-.029
Party Member	0.154	.152
PartyMem*PID	0.001	---
Mistrust	-0.005	-.019

"R squared" = .240      DV Range 0 to 1      Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

**Table 7      Protest Intent**

	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>First Difference</b>
Constant	-0.206	
Age	-0.001	-.082
Education	0.006	.045
Income	-0.003	-.013
Gender (male)	0.052	.052
Muslim	0.040	.040
Christian	0.002	.002
Political Engagement	0.106	.222
Grievance	0.052	.375
Identity	0.018	.199
Griev*Identity	0.003	---
Recruitment	0.122	.122
PID	-0.005	-.003
Party Member	-0.024	-.099
PartyMem*PID	0.032	---
Mistrust	-0.018	-.074

"R squared" = .313      DV Range 0 to 1      Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

**Table 8      National Action**

	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>First Difference</b>
Constant	-0.263	
Age	-0.001	.041
Education	-0.001	-.006
Income	-0.025	-.100
Gender (male)	0.082	.082
Muslim	0.083	.083
Christian	0.065	.065
Political Engagement	0.090	.179
Grievance	0.073	.446
Identity	0.013	.110
Griev*Identity	0.001	---
Recruitment	0.166	.166
PID	-0.001	-.027
Party Member	0.015	.204
PartyMem*PID	0.053	---
Mistrust	-0.027	-.109

"R squared" = .270      DV Range: 0 to 1      Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

**Table 9      Land Day**

	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>First Difference</b>
Constant	-0.426	
Age	0.000	.001
Education	0.010	.077
Income	-0.033	-.134
Gender (male)	0.086	.086
Muslim	0.145	.145
Christian	0.106	.106
Political Engagement	0.090	.133
Grievance	0.105	.432
Identity	0.033	.003
Griev*Identity	-0.007	---
Recruitment	0.151	.151
PID	-0.001	-.029
Party Member	0.033	.234
PartyMem*PID	0.052	---
Mistrust	-0.018	-.072

"R squared" = .232      DV Range 0 to 1      Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.



Further analysis indicates that the relationship between grievance and SCB is conditioned by the kind of identity one holds. When holding identity constant at “Israeli,” the SCB first difference for grievance is considerably less (.398) than when identity is held at the other end of the scale, at “Palestinian” (.557). Grievances matter less to Israeli identifiers than Palestinian identifiers when it comes to system-challenging behavior. Breaking down the SCB variable into its component parts once again shows how this relationship changes for different kinds of behavior. For protest action, for example, the contrast between Israeli and Palestinian identifiers is the largest, with the first difference for Israeli identifiers at .16 and for Palestinian identifiers at .75. The contrast is quite small, on the other hand, for national action (.42 for Israeli identifiers and .46 for Palestinian identifiers).

**Table 10     First Differences: Grievance**

Dependent Variable	Israeli	Palestinian
SCB	.398	.557
Protest Action	.159	.752
Protest Intent	.316	.430
National Action	.426	.464
Land Day	.561	.313

Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

Since the conditional relationship between identity and grievance is symmetrical, we can discern a similar pattern for the first difference of identity at different levels of grievance. For SCB, having a Palestinian identity is not an important factor for individuals with low levels of grievance. It is more important, however, for those with high levels of grievance. This relationship indicates a synergy between the two: low grievances and low Palestinian identity are found hand in hand, while high grievances and high Palestinian identity work together to increase system-challenging behavior at a much higher rate. With the exception of Land Day, an intensification effect takes place between identity and grievance.

**Table 11 First Differences: Identity**

Dependent Variable	Low Grievance	High Grievance
SCB	.003	.162
Protest Action	-.311	.282
Protest Intent	.114	.227
National Action	.081	.119
Land Day	.189	-.059

Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

The meaning of grievance's differential impact for Israeli and Palestinian identifiers is most apparent for protest action: identification with the state (as "Israeli") may attenuate the effect of grievance on protest. If individuals identify

with the state, they are less likely to protest even if they hold significant grievances. Thus cultivating identification with the state among minorities can be an important tool in the struggle to maintain ethnic stability.

However, the gap between Israeli and Palestinian identifiers is narrower for other kinds of system-challenging behavior. This fact reflects the differences in the kind of behavior. Protest action, for example, probably requires the highest level of initiative. It is relatively confrontational and requires time and effort to inform oneself about upcoming protest activities as well as to attend. It may therefore require both a high level of grievances and a strong anti-establishment identity (“Palestinian”).

National action, on the other hand, is relatively nonconfrontational (most of the time), involves only minor information costs since Land Day and Nakba Day are well-known annual occurrences. It may therefore only require moderate levels of grievances and anti-establishment identity. Interestingly, for Land Day alone, the interaction between identity and grievance is reversed: grievances matter more for Israeli identifiers than for Palestinian identifiers. In this case, only one or the other may be required; it may be sufficient to have only relatively high grievances or a relatively anti-establishment identity for participation in this annual commemoration.

## **DISCUSSION**

The estimates of the direct effects on SCB emphasize the importance of both grievance and identity. Although grievance has a strong direct effect on political action, this impact may be tempered by Israeli or Israeli-leaning identities. More generally, states may be able to promote stability by cultivating identification with the state. This finding is consistent with those in the study of organizational behavior, to the effect that employees tend to act in keeping with the firm's objectives if they have acquired the firm's organizational identity (Tompkins and Cheney 1985). The state, therefore, can choose to either reduce ethnic grievances or increase state identification (or both) in an effort to improve ethnic relations. The next two chapters will investigate the determinants of grievance and identification and their implications for system-challenging behavior.

## **Chapter 6: Ethnic Grievance in the Israeli Palestinian Context**

Grievance refers to the feelings of injustice found among individuals who believe they have been wronged. According to Webster's dictionary, grievance is an act that inflicts undeserved hurt, a cause of distress that affords reason for complaint or resistance. As measured in my survey, grievance indicates perceptions of ethnic discrimination, group powerlessness, and an ethnic bias in the political system. Among Israeli Palestinians, feelings of grievance are salient and dominate the political environment.

The protest literature suggests that grievances are an important determinant of protest behavior (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Gurr 1970; Jennings and van Deth 1990). The analysis of the previous chapter similarly indicates that system-challenging behavior – of which protest is a major component – is in part driven by ethnic grievances. Grievances provide major motivation for political action: in the cost-benefit calculus of political action, one important “payoff” from the cost of participation is the redress of grievances. Thus, for those who are primarily motivated in political action by tangible outcomes (Downs 1957; Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991; Riker and Ordeshook), the force of grievances can play an important role in provoking system-challenging political action such as protest. For others, whose motivation for action may be less tangible, such as the expression of identity or opinion, grievances may still play an important role, though its impact may be indirect, for example, through the formation of protest-prone anti-establishment identities.

Ethnic grievances may be a particularly potent form of grievances, since (as discussed in Chapter 2) ethnic identities tend to provoke intense emotions. As the resource-distribution role of the modern state has grown, it has inevitably created ethnic differentials. When ethnic identity is salient, these differentials are highly visible, which is likely to generate significant ethnic grievances. Ethnic political action is the probable result.

### **ETHNIC GRIEVANCE IN ISRAEL**

Among Israeli Palestinians, there are three main sets of grievances: economic, political, and symbolic. The economic grievances focus on the low socioeconomic status of Israeli Palestinians. Several factors combine to drive down the SES of Israeli Palestinians. First of all, Israeli Palestinians do not usually serve in the army and are therefore not given the extensive veterans benefits given to most Jewish Israelis. Because of the security situation, it is difficult for Israeli Palestinians to obtain high-level security clearances, making employment in the large military-security complex – where much of the skilled engineering labor is employed – extremely rare. Government subsidies and investment in local projects are generally distributed unevenly, with Israeli Palestinian localities usually getting short shrift. As a result, Israeli Palestinians occupy the lowest rungs on the socioeconomic ladder.

The political grievances revolve around the lack of Israeli Palestinian power in the political system. While some of the reasons for the lack of influence are internal, such as Arab party fragmentation and infighting among leaders,


Israeli Palestinian grievances focus on the external causes of their disempowerment. Zionist ideology generally is suspicious of non-Jewish political power and anti-Zionist ideologies, so both formal and informal procedures work to reduce Israeli Palestinian political power below what would be expected based on their proportion of the electorate. An informal consensus works to exclude Arab parties from governing coalitions and to exclude Israeli Palestinians from other sensitive decision-making bodies (such as the Israeli Lands Authority), while formal legislation limits the expression of anti-Zionist ideas popular among Israeli Palestinians.

The importance of symbolic politics (Horowitz 1985) for ethnic relations is readily apparent in the Israeli political arena. For Jewish Israelis, whose collective memory includes centuries of oppression and attempts at extermination, the Jewish nature of the state provides a comforting symbol of security for the Jewish people. However, this same symbol is an important source of grievance for Israeli Palestinians due to its exclusionary nature. As the state of the Jewish people, according to the Israeli Declaration of Independence, and not of all its citizens, Israeli Palestinians feel a profound sense of exclusion. The state flag, holidays, and dominant language likewise leave Israeli Palestinians out. In short, Israeli Palestinians suffer from a feeling of not belonging to the collectivity that the state is meant to serve and represent. As a result, their identification with the state is low, as we will see in the following chapter.

## THE DISTRIBUTION OF GRIEVANCE

The extent of Israeli Palestinian grievance is apparent in the results of the survey. Israeli Palestinian responses were concentrated at the high grievance end of the scale for every question. For example, only 5 percent of the sample reported that the government considers Arab citizens' opinion in its decision-making "to a very large degree" or a "large degree," while nearly eighty percent thought that Arab opinion was considered "to a small degree" or "not at all."

**Figure 8 Perceptions of Government Responsiveness to Arabs**




Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

The distribution of opinions was reversed when Israeli Palestinian respondents were asked about the extent that Jewish citizens' opinions were considered in opinion-making. Ninety-one percent of respondents reported that



they believed the government considers Jewish citizens' opinions "to a very large degree" or "a large degree," while only three percent believed Jewish opinions were considered "to a small degree" or "not at all."

**Figure 9     Perceptions of Government Responsiveness to Jews**




Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

The differential between the two questions is illustrative of the Israeli Palestinian perception of disempowerment. Subtracting the second question from the first question for each respondent provides a measure of the respondent's perception of the ethnic power gap in Israel. Each question was a five-point scale, so the middle position (5) on the figure below represents parity, that is, no difference between

Arab and Jewish power. Responses above 5 represent a differential in favor of Jewish power, and below 5 represent a differential in favor of Arab power.

**Figure 10 Arab-Jewish Power Differential: Opinions in Decision-Making**




Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

Only 24 respondents (two percent) believe that Arabs opinions are considered more than Jewish opinions, while only 73 (six percent) reported parity. The rest (92 percent) perceived a differential in favor of Jewish opinion. This gap reveals the extent to which Israeli Palestinians feel left out of the decision-making process. Without government responsiveness to their opinions, Israeli Palestinians feel vulnerable to state abuse.

A similarly-constructed differential is shown below. When asked, Israeli Palestinians rated “Arab influence on state affairs” very low and Jewish influence very high. The difference between the two is shown in the figure below. The question responses were four-point scales, so the middle position (4) represents parity, above 4 indicates a differential in favor of Jewish citizens, and below 4 represents a differential in favor of Arab citizens. Once again, the distribution is heavily skewed toward the perception of Jewish power.

**Figure 11 Arab-Jewish Power Differential: Influence on State Affairs**




Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

Political power differentials are a very important form of grievance, because it is through political power that other grievances may be redressed. Without political power, hope for an improved situation remains low.


A general measure of perceptions of discrimination also reveals a skewed distribution. When asked how much discrimination against Arabs there is in Israel, the overwhelming majority (78 percent) responded that there is a “large degree” or “very large degree” of discrimination. When asked about their personal experience with discrimination, the distribution appeared more normal in shape but nevertheless reveals considerable experience with ethnic discrimination.

**Figure 12 Perceived Discrimination Against Arabs**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.


**Figure 13    Personal Experience with Discrimination**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.


Respondents also perceive a large economic gap between Arabs and Jews, and generally place the blame for the gap on the government. When asked about the extent of the Arab-Jewish gap, respondents generally perceived considerable Arab-Jewish difference, with over 81 percent perceiving a “large” or “very large” gap. Most of the respondents placed blame on the government for this gap: almost 60 percent chose the highest category. The two combined, large economic gap and high degree of state responsibility for the gap, could be seen as a sign of gross dissatisfaction with the status quo. It indicates a willingness to target the state with political action designed to improve the situation of Israeli Palestinians.

**Figure 14 Arab-Jewish Gap**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.


**Figure 15 Blame for Arab-Jewish Gap**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

The existence of high grievances and state blame for at least some of the grievances suggests lack of faith in the political system. Indeed, a growing sentiment blames the Jewish-Zionist nature of the state for discrimination. Advocates of this position argue that a Jewish-Zionist state, by definition, cannot treat non-Jews equally. The political, economic, and symbolic discrimination is part and parcel of the nature of the state. As a result, the state must lose its ethnic Jewish element, becoming the state of all its citizens, before it can be truly democratic and end ethnic discrimination. Survey responses indicate that this sentiment is indeed strong, though not unanimous.

**Figure 16 Israel can be a Democracy and Jewish-Zionist State**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

On these same items, a large difference between Jewish and Arab respondents can be seen. In general, Israeli Palestinians perceive much more ethnic discrimination than do Jewish Israelis. For example, only 40 percent of Jewish Israelis perceive a large or very large degree of discrimination against Arabs, while 80 percent of Israeli Palestinians do. This degree of perception gap is generally reproduced across the grievance and discrimination items.

**Table 12 Arab-Jewish Comparison: Grievance**

	<b>Jewish Israelis</b>	<b>Israeli Palestinians</b>
<b>Discrimination against Arabs</b> (large or very large degree)	40%	80%
<b>Gap between Arabs and Jews</b> (large or very large)	65	81
<b>Arab input into Israeli decision-making</b> (small or none)	47	80
<b>Government blame for Arab-Jewish gap</b> (large or very large degree)	59	87

Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians and Lowrance, S. 2001 Political Participation and Ethnic Attitudes: A Survey of Adult Israeli Jews.

## **GRIEVANCE AND IDENTITY**


The grievances described above are not randomly distributed throughout the Israeli Palestinian population. Identity, one of this study's key variables, is



highly correlated with grievance (.4088). The most anti-establishment identity, the Palestinian identity, is overrepresented among the highest grievance category across most variables. That is, the most aggrieved individuals tend to identify on the upper end of the identity scale, in whole or in part as Palestinian.


In the power differentials shown above, the highest category (9 in the case of Arab opinions and 7 in the case of influence on state affairs) in each case has a high percentage of Palestinian identifiers. Those who perceive the largest power gap between Arabs and Jews generally identify in a counter-establishment manner.

**Figure 17 Identity and Power Differential: Opinions in Decision-Making**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

**Figure 18 Identity and Power Differential: Influence on State Affairs**




Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

In both cases, the Israeli identities are found in the highest power differential category only at a very low rate, while the Palestinian identities are well represented in the high category. Only nine percent of Israeli identifiers but 45 percent of Palestinian identifiers perceived the largest possible Arab-Jewish gap in opinion considered in state decision-making, while seven percent of Israeli identifiers but 54 percent of Palestinian identifiers reported the largest Arab-Jewish influence gap.

Similarly, the Palestinian identifiers perceive greater discrimination, a larger Arab-Jewish gap and place greater blame for the gap on the state. This


suggests that those on the upper end of the identity scale, who identify in whole or in part as Palestinian, have the motive as well as the target - the state - for system-challenging political action.

**Figure 19 Identity and Perceived Discrimination**




Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

**Figure 20 Identity and Perceived Arab-Jewish Gap**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

**Figure 21 Identity and State Blame for Arab-Jewish Gap**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.


## **DETERMINANTS OF GRIEVANCE: A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS**

The above analysis shows that a bivariate link exists between identity and grievance. It is possible, however, that the correlation may be spurious, caused by a third variable correlated with both identity and grievance. The multivariate analysis conducted according to the model laid out in chapter 4 can reveal the determinants of grievance, taking into account the effect of other variables. In other words, what causes a person to feel aggrieved?

A number of factors are expected to significantly impact grievance, as discussed at length in chapter 4. Most important are the key variables of identity and system-challenging behavior. Given the bivariate relationship between identity and grievance, it may be expected to also hold on a multivariate level. Those who hold an anti-establishment identity may in fact perceive ethnic differentials more readily, since their Palestinian identity primes them to think in ethnic categories and frame issues in terms of justice and victimization. Also, engaging in system-challenging action may in fact encourage individuals to perceive greater injustice. In other words, actions may cause a change in attitudes, producing greater grievances as a result of engaging in SCB. Other variables, such as religion, partisan affinity, and personal experiences with discrimination, are likely to impact grievances as well, as previously described. In general, variables are coded with the expectation of a positive relationship with the dependent

variable, where expectations exist. Below, my expectations are noted in the figure. Only age is expected to have a negative effect.

**Figure 22    Multivariate Analysis: Determinants of Grievance**



$$Grievance = \alpha + \beta_{25}Age + \beta_{26}Educ + \beta_{27}Income + \beta_{28}Muslim + \beta_{29}Christian + \beta_{30}Engagement + \beta_{31}Identity + \beta_{32}SCB + \beta_{33}PID + \beta_{34}Pdiscrim + \beta_{35}Mistrust + \epsilon$$

The results of the analysis are as follows:

**Table 13 Determinants of Grievance**

	Coefficient	Std. Error	First Difference
Constant	.307	.025	
Age	.001*	.000	.041
Education	.011**	.003	.049
Income	-.007*	.003	-.028
Muslim	-.085**	.018	-.085
Christian	-.077**	.019	-.078
Engagement	-.018*	.009	-.036
<i>Identity</i>	.193**	.037	.193
<i>SCB</i>	-.016	.031	-.016
PID	.009**	.003	.043
Personal Discrimination	.062**	.003	.248
Mistrust	.041**	.004	.162

"R squared" = .5549      \*p ≤ .05; \*\*p ≤ .01      Scale of DV = 0 – 1  
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

The results of the above analysis generally confirm expectations. For the key variable of identity, a positive, statistically significant impact on grievance was found. The magnitude of effect, found in the first differences column, was the

second largest in the equation. Thus, having a Palestinian identity makes one more likely to hold significant grievances. For the other key variable, SCB, however, expectations were not confirmed; the relationship between grievance and SCB was not statistically significant. Therefore, one cannot conclude that engaging in system-challenging political action makes individuals more aware of potential grievances. In this case, the political action does not appear to change attitudes, despite the potential for such a possibility.

The variable with the strongest impact on grievances was the personal discrimination measure. Having more personal experience with discrimination makes an individual more likely to have high grievances. It is possible that the personal experience makes individuals more aware of more abstract grievances that affect the group as a whole.

Another factor impacting grievance is mistrust. Grievances, particularly ones that focus on the failings of the state, require a level of mistrust to be active. Simultaneously trusting the government and blaming it for problems may not be compatible positions. Other variables had small effects on the dependent variable, though sometimes in the opposite direction of prior expectations. For example, being more engaged in politics makes one *less* likely to have grievances. Similarly, Muslims and Christians are also less likely to be aggrieved, compared to the reference category of Druze. Despite the fact that Muslims and Christians are considered to be less accommodating to Jewish Israelis than the Druze, the



Druze are *more* likely to have grievances than Muslims and Christians, once other factors are taken into account, though the effect is small. Older, more educated individuals with lower incomes are more likely to have grievances as well, as are those who identify with Arab parties, though once again these effects, though statistically significant, are small.

## **DISCUSSION**

This chapter has shown the extent of grievances among Israeli Palestinians, and their distribution among the Israeli Palestinian population. Israeli Palestinians strongly feel discriminated against because they are non-Jewish Arabs, believe that the political system ignores them, and blame the government for the large Arab-Jewish gap they perceive. These grievances are more likely to be found among those who hold Palestinian identities, that is, on the upper end of the identity scale. On a multivariate level, this relationship between grievance and identity held up. Having a Palestinian identity makes one more likely to have more grievances. It was theorized that a counter-establishment ethno-political identity such as the Palestinian identity may make individuals more aware of ethnic differentials and place greater value on them, thus activating higher grievances.

The fact that identity has a strong impact on grievances has implications for system-challenging behavior. Since grievances have a strong direct effect on SCB, as discussed in the previous chapter, identity, then, has an indirect effect on SCB through grievances. This is in addition to the direct effect found in the previous chapter. The next chapter will turn to identity as a dependent variable, investigating its importance in Israeli Palestinian life, its distribution, and its determinants.

## **Chapter 7: Being Palestinian in Israel: Identity and the Context of Political Action**

Identity remains central to the conflict over historical Palestine. The congruence or divergence of personal identity and state identity often act as sources of conflict between peoples of differing national character. In Israel, the Jewish nature of the state – heavily contested among Israeli Palestinians but cherished among Jewish Israelis, creates dilemmas of identity among Israeli citizens who are not Jewish. This chapter explores the development and meaning of identity among Israeli Palestinians, with an empirical look at the different kinds of identities and the factors leading to them.

### **THE DISTRIBUTION AND NATURE OF PALESTINIAN IDENTITY**

Because of the competing trends both facilitating and retarding Palestinian identity outlined in chapter 2, not all Palestinians share the same degree of identification with the Palestinian people. There are a number of self-identification labels in use in Israel today, each with different meanings and political implications. Thus investigating distributions of identity at the individual level is essential for understanding its effect in the political arena.

The data on Palestinian Arab identity in Israel are sparse, particularly before the 1980s and mainly are based on small, convenience samples like students. Different researchers have asked different questions and used different


methods, making comparisons. Yet the scholarly consensus is that there has been a growing trend towards greater Palestinian identification and less Israeli identification, particularly since 1967 (Lustick 1980; Mi'ari 1987; Rouhana 1997; Smootha 1992).

For example, the earliest study of Palestinian Arab identity reported that before 1967, a sample of adolescents, young adults, and parents chose “Israeli” as the most accurate definition of themselves, given the choice between “Israeli,” “Arab,” “Palestinian,” and “Israeli Arab.” After 1967, however, interviews with a comparable sample revealed that “Arab” had moved to first place and “Israeli” to last (Peres and Yuval-Davis 1969). The first indications of a specifically Palestinian identity emerged in research carried out in 1974 and 1975. In this study, 47 percent of a sample of 348 adults in four Arab towns and three mixed Arab-Jewish cities indicated that the term “Israeli” described them a little or not at all, and only 14 percent thought that it was completely suitable, whereas 63 percent of the respondents said the term “Palestinian” described them very well and only 15 percent said it described them a little or not at all (Tessler 1977).

The first fully representative sample of Palestinian Arab citizens was carried out in 1976 by the sociologist Sammy Smootha, who followed up with further surveys in 1980, 1985 and 1988. These surveys have indicated a gradual decline in the reported suitability of the term “Israeli” (from 52 percent in 1976 to 46 percent in 1988) and an increase in the suitability of the term “Palestinian” (from 58 percent in 1976 to 68 percent in 1985) (Smootha 1992). My surveys, conducted in 2001, indicate a continuation of this trend, with 70 percent of Arab

respondents reporting that the term “Palestinian” is very appropriate or appropriate to them. When given a choice between seven self-identification categories, nearly 66 percent chose a label that included the term “Palestinian.”

**Figure 23 Self-Identification Among Israeli Palestinians**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

There are many possible reasons why Palestinian identity has been increasing in Israel. First of all, social change in the Palestinian population has involved a weakening of local identities such as the clan (*hamula*) as education and other indicators of social change have increased. Furthermore, the strength of

Arab nationalism, an anti-Zionist form of identification that somewhat competes with Palestinian identity, drastically decreased following the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war. After Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in the same war, Israeli Palestinians renewed contact with Palestinians in the territories, where a strong sense of Palestinian nationalism already existed and undoubtedly affected Israeli Palestinians' own sense of nationalism. Finally, the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987 increased Israeli Palestinian solidarity with their compatriots under fire across the Green Line, and also intensified the latter's Palestinian nationalism. Of course, some of the increase may be a reduction of systematic measurement error. As noted, then loosening of Israeli restrictions on Palestinian expression and political activity over the past three decades have allowed more open expression of Palestinian identity.

The meaning of Palestinian identification, however, remains unsettled and controversial. Smootha (1992), for example, identifies indications of simultaneous "Israelization" and "Palestinianization" occurring in Israel among Arabs. He points to growing trends of Palestinian recognition of Israel's right to exist, a desire to remain in Israel even if a Palestinian state is established, interaction with the Jewish population of Israel, and bilingualism and biculturalism as indicators of "Israelization." These trends have occurred concurrently with the shift in distribution of opinion towards Arab respondents identifying themselves as Palestinians in surveys.

Nadim Rouhana, on the other hand, argues that Smootha conflates Israeli identity with mere Palestinian accommodation of Israeli reality (1997). Rouhana

uses the results of his own survey to construct a persuasive social-psychological model of Palestinian identity in Israel. He distinguishes between national identification and civic identification. National identification governs the realm of ideology, allegiance and belonging, whereas civic identity defines individuals as legal citizens of a state and members of a political entity regardless of their national affiliation. According to Rouhana, Palestinians in Israel lack an integrated collective identity, one that successfully integrates various dimensions (socio-cultural, political, and formal-legal) with affective axes of attachment. Israeli identity dominates only the formal-legal dimension, and makes some impact on the socio-cultural dimension, but Palestinian identity dominates the political dimension and, most significantly, the affective axes. In other words, Israeli identity has not been internalized by Israeli Palestinians as a national identity; instead, it merely describes the civic and geographic affiliation of Palestinians in Israel.

Rouhana's findings indicate that most Israeli Palestinians have no sentimental attachment and a sense of belonging to Israel. They may formally interact with the Israeli system administratively, legally, economically, and politically, and they may be bilingual, familiar with Israeli culture and influenced by democratic values, but this does not mean that they identify with Israel as a nation. This affective attachment to a nation is reserved for the Palestinian people. Rouhana's interviews revealed that Israeli Palestinians express solidarity with Palestinians in the occupied territories and diaspora, agree with Palestinian goals such as statehood in the occupied territories, and respect national symbols. They

feel that they share Palestinian culture and society, a common history, heritage and social values. Pride and patriotism are expressed in relation to the Palestinian people, not for the Israeli state. Thus Rouhana concludes that Israeli Palestinians have not internalized Israeli identity or feel like part of an Israeli collective. Instead, they interact with the Israeli system and culture, but identify as Palestinians on the affective level.

Rouhana makes generalizations about the entire Israeli Palestinian population, although his own data indicate that the nature of identity is much more varied. In fact, the extent of identification with the state varies from person to person, as Figure X suggests. Therefore, individuals who hold different identities diverge significantly in terms of political attitudes and other precursors to ethnic political action.


In the previous chapter, the distribution of grievance among the different identity groups was outlined. Individuals on the high end of the identity scale, who identify as Palestinian in whole or in part, perceive greater discrimination, powerlessness, and Arab-Jewish economic gap. This chapter shows the distribution of partisan affinity, party vote, and vote boycotting among identity groups. Once again, Palestinian identity is associated with the nationalist position. In general, these identities are infused with political meaning as well as ethnic identity.

The political meaning of the identity groupings becomes clear upon examination of the distribution of partisan affinity. When asked which party respondents feel close to, only 14 percent of “Israeli” identifiers expressed affinity




for Arab parties over Zionist parties, while 95 percent of Palestinian identifiers (and 98 percent of Palestinian Arab identifiers) felt close to Arab parties. In a similar vein, the Balad/Tajamu' party, generally considered the most nationalist party, was favored by Palestinian identifiers at a much higher rate than Israeli identifiers.

**Figure 24 Identity and Partisan Affinity (Arab Parties)**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.


**Table 25    Identity and Partisan Affinity (Balad Party)**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

Vote boycotting is also associated with the Palestinian identity. The 2001 Prime Minister elections was widely boycotted among Israeli Palestinians due to their anger at the Barak administration's perceived culpability in the riots of the previous autumn that killed 13 Israeli Palestinians. Palestinian identifiers boycotted at a higher rate than Israeli identifiers, probably reflecting the nationalist sentiment underlying the propensity to boycott.


**Figure 26 Identity and Vote Boycott (2001)**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

When asked which party they would vote for if party elections were held today, respondents with a Palestinian identity favored Arab parties at a higher rate than Israeli identifiers. Arab parties are considered to be anti-Zionist (or non-Zionist at best, in the case of the Communist party), and as such, their appeal is to those who are more critical of the Jewish-Zionist nature of the state.


**Figure 27 Identity and Vote Intention**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

Regarding external politics, only 16 percent of Israeli identifiers (and 15 percent of Israeli Arab identifiers) opposed the Oslo Accords, but nearly 45 percent of Palestinian identifiers opposed the agreements. Most opposition to the Oslo Accords in the Arab world comes from the nationalist stream of politics, which argues that the Accords did not give the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza enough rights. In Israel, a similar phenomenon is found among Israeli Palestinians. Palestinian identifiers, the most nationalist among Israeli Palestinians opposed the Accords much more than Israeli identifiers and others on the lower end of the identity scale.

**Figure 28 Identity and Opposition to the Oslo Accords**



Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

The above figures have shown the consistency of political identification among Israeli Palestinians. The order of identities from least Palestinian to most is relatively consistent across different measures. Those who identify as “Israeli” or “Israeli Arab” (the favored term of the Israeli establishment), are reasonably accomododating to Israeli political priorities. They support the Oslo Accords, vote for (and identify with) Zionist parties, perceive less discrimination, and did not boycott the 2001 elections at a high rate. Those identifying as “Palestinian” or “Palestinian Arab,” having rejected any identifying label that includes “Israeli,” hold the most nationalist positions and are least satisfied with the status quo.

“Israeli Palestinian” and “Palestinian in Israel” identifiers attempt to combine both Palestinian and Israeli identities of some sort, and are generally in between the two extremes.

The enigmatic “Arab” label is difficult to explain in these terms, since it lacks either a Palestinian or Israeli marker. Historically it has referred to Bedouin and may still carry that connotation. The Bedouin in Israel have historically acted instrumentally within the Israeli system, often volunteer for the army, and have been thought of as non-political. Recently, however, Bedouin have become more politically active and have been heavily recruited by the Islamic movement (Nir 2002). Thus, the location of Arab identifiers towards the “Israeli” side of the scale on most measures reflects their historical accommodation with Israel. Nevertheless, “Arabs” are not as accommodating as “Israeli” or “Israeli Arab” identifiers, which may indicate that some are becoming more nationalist as a result of recent events.

The above results reveal the political nature of these identities. The identities are ethno-national on the surface, depicting a relationship of an ethnic minority to the state that it lives in. An “Israeli Arab,” for example, chooses that identity to show he or she belongs to the country “Israel” but is also a member of an ethnic minority, “Arabs.” But underneath the national nature of these identities is a strong political orientation reflected in the figures of this chapter and the last. Individuals identify themselves according to their political orientation on the nationalist dimension. The nationalist dimension (as opposed to economic or social) dominates the political scene among Israeli Palestinians, so one’s choice of

identification labels is an important political form of self-definition. Knowing how an individual identifies herself is an important indicator of overall political orientation.


## MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

The above description explains the significance of different identities among Israeli Palestinians, but it does not explain why some choose to identify the way they do. Given the difficult environment that Israeli Palestinians find themselves in, why do some choose to identify with the state, as Israelis, and others choose to reject the state and identify with an anti-establishment identity such as the Palestinian identity? The variation of identity can be explained at least in part by a multivariate analysis such as the one described in the previous chapter.

At this point I consider the third (identity) equation of the model outlined in chapter 4. With the exception of age, all variables are expected to have a positive effect on Palestinian identity.

$$\begin{aligned} Identity = & \alpha + \beta_{16}Age + \beta_{17}Educ + \beta_{18}Muslim + \beta_{19}Christian + \\ & \beta_{20}Engagement + \beta_{21}Grievance + \beta_{22}SCB + \beta_{23}EthnicDistance + \\ & \beta_{24}CulturalDissimilarity + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

**Figure 29    Multivariate Analysis: Determinants of Identity**



The table below contains the results of the analysis. Many, though not all, of the expectations were confirmed. As in the previous two chapters, I have included a “first difference” column, which indicates the magnitude of effect. The



first difference is the difference in expected value of the dependent variable when an independent variable is varied from its minimum to its maximum. This provides an illustration of the full range of the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable, in this case, identity.

**Table 14 N2SLS: Determinants of Identity**

Dependent Variable = Identity			
Variable Name	Coefficient	Standard Error	First Difference
Constant	-0.356	0.059	
Age	0.001	0.001	0.041
Education	0.001	0.006	0.010
Muslim	0.30**	0.029	0.299
Christian	0.240**	0.034	0.240
Engagement	0.025	0.018	0.050
<i>Grievance</i>	0.547**	0.008	0.547
<i>SCB</i>	0.092	0.061	0.092
Ethnic Distance	0.047**	0.010	0.187
Cultural Dissimilarity	-0.007	0.010	-0.028

“R-squared” = 0.346      \*p≤ .05; \*\*p≤ .01      Scale of DV: 0 to 1  
Source: Lowrance, S. 2001. Political Participation and the Ethnic Divide in Israel: A National Survey of Israeli Palestinians.

Based on the above results, it appears that ethnic-based grievances have the strongest effect on identity choices. The effect of having strong grievances

(maximum on the scale) compared to weak grievances (minimum on the scale) is a change in the expected value of the identity variable by .55 on a total scale of 0 to 1. Having strong grievances makes an individual much more likely to identify at the high end of the identity scale – with a Palestinian identity.

After grievance, religion and ethnic distance have relatively strong effects on identity. As predicted, Muslims and Christians are more likely to identify as Palestinian than Druze, with Muslims the most likely and Christians next. Feeling personally distant from Jewish Israelis also has a relatively strong effect. Both religion and ethnic distance have a relatively strong magnitude of effect as measured by the first difference. Other variables only showed modest effects and their coefficients were not statistically significant.

## **DISCUSSION**

Despite decades of Israeli efforts to deny, discourage, and suppress the Palestinian identity as a threat to Israeli-Zionists hegemony, it has nonetheless persisted. However, not every Israeli Palestinian identifies – in whole or in part – as Palestinian. The empirical analysis has shown that the different self-identifying labels used differ in their political content and implications for political participation. The group of individuals that call themselves “Israelis” differs significantly from those who call themselves “Palestinians” in terms of their political attitudes, their partisan affinity, and their political participation (boycotting, Arab party vote).

The multivariate analysis found that the factor most strongly encouraging Palestinian identification is a feeling of ethnic grievance. Perceptions of endemic bias against Israeli Palestinians as a community may activate the salience of Palestinian identity, thereby encouraging a Palestinian identity. In effect, Israel may be helping to cause what it least desires: a growing Palestinian identity. The source of the grievances, Israel's official policies and unofficial societal practices, may in fact be generating the identity that is considered threatening by most Israelis. The persistence of this identity reinforces a competing claim to the land Jewish Israelis claim, as well as reduces a much-needed identification with the state among Israeli Palestinians.

## **Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusions**

### **SUMMARY**

This project has aimed to answer a number of research questions.

1. Who conducts system-challenging political behavior among Israeli Palestinians and why? In other words, what are the determinants of SCB in Israel?
2. What are the implications of individual identity for SCB?
3. What are the implications of grievance for SCB and identity?

The findings indicate a complex and mutually reinforcing relationship between the key variables, identity, grievance, and SCB.

1. The findings of the project indicate that highly aggrieved individuals, other things being equal, will engage in system-challenging action more than others. The direct effect of grievance was relatively strong, supporting the conclusions of others such as Gurr, who argue for the importance of grievance for protest. Other variables affecting SCB were largely according to expectations: the politically engaged, party members, and recruited individuals were also found to be more likely to engage in SCB.
2. Having a Palestinian identity has a moderate direct effect on SCB; the more Palestinian (and less Israeli) one's identity, the more SCB the individual is likely to perform. Palestinian identity also affects grievance; Palestinian identifiers are more likely to hold significant


grievances. Since identity has a direct effect on grievance, identity thus has an indirect effect on SCB *through* grievance, as depicted in the model representation below. In addition, identity has a conditional effect on SCB in interaction with grievance. When identity is “Israeli,” the effect of grievance on SCB is much lower than when one identifies as “Palestinian.” Thus having an identity friendly to the state helps individuals act in accordance to state goals such as preserving the ethnic status quo. Religion (Muslims and Christians as opposed to Druze) and ethnic distance (feeling distant from Jewish Israelis) were also found to be positively associated with the Palestinian identity.

3. Not only does grievance have a strong direct impact on SCB, but it also strongly affects identity choices. Aggrieved individuals are more likely to identify as Palestinian, in whole or in part. Thus the relationship between grievance and identity is a mutually reinforcing one; each causes the other. The Palestinian identity primes individuals to be aware of ethnic grievances, since the Palestinian identity is based on a sense of historical injustice. On the other hand, having grievances makes one more likely to choose to identify as Palestinian.

The relationship between the three key variables, identity, grievance, and SCB, is depicted in the diagram below. The direct effect of identity is drawn in red, and the direct effect of grievance in blue. The direct effect of SCB remains black,

since the analysis did not find significant effects of SCB on either of the other two key variables.

**Figure 30 Simplified System-Challenging Behavior Model: Key Variables**



## **POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

### **Israel**

The findings of this study suggest that Israeli policy-makers may want to cultivate feelings of affinity with the state and/or reduce ethnic grievances if they want to avoid system-challenging behavior among Israeli Palestinians. That is, they could address the identity variable or the grievance variable, or preferably, both variables.

### *Grievance*

Some Israeli moderates, both Jewish and Arab, have suggested that Israel should decrease the Arab-Jewish gap and reduce ethnic discrimination. This would address the grievance variable. These advocates do not say such moves would satisfy everyone, but they would satisfy enough people so that relatively few system-challengers would remain.

The results of this study suggest that addressing the grievance variable would have a powerful effect on SCB. Grievance has the strongest direct effect on SCB, so reducing grievance would reduce SCB. Since individuals with high grievances are also more likely to identify as Palestinian, lowering grievance would also have the effect of reducing the attractiveness of the Palestinian identity, which is considered to be radical and undesirable by most mainstream Jewish Israelis.

There is considerable support in Israel for reducing discrimination against Israeli Palestinians, at least in abstract terms. However, the fact that no action has been taken on this issue suggests that support may be less forthcoming on specific policies, as opposed to the abstract principle of equality, as has been suggested elsewhere (Shamir and Sullivan 1985). In addition, the difficult economic situation in Israel is currently unfavorable to a new redistribution of the economic pie, so the relatively powerless Israeli Palestinians are unlikely to increase their share in the near future.

### *Identity*

Other Israelis, mostly Israeli Palestinians, argue that they cannot be “bought off” by higher standards of living. Instead, the entire political system needs to change to bring about a transformation of ethnic relations. Thus the exclusive Jewish-Zionist nature of the state needs to be changed so that the state can belong to all its citizens, not just the Jewish ones.

By addressing the identity variable in this way, the ethnic identity of the state could expand to include Israeli Palestinians as well as Jews. Thus Israeli Palestinians could have hope of attaining an affective identification with the state that may act, as my research suggests, as a factor to decrease the importance of grievance for system-challenging action.

There is little support for this proposition in Israel, however. The Jewish nature of the state is cherished among Jews both in Israel and worldwide, and diluting Israel’s Jewish character would be highly unpopular at this time when the state is seen as under attack. In the future, however, if Israeli-Palestinian relations improve, such a proposal may become viable.

A relatively symbolic change can go far towards incorporating Israeli Palestinians into the state, which may make them less likely to act against it even if they still feel aggrieved. It is much more difficult to undo the effects of more than a half century of discrimination against Israeli Palestinians, though I believe it is important to try. In short, even though it is politically more difficult, in the end it may be physically easier to change the symbolism of the state rather than attempting to undo the effects of several generations of discrimination.



### **Israeli Palestinians**

The results of this study suggest that Israeli Palestinian efforts to preserve and enhance Palestinian identity in Israel may not only be a positive phenomenon in itself, but may also be useful for encouraging activism, from the Israeli Palestinian point of view. Since the Palestinian identity appears to encourage system-challenging behavior, and may also magnify the effect of grievance on SCB, encouraging Palestinian identity may in fact encourage political action. Action that challenges the ethnic status quo may be particularly valuable to Israeli Palestinians, so the encouragement of SCB through identity-building could be a fruitful avenue to pursue.

It is worth mentioning that the simultaneous encouragement of Israeli identity and Palestinian identity are generally incompatible at this time. The way these identities are currently constructed leaves very little room for the other. Although some manage to combine both Israeli and Palestinian identities (note that only 9.5 percent of the survey sample identified as Israeli Palestinian), in general, the appropriateness of the Israeli identity and the Palestinian identity are negatively correlated (-.3). The Palestinian identity is based on a collective memory of disempowerment and dispersal at the hands of Zionists and Israelis, while the Israeli identity is based on a nearly exclusive claim to historical Palestine and negation of parallel Palestinian claims.

However, some observers do not believe that this situation needs continue unchanged. Altering the meaning of Israeli identity and/or Palestinian identity to include an acceptance of the other can help make these identities more

compatible. There may be several ways to do this, but one often-mentioned way is to re-define Israel as the state of all its citizens, thus creating an Israeli identity that is civic, rather than religio-national (Grossman 1993; Rouhana 1997). In any case, the compatibility of the two identities is essential for resolving the ethnic conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, both inside and outside Israel.

### **Other Countries**

The results of this study are also applicable to other countries experiencing ethnic conflict. Post-Communist Europe, for example, has been experiencing ideological transformation since the fall of communist governments in 1989. Taking the place of the communist identity of the state has been national identities, often constructed in such a way as to exclude minorities long residing in its borders. Discrimination, identity conflict, and mutual recriminations, as in the case of Israel, plague majority-minority relations in places such as Slovakia (Bacova 1999; Harlig 1997), Estonia and Latvia (Smith 1996), and Croatia (Brunner 1996). For these countries and others, the lessons of this research may be instructive.

In general, these results may serve as a warning that ethnic grievances are not likely to be easily ignored or suppressed, as some nationalists may hope. The outcome of ethnic grievances may be further ethnic mobilization. The study also points out the importance of symbolic politics, and that of identity in particular, for the persistence and resolution of ethnic conflict. On a less optimistic note, the importance of identity suggests the difficulty of resolving some ethnic conflicts.

Identities are not easily negotiable and tend to provoke intense emotions, and thus conflicts may become less amenable to resolution when closely-held identities are seen as being at stake.

## **CONTRIBUTION**

This study has contributed to the literatures of ethnic identity, ethnic conflict, and Israeli ethnic politics. It has contributed to the ethnic identity literature by illuminating the motivational nature of an ethno-political identity, the Palestinian identity in Israel. This identity has important effects on political behavior and some attitudes, such as grievance.

The study has also contributed to the ethnic conflict literature by both confirming and clarifying research by Gurr (2000), who argues that ethnic conflict may be reduced by a commitment to minority rights. The results of my study suggests that increasing minority rights may reduce grievances, which will in turn reduce system-challenging behavior by minorities. My research goes further, however, to qualify this grievance – action relationship. If minorities identify with the state and its goals, the impact of grievances can be reduced.

Finally, this dissertation has added to the Israeli ethnic politics literature. Rather than dichotomizing identity into Israeli and Palestinian, I have put identity on an ordinal scale, which provides a more detailed picture of identity. This study has also sketched the implications of Palestinian identity for Israeli politics. Palestinian identity is not simply an irrational hatred of all things Israeli; rather, it derives from perceived discrimination and other legitimate grievances. And this

study has used quantitative methods to address the consequences of Palestinian identity for political behavior in Israel. Palestinian identity can result in greater system-challenging action by Israeli Palestinians, but the Israeli identity may in fact reduce this tendency toward system-challenging action.

## **FUTURE RESEARCH**

Four main avenues for future research immediately present themselves. First of all, it much research remains to be done on why people identify with a state and the implications for this identification. This dissertation has attempted to uncover one main implication: the reduced likelihood for system-challenging behavior. However, it is not clear why individuals identify with the state at all, particularly under difficult circumstances such as those experienced by Israeli Palestinians. What are the mechanisms by which these identities develop? How are the identities sustained? Changed? How do these identities affect other forms of participation, including state-supporting as well as state-challenging action?

The second avenue is to investigate the impact of other kinds of identity, in particular, religious identity. In the Middle East, where political Islamic movements are active, it may be fruitful to clarify how, if at all, religious identity differs from national identity, and if participation outcomes differ. Since religious movements are in some areas of the Middle East the only organized opposition, such research may have implications for democratization efforts in the region.

A third avenue for research is the investigating the effect of system-maintenance processes and legitimizing processes, like voting, on SCB. It is

possible that such activities drain the energy from system-challenging activities rather than reinforcing them. If this is the case, working within the system could end up prolonging the status quo in the long run, rather than changing it.

Testing this proposition, however, is more difficult than one would expect at first glance. Voting, in all likelihood, is endogenous. Preliminary analyses, ignoring voting's likely endogeneity, suggest that the role of political parties is crucial to the understanding of both SCB and system-legitimizing processes in contexts such as Israel. Voting in the 1999 general elections is positively associated with SCB, while voting in the 2001 elections is negatively associated with SCB. In 1999, the political parties mobilized voters to turn out, while in 2001 the parties actively boycotted the elections and worked with the organized boycott movement to "mobilize" voters to stay home on election day. Given that Arab parties are active in organizing SCB as well as voting, as discussed in chapter 5, one could expect this mixed result. In fact, some political parties, such as the Balad/Tajamu' party, operate on the edge of legality and state as a primary aim the changing of the political system from an ethnic-Jewish to a civic-egalitarian system. It is likely that different "kinds" of voting – not only the choice of party but also the choice as to vote or boycott – have different effects on SCB.

However, to fully test these hypotheses, a new model must be specified. Both grievance and identity, among other things, probably affect voting, and may even be affected *by* voting. Adding a fourth equation to the model with voting as a dependent variable would thus be necessary to take into account voting's

endogeneity. This will complicate identifying the model, and thus it is a project best left for future research.

Finally, the expansion of the system-challenging behavior model to other countries may be pursued. As mentioned above, several Eastern European countries have similar ethnic structures and the conflict between groups in many ways resembles that in Israel. Testing the SCB model in a similar environment as well as a dissimilar environment, such as the United States, may reveal the applicability and the limitations of the model.

## **CONCLUSION**

This study has shed light on the importance of identity politics in the world today. Identity can be a tool of the state for state- and nation-building, and it can also be a tool of minorities for mobilizing system-challenging action. Identity has often been underestimated by political scientists due to the difficulty in measurement and definition, since political scientists prefer instead to leave the study of identity to psychologists. However, I would recommend a blurring of the lines between fields, allowing some cross-fertilization between politics and psychology. It is important for political scientists to gain insights into identity, but also it has outcomes that political scientists are eager to comprehend. Identity has been a motivating factor behind anti-colonial movements, nationalist movements, and religious movements of the preceding centuries. It is behind the religious terrorism of al Qaida that confronts us today. Thus it is important to understand how others perceive the world and the logical action outcomes of that perception.

Such an understanding is essential to navigating the minefields of the modern world , as well as to the acceptance of the “other” and the creation of a world built on tolerance.

## **Appendix A: About the Survey**

The Arabic sample of the survey was conducted using face-to-face interviews in Arabic during the months of January – May of 2001 by the Givat Haviva Center for Peace Research. It was based on a name sample, randomly drawn from the population register of the Ministry of Interior. Included in the sample were residents of 44 villages and towns inside the Green Line, which constitutes a representative stratified sample of all localities in which Palestinian citizens live. The resulting data set consists of 1202 respondents.

The Jewish sample of the survey was conducted by the Survey Consulting Unit of the University of Haifa, January 21 – February 5, 2001. The interviewing was carried out in Hebrew by telephone. The sample consists of a simple random sample of the Israeli Jewish population within Israel's pre-1967 borders. The resulting data set consists of 503 respondents.



## Appendix B: English translation of the Arabic Questionnaire

My name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I am a survey interviewer from the University of Haifa. We are conducting a survey on a number of issues. Your name was randomly chosen to be in a sample of 1200 people from all parts of the country. All of the information that you express will be anonymous and will be used for research purposes only. The goal of this research is to know people's opinions about the society and country we live in. In the questions we will ask you, there are no correct or incorrect answers. I will read you the questions and the possible answers and you may choose the response that is closest to your opinion.

ID Serial number.

1. To what degree do you have trust in government?  
1 To a very large degree  
2 To a large degree  
3 To a moderate degree  
4 To a small degree  
5 Not at all
2. To what degree are you interested in politics and public affairs?  
1 To a very large degree  
2 To a large degree  
3 To a moderate degree  
4 To a small degree  
5 Not at all
3. How often do you read a newspaper?  
1 Daily  
2 Several times a week  
3 Once a week  
4 Seldom  
5 Do not read
4. To what degree do you agree with the statement: "Sometimes political and governmental matters are so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on."  
1 To a very large degree  
2 To a large degree  
3 To a moderate degree  
4 To a small degree  
5 Not at all
5. To what degree, in your opinion, does the government consider Arab citizens' opinion in its decision making?  
1 To a very large degree  
2 To a large degree  
3 To a moderate degree  
4 To a small degree  
5 Not at all

6. And to what degree, in your opinion, does the government consider Jewish citizens' opinion in its decision making?
  - 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
7. Do you support or oppose the Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO?
  - 1 Strongly Support
  - 2 Support
  - 3 Oppose (skip the next question)
  - 4 Strongly oppose (skip the next question)
8. If you support the Oslo accords, do you accept the way they are implemented?
  - 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
9. To what degree do you feel close toward the Jews in Israel?
  - 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
10. Culture is expressed in matters like music, food, language, and values of right and wrong. To what degree are the cultures of Arabs and the Jews in Israel similar to each other?
  - 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
11. How are the relations, in your opinion, between Arab citizens and Jews in Israel today?
  - 1 Very good
  - 2 Good
  - 3 Neither good nor bad
  - 4 Bad
  - 5 Very bad
12. To what degree, in your opinion, do Arab citizens have influence on state affairs?
  - 1 Too much influence
  - 2 Sufficient influence
  - 3 Little influence
  - 4 No influence at all

13. To what degree, in your opinion, do Jewish citizens have influence on state affairs?
  - 1 Too much influence
  - 2 Sufficient influence
  - 3 Little influence
  - 4 No influence at all
14. To what degree, in your opinion, is there discrimination against Arab citizens in Israel?
  - 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
15. To what degree have you personally been hurt by discrimination against Arabs?
  - 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
16. To what degree, in your opinion, is there a gap in the achievements of Arab citizens and Jews?
  - 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
17. To what degree, in your opinion, is the Israeli government responsible for the gap in the achievements of Arab citizens and Jews?
  - 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all

We are interested in knowing about different ways people participate in politics. For example:

18. During the last election campaign, did you try to persuade certain people to vote for any party or candidate?
  - 1 Yes
  - 2 No (skip the next question)
19. If yes, whom did you try to persuade? (1-3 answers are possible)
  - 1 Family members
  - 2 Close friends
  - 3 Neighbors
  - 4 Other persons. Indicate

20. In how many legal protest actions such as demonstrations and marches have you participated in the past five years? \_\_\_\_\_ (Indicate an exact number, if 0, skip the next question)
21. (If participated in at least one demonstration or march) What issue did the most recent legal protest action you participated in address?
  - 1 Peace
  - 2 Equality (budgets of local governments, unemployment, housing distress, destruction of illegal buildings, lands, unrecognized localities, educational services, etc.)
  - 3 Affairs internal to Arab (women status, violence against women, dysfunctioning of local authorities, hamula and communal disputes, crime) 1-3 answers.
  - 4 Environmental issues
  - 5 Other issues. Indicate
22. In how many illegal protest actions such as unlicensed demonstrations and violent marches have you participated in the past five years? \_\_\_\_\_ (Indicate an exact number, two digits)
23. How often do you participate in Land Day events?
  - 1 Never
  - 2 Seldom
  - 3 Every few years
  - 4 Every year
24. Did you participate in the Naqba commemoration events this year?
  - 1 Yes
  - 2 No
25. What are the chances that you will participate in the future in legal protest actions such as licensed demonstrations and marches?
  - 1 Great chances
  - 2 Considerable chances
  - 3 Moderate chances
  - 4 Small chances
  - 5 No chances
26. What are the chances that you will participate in the future in illegal protest actions such as unlicensed demonstrations and violent marches?
  - 1 Great chances
  - 2 Considerable chances
  - 3 Moderate chances
  - 4 Small chances
  - 5 No chances

Now I'm going to ask you about requests directed sometimes to people to participate in politics. For example:

27. Have you personally been asked by someone to vote or to abstain from voting in the past five years?
  - 1 Yes
  - 2 No (skip the next question)

28. If yes, by whom? (1-3 answers).
  - 1 A family member
  - 2 A close friend
  - 3 A neighbor
  - 4 A superior in a job
  - 5 An active member of a political party
  - 6 A member of an organization or a voluntary association
  - 7 Other. Indicate
29. Have you personally been asked by someone to vote for or against a certain candidate or a certain party in the past five years?
  - 1 Yes
  - 2 No (skip the next question)
30. If yes, by whom? 1-3 answers.
  - 1 A family member
  - 2 A close friend
  - 3 A neighbor
  - 4 A superior in a job
  - 5 An active member of a political party
  - 6 A member of an organization or a voluntary association
  - 7 Other. Indicate
31. Have you personally been asked by someone to participate in a protest action such as a demonstration, a march or a petition in the past five years?
  - 1 Yes
  - 2 No (skip the next question)
32. If yes, by whom? 1-3 answers.
  - 1 A family member
  - 2 A close friend
  - 3 A neighbor
  - 4 A superior in a job
  - 5 An active member of a political party
  - 6 A member of an organization or a voluntary association
  - 7 Other. Indicate
33. In the past five years, have you attended a meeting in your mosque/church/khilwie about a political issue?
  - 1 Yes
  - 2 No

Now, I am going to read to you some statements, and I would like you to tell me to what degree you agree with each one.

34. Israel can be a democracy and a Zionist Jewish state at the same time.
  - 1 Strongly agree
  - 2 Agree
  - 3 Disagree
  - 4 Strongly disagree

35. Israel must recognize Arabs as a minority with equal and full rights.
  - 1 Strongly agree
  - 2 Agree
  - 3 Disagree
  - 4 Strongly disagree
36. Despite its flaws, the Israeli regime offers Arab citizens more civil rights and political freedoms than what Arab states offer their citizens.
  - 1 Strongly agree
  - 2 Agree
  - 3 Disagree
  - 4 Strongly disagree
37. Voting in elections is one of the most efficient ways to achieve equality for Arabs in Israel.
  - 1 Strongly agree
  - 2 Agree
  - 3 Disagree
  - 4 Strongly disagree
38. I am a citizen of Israel but for me it is like a foreign country.
  - 1 Strongly agree
  - 2 Agree
  - 3 Disagree
  - 4 Strongly disagree
39. Israel has the right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state.
  - 1 Strongly agree
  - 2 Agree
  - 3 Disagree
  - 4 Strongly disagree
40. Is the term "Israeli" appropriate in describing your identity? [The fourth category "Not appropriate at all" was deleted from the Arabic questionnaire by technical mistake]
  - 1 Very appropriate
  - 2 Appropriate
  - 3 Not too appropriate
41. Is the term "Palestinian" appropriate in describing your identity? [The fourth category "Not appropriate at all" was deleted from the Arabic questionnaire by technical mistake]?
  - 1 Very appropriate
  - 2 Appropriate
  - 3 Not too appropriate
42. Is the term "Israeli Palestinian" appropriate in describing your identity? [The fourth category "Not appropriate at all" was deleted from the Arabic questionnaire by technical mistake]
  - 1 Very appropriate
  - 2 Appropriate
  - 3 Not too appropriate

43. How would you define yourself if you had to choose one of the following
- 1 Arab
  - 2 Palestinian Arab
  - 3 Israeli Arab
  - 4 Israeli
  - 5 Israeli Palestinian
  - 6 Palestinian in Israel or Palestinian Arab in Israel
  - 7 Palestinian
44. To which of the following parties do you feel closest?
- 1 The United Arab List (Arab Democratic Party, Islamic Movement, Mahamid)
  - 2 The Front (Rakah)
  - 3 Balad headed by Bishara
  - 4 The Arab Renewal Party headed by Tibie
  - 5 Jewish parties such as Labor, Meretz and HaMerkaz
  - 6 Jewish parties such as Likud, Mafdal and Shas
45. For which party would you vote if elections to the Knesset were held today?
- 1 The United Arab List (Arab Democratic Party, Islamic Movement and Mahamid)
  - 2 The Front (Rakah)
  - 3 Balad headed by Bishara
  - 4 The Arab Renewal Movement headed by Tibie
  - 5 One Israel (Labor Party)
  - 6 Meretz
  - 7 HaMerkaz
  - 8 Shinui
  - 9 Am Ehad
  - 10 Likud
  - 11 Shas
  - 12 Mafdal
  - 13 Yahadut Hatorah
  - 14 Yisrael Ba'aliya
  - 15 Yisrael Betenu
  - 16 Ha'ihud Hal'umi
  - 17 Another Party. Indicate
  - 18 I have not decided
  - 19 I will not vote
  - 20 Not willing to say
46. For which candidate for a Prime Minister would you vote if elections were held today?
- 1 The Labor candidate
  - 2 The Likud candidate
  - 3 Blank vote
  - 4 I have not decided
  - 5 I will not vote
  - 6 Not willing to say

47. For which party did you vote in the Knesset elections in 1999?
- 1 The United Arab List (Arab Democratic Party, Islamic Movement and Mahamid) (skip the next question)
  - 2 The Front (Rakah) (skip the next question)
  - 3 Balad and the Arab Renewal Party headed by Bishara and Tibie (skip the next question)
  - 4 One Israel (Labor, Gesher, Memad) (skip the next question)
  - 5 Meretz (skip the next question)
  - 6 HaMerkaz (skip the next question)
  - 7 Shinui (skip the next question)
  - 8 Am Ehad (skip the next question)
  - 9 Likud (skip the next question)
  - 10 Shas (skip the next question)
  - 11 Mafdal (skip the next question)
  - 12 Yahadut Hatorah (skip the next question)
  - 13 Yisrael Ba'aliya (skip the next question)
  - 14 Yisrael Betenu (skip the next question)
  - 15 Ha'ihud Hal'umi (skip the next question)
  - 16 Haderekh Hashlishit (skip the next question)
  - 17 Mifleget Hanashim (skip the next question)
  - 18 Panina Rosenblum Party (skip the next question)
  - 19 Hagimla'im Party (skip the next question)
  - 20 Casino Party headed by Tisona (skip the next question)
  21. A'le Yarak (skip the next question)
  22. Hayrukim (skip the next question)
  - 23 The New Arab Party headed by Makhul (skip the next question)
  - 24 Da'am (Democratic Labor Party) (skip the next question)
  - 25 Another party: \_\_\_\_\_ (skip the next question)
  - 26 I did not vote (although I had the right to vote)
  - 27 I Did not have the right to vote (I was under 18) (skip the next question)
  - 28 Not willing to say
48. Why did not you vote in the Knesset elections in 1999? 1-3 answers.
- 1 I had difficulty getting to the polls, I was abroad, I was out of town, I was sick, I had problems with my identity card
  - 2 I was busy
  - 3 I was not interested in politics
  - 4 I was not familiar with the parties
  - 5 I felt that my vote will make no difference
  - 6 There was no appropriate party with good candidates
  - 7 Voting is against my conscience or religion
  - 8 I did not have the right to vote (I was under 18)
  - 9 I did not vote for another reason. Indicate
49. Which candidate for a Prime Minister did you vote for in 1999?
- 1 Shimon Peres
  - 2 Benyamin Netanyahu
  - 3 Blank vote
  - 4 I did not vote (although I had the right to vote)



- 5 I did not have the right to vote (I was under 18)  
 6 Not willing to say
50. Are you a member of a political party?  
 1 Yes  
 2 No (skip the next question)
51. If yes, which party?  
 1 The United Arab List (Arab Democratic Party, Islamic Movement and Mahamid)  
 2 The Front (Rakah)  
 3 Balad headed by Bishara  
 4 The Arab Renewal Movement headed by Tibie  
 5 One Israel (Labor Party)  
 6 Meretz  
 7 HaMerkaz  
 8 Shinui  
 9 Am Ehad  
 10 Likud  
 11 Shas  
 12 Mafdal  
 13 Yahadut Hatorah  
 14 Yisrael Ba'aliya  
 15 Yisrael Betenu  
 16 Ha'ihud Hal'umi  
 17 Another Party: \_\_\_\_\_  
 18 Not willing to say
52. What is your religion?  
 1 Moslem  
 2 Christian  
 3 Druze
53. With regard to religious observance, what do you consider yourself?  
 1 Very religious  
 2 Religious  
 3 Religious to some extent  
 4 Not religious
54. How old are you? (age in number of years) \_\_\_\_\_
55. Martial status  
 1 Married  
 2 Widowed  
 3 Single  
 4 Divorced
56. What is the last class you attended in school?  
 1 No schooling  
 2 Incomplete primary  
 3 Complete primary  
 4 Incomplete secondary  
 5 Complete secondary  
 6 Post-secondary, incomplete higher  
 7 Bachelor degree

- 8 Master degree
- 9 Doctoral degree
- 57. What do you do in the main?
  - 1 Employed (including a civilian in the army or a soldier in the professional army)
  - 2 A soldier in a compulsory service
  - 3 Not working but seeking work
  - 4 Neither working and nor seeking work
  - 5 Retired
  - 6 A university student, a Yeshiva student, another student, a youth before the draft, a volunteer
  - 7 A housewife
- 58. How many persons do live in this home? \_\_\_\_\_
- 59. The average net monthly income of an Arab family in Israel is about 6,500 NIS. In comparison, the income of your family is:
  - 1 Much above the average
  - 2 A bit above the average
  - 3 About the average
  - 4 A bit below the average
  - 5 Much below the average

#### **Additional Details on the Respondent Completed by the Interviewer**

- 60. What was the overall reliability of the information given by the respondent?
  - 1 Not reliable
  - 2 Sufficient
  - 3 Good
  - 4 Very good
- 61. Gender
  - 1 Man
  - 2 Woman
- 62. Place of residence.
- 63. Date of interview (63a: day in the month; 63b: month)

## **Profiles of Places of Residence**

### RELIGCOM Religious composition

- 1 Moslem
- 2 Mixed, with Moslem majority
- 3 Druze
- 4 Mixed, with Druze majority
- 5 Christian
- 6 Mixed, with Christian majority
- 7 Mixed, with no majority

### REGION Region

- 1 The Galilee
- 2 Triangle
- 3 Center
- 4 Negev

### MUNICIPL Municipal status

- 1 Municipality
- 2 Local council
- 3 Regional council
- 4 Unincorporated

### SIZE Population size

- 1 15,000 and over
- 2 10,000-14,999
- 3 5,000-9,999
- 4 1,000-4,999
- 5 Under 1,000

### CLUSTER Socioeconomic level (classification of localities by Central Bureau of Statistics)

- 1 (Lowest)
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10 (Highest)

RAAM %vote for Raam (Arab United Party) in the 1999 Knesset elections

HADASH %vote for Hadash in the 1999 Knesset elections

BALAD %vote for Balad in the 1999 Knesset elections

INTIFADA Involvement of place of residence in the October 2000 Arab uprising (impressionistic evaluation)

1 Small or no involvement

2 Medium degree of involvement (demonstrations, road blocking, etc)

3 High involvement (intense protest, many arrests, wounded and casualties)

## Appendix C: The Arabic Questionnaire

أسمى \_\_\_\_\_ وأنا مقابل من جامعة حيفا . نحن نجرى استطلاعات رأى فى مواضيع شتى . لقد أختير أسمك صدفة فى عينة عشوائية من 1200 شخص من جميع أنحاء البلاد . كل المعلومات التى تدلى بها تبقى سرية و بدون أسماء وتستعمل لإغراض البحث الإحصائى فقط . هدف البحث هو معرفة آراء الأشخاص للمجتمع و الدولة التى يعيشون بها . فى الأسئلة التى تطرح عليك لا يوجد اجابات صحيحة و غير صحيحة سوف أقرأ عليك الأسئلة والأجابات والمطلوب منك هو أختيار الأجابة الأقرب إلى رأيك (المقابل: أقرأ على المقابل كافة الإجابات لكل سؤال وضع دائرة حول إجابة واحدة إلا إذا ذكر غير ذلك . إذا أجاب القابل قبل قراءة الأجوبة فاقراء فقط الجابات الملائمة) .

1- إلى أى مدى تثق فى الحكومة

- 1- بمدى كبير جداً
- 2- بمدى كبير
- 3- بمدى متوسط
- 4- بمدى قليل
- 5- لا أثق بتاتا

2- إلى أى مدى أنت تهتم فى السياسة و قضايا الجمهور

- 1- بمدى كبير جداً
- 2- بمدى كبير
- 3- بمدى متوسط
- 4- بمدى قليل
- 5- لا أهتم بتاتا

3- بأى وتيرة تقرأ جرائد ؟

- 1- كل يوم
- 2- عدة مرات بالأسبوع
- 3- مرة فى الأسبوع
- 4- فى فترات متباعدة
- 5- لا أقرأ

4- إلى أى مدى توافق مع الجملة القائلة (أحياناً تكون قضايا السياسة و الحكومة معقدة إلى درجة ان أنساناً مثلى لا يستطيع فهم ما يجرى على حقيقة )

- 1- بمدى كبير جداً
- 2- بمدى كبير
- 3- بمدى متوسط
- 4- بمدى قليل
- 5- لا وافق بتاتا

5- إلى أى مدى حسب رائيك تأخذ الحكومة بالإعتبار رأى المواطنين العرب فى اتخاذ قراراتها ؟

- 1- بمدى كبير جداً
- 2- بمدى كبير
- 3- بمدى متوسط
- 4- بمدى قليل
- 5- اخذة بالإعتبار بناتاً

6- إلى أى مدى حسب رائيك تأخذ الحكومة بالإعتبار رأى المواطنين اليهود فى اتخاذ قراراتها ؟

- 1- بمدى كبير جداً
- 2- بمدى كبير
- 3- بمدى متوسط
- 4- بمدى قليل
- 5- لاتأخذة بالإعتبار بناتاً

7- هل انت مؤيد أم معارض للإتفاقيات أوسلو ومنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية؟

- 1- مؤيد جداً
- 2- مؤيد
- 3- معارض (لا تجب على السؤال التالى)
- 4- معارض جداً (لا تجب على السؤال التالى)

8- إذا كنت مؤيد للإتفاقيات أوسلو . هل مقبول عليك طريقة تطبيقهم ؟

- 1- بمدى كبير جداً
- 2- بمدى كبير
- 3- بمدى متوسط
- 4- بمدى قليل
- 5- بالمره لا

9- بأى مدى تشعر قريباً للمواطنين اليهود فى إسرائيل ؟

- 1- بمدى كبير جداً
- 2- بمدى كبير
- 3- بمدى متوسط
- 4- بمدى قليل
- 5- بالمره لا

10- تتجلى الثقافة فى مجالات عدة مثل الموسيقى , الفن , اللغة و قيم الخير والشر إلى أى مدى ثقافة اليهود والعرب فى إسرائيل متشابهتين ؟

- 1- بمدى كبير جداً
- 2- بمدى كبير
- 3- بمدى متوسط

4- بمدى قليل

5- بالمرة لا

11- ما هو وضع العلاقات حسب رأيك, بين اليهود والعرب فى اسرائيل اليوم؟

1- جيده جداً

2- جيده

3- غير جيده و غير سيئة

4- سيئة

5- سيئة جداً

12- إلى اى مدى يوجد , حسب رأيك تأثيراً للمواطنين العرب على قضايا الدولة؟

1- تأثيراً كبيراً جداً

2- تأثيراً كافياً

3- تأثيراً قليلاً

4- لا يوجد تأثيراً بتاتاً

13- إلى اى مدى حسب رأيك يوجد تأثيراً للمواطنين اليهود فى اسرائيل على قضايا الدولة؟

1- تأثيراً كبيراً جداً

2- تأثيراً كافياً

3- تأثيراً قليلاً

4- لا يوجد تأثيراً بتاتاً

بمدى كبير جداً	بمدى كبير	بمدى متوسط	بمدى قليل	لا يوجد بتاتاً

					واليهود مواطني إسرائيل ؟
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18- خلال الإنتخابات الأخيرة للكنسيت ورئاسة الوزراء هل حاولت أن تقنع أشخاصاً من التصويت لصالح حزب معين أو مرشح معين ؟

- 1- نعم
- 2- لا ( إذا كان الجواب لا , لا تجب على السؤال التالي )

19- إذا كان الجواب نعم من حاولت أن تقنع ( يمكن إختيار 1-3 إجابات )

- 1- أقارب من العائلة
  - 2- أصدقاء مقربون
  - 3- جيران
  - 4- آخرون
- 20- كم هو عدد الفعاليات الإحتجاجية القانونية مثل مظاهرات ومسيرات التي اشتركت بها فى السنوات الخمس الأخيرة ؟
- فعاليات أحتجاجية
- ( للمقابل , يجب ذكر العدد الدقيق باللغة العبرية )
- ( إذا كان الجواب صفر , لا تجب على السؤال التالي )

21- إذا أشتركت على الأقل بواحدة ما هو الموضوع الذى دارت حولة الفعالية الإحتجاجية القانونية الأخيرة التي أشتركت بها ؟

- 1- سلام
- 2- حقوق ديمقراطية (حق التعبير عن الرأى , حق التنظيم , حق الإحتجاج , حق التمثيل فى مؤسسات الدولة )
- 3- مساواة (ميزانية السلطات المحلية , بطالة , ضائقة المسكن , هدم بيوت غير قانونية , أراضى , قرى غير معترف بها , خدمات تعليم وغيرها )
- 4- مواضيع داخلية تخص القرية أو المجتمع العربى .
- 5- (مكانة المراة , العنف ضد المراة , عمل السلطة المحلية , نزاعات عائلية ووطنية , اجرام )
- 6- جودة البيئة
- 7- آخر , ما هو

22- كم هو عدد الفعاليات الإحتجاجية غير القانونية مثل مظاهرات غير قانونية ومسيرات عنيفة التي أشتركت بها فى السنوات الخمس الأخيرة ؟

(للمقابل , يجب ذكر العدد القيق باللغة العبرية )

23- كل كام سنة أنت تشترك فى فعاليات يوم الأرض ؟

- 1- لم أشترك بها بتاتاً
- 2- فى فترات متباعدة
- 3- كل كام سنة
- 4- كل سنة



24- هل اشتركت هذه السنة فى فعاليات لذكرى النكبة ؟

1- نعم

2- لا

25- ما هى احتمالات اشتراكك فى المستقبل فى فعاليات احتجاجية قانونية مثل مظاهرات ومسيرات قانونية ؟

1- احتمالات كبيرة

2- احتمالات جيدة

3- احتمالات متوسطة

4 – احتمالات قليلة

5- لا يوجد احتمال

26- ما هى احتمالات مشاركتك فى المستقبل فى فعاليات احتجاجية غير قانونية مثل المظاهرات غير القانونية ومسيرات عنيفة ؟

1- احتمالات كبيرة

2- احتمالات جيدة

3- احتمالات متوسطة

4 – احتمالات قليلة

5- لا يوجد احتمال

27- هل طلب منك بشكل شخصى من قبل أحد الأشخاص , أن تصوت أو تمتنع عن التصويت فى السنوات الخمس الأخيرة ؟

1- نعم

2- لا ( لا تجب على السؤال التالى )

28- ذا كان الجواب نعم من طلب منك ذلك , (يمكن اختيار 1-3 إجابات ) ؟

1- أقارب من العائلة

2- صديق قريب

3- جار

4 – مسؤول فى العمل

5- نشيط حزبى

6- عضو فى منظمة أو جمعية

7- آخر , حدد .....

29- هل طلب منك بشكل شخصى من قبل أحد الأشخاص , أن تصوت مع أو ضد مرشح معين فى السنوات الخمس الأخيرة ؟

1- نعم

2- لا ( لا تجب على السؤال التالى )

30- إذا كان الجواب نعم من طلب منك ذلك , ( يمكن اختيار 1-3 إجابات ) ؟

- 1- أقارب من العائلة
- 2- صديق قريب
- 3- جار
- 4 – مسؤول فى العمل
- 5- نشيط حزبى
- 6- عضو فى منظمة أو جمعية
- 7- آخر , حدد .....

31- هل طلب منك بشكل شخصى من قبل أحد الأشخاص , أن تشترك بفاعلية إحتجاجية مثل مظاهرة مسيرة أو عريضة ؟

- 1- نعم
- 2- لا ( لا تجب على السؤال التالى )

32- إذا كان الجواب نعم من طلب منك ذلك , ( يمكن اختيار 1-3 إجابات ) ؟

- 1- أقارب من العائلة
- 2- صديق قريب
- 3- جار
- 4 – مسؤول فى العمل
- 5- نشيط حزبى
- 6- عضو فى منظمة أو جمعية
- 7- آخر , حدد .....

33- هل أشرت بقاء فى موضوع سياسى فى المسجد / الكنيسة / او الخوة فى السنوات الخمس الأخيرة ؟

- 1- نعم
- 2- لا

غير موافق إطلاقاً	غير موافق	موافق	موافق فقط	
4	3	2	1	34- يمكن لإسرائيل أن تكون دولة ديمقراطية ودولة يهودية صهيونية فى نفس الوقت ؟
4	3	2	1	35- على دولة إسرائيل أن تعترف بالعرب كأقلية صاحبة حقوق كاملة ومتساوية

4	3	2	1	36- مع كل نواقص النظام فى إسرائيل إلا أنه يقدم للمواطنين العرب حقوق مدنية وحريات سياسية أكثر مما تقدمه الدول العربية لمواطنيها
4	3	2	1	37- التصويت فى الانتخابات هى إحدى أنجح الطرق من أجل الحصول على المساواة للعرب فى إسرائيل ؟
4	3	2	1	38- أنا مواطن إسرائيلى و لكن بالنسبة لى إسرائيل هى دولة عربية
4	3	2	1	39- لإسرائيل الحق فى الوجود كدولة يهودية صهيونية ؟

ليس ملائماً كثيراً	ملائم	ملائم جداً	
3	2	1	40- ما هو مدى ملائمة الوصف "إسرائيلى" لوصف هويتك ؟
3	2	1	41- ما هو مدى ملائمة الوصف "فلسطينى" لوصف هويتك ؟
3	2	1	42- ما هو مدى ملائمة الوصف فلسطينى - إسرائيلى لوصف هويتك ؟

43- كيف تعرف هويتك لو طلب منك إختيار إحدى الأماكن التالية ؟

- 1- عربى
- 2- عربى فلسطينى
- 3- عربى إسرائيلى
- 4- إسرائيلى
- 5- فلسطينى إسرائيلى
- 6- فلسطينى فى إسرائيل أو عربى فلسطينى فى إسرائيل
- 7- فلسطينى

44- لأي حزب من الأحزاب التالية تشعر قريباً لك أكثر ؟

- 1- القائمة العربية الموحدة ( الحزب العربى ، الحركة الإسلامية وهاشم محاميد
- 2- لجبهة الديمقراطية ( الحزب الشيوعى الإسرائيلى ) .
- 3 التجمع الديمقراطى برسائة عزمي بشارة .
- 4- الحركة العربية للتغير برسائة أحمد طيبي .

- 5- أحزاب يهودية مثل العمل ، ميرتس والمركز .
- 6- أحزاب يهودية مثل الليكود ، المفدال وشاس .

45- لأي حزب ستصوت فيما لو أجريت الانتخابات للكنيست اليوم ؟  
القائمة العربية الموحدة ( الحزب الديمقراطي العربي الحركة الإسلامية وهاشم محاميد )

- 2- الجبهة الديمقراطية ( الحزب الشيوعي الإسرائيلي ) .
- 3- التجمع الديمقراطي برسالة عزمي بشارة .
- 4- الحركة العربية للتغير برسالة أحمد طيبي .
- 5-العمل ( أسرائيل موحدة ) .
- 6- ميرتس .
- 7- المركز .
- 8- شينوي .
- 9- عام أحاد .
- 10- الليكود .
- 11- شاس .
- 12- مفدال .
- 13- يهودوت هتوراه ( أغودات يسرائيل + علم التوراة ) .
- 14- يسرائيل بعلباه .
- 15- يسرائيل بيتنو برسالة أفغدور ليبيرمان .
- 16- ايحود لنومي .
- 17- حزب آخر .
- 18- لم أقرر بعد .
- 19- لن أصوت .
- 20- أرفض الأجابة .

46- لأي من المرشحين لرسالة الحكومة ستصوت فيما لو أجريت الانتخابات اليوم؟

- 1- يهود براك .
- 2- ارييل شارون .
- 3- ورقة فارغة .
- 4- لم أقرر بعد .
- 5- أرفض الأجابة .

47- لأي حزب صوتت في انتخابات الكنيست في سنة 1999 ( لاحظة للمقابل : إذا صوت أو لم يصوت بسبب عدم حصوله علي حق التصويت تنازل عن السؤال التالي ) .

- 1- القائمة العربية الموحدة ( الحزب الديمقراطي العربي الحركة الإسلامية ومحاميد ) .
- 2- الجبهة الديمقراطية ( الحزب الشيوعي ) .
- 3- التجمع برسالة أحمد طيبي .
- 4- أسرائيل واحدة ( العمل ، جيش ، ميماد ) .
- 5- ميرتس .

- 6- المركز .
- 7- شينوي .
- 8- عام احاد .
- 9- ليكود .
- 10- شاس .
- 11- مفدال .
- 12- يهودت هتورات .
- 13- يسرائيل بيتنو .
- 15- ايحود لئومي .
- 16- هديرخ هشلشيت .
- 17- حزب النساء .
- 18- بنينا روزنبلوم .
- 19- حزب المتقاعدون .
- 20- حزب الكازينو طيسونا .
- 21- علي يروك .
- 22- الخضر برسائة دوي تسوكر .
- 23- حزب العمل الجديد برسائة مخول .
- 24- دعم ( حزب العمال العربي ) .
- 25- حزب آخر .
- 26- لم أصوت ( ولكنني كنت صاحب حق اقتراع ) .
- 27- لم يكن لي حق التصويت ( كنت أقل من 18 عاماً ) .
- 28- أرفض الأجابة .

- 48- لماذا لم تصوت في الانتخابات الماضية (1999) .
- 1- لم أصوت بسبب صعوبة الوصول إلي صندوق الاقتراع ، كنت خارج البلد ، مريض ، مشاكل مع بطاقة الهوية .
- 2- لم أصوت لانه لا وقت لدي / كنت مشغولاً .
- 3- لم أصوت لأنني لا أهتم بالانتخابات .
- 4- لم أصوت لأن صوتي لن يغير .
- 5- لم أصوت لأن صوتي لن يغير .
- 6- لم أصوت لأنه لا توجد اليوم قائمة ملائمة ومرشحين ملائمين .
- 7- لم أصوت لأن التصويت للكنيست مناف لضميري أو لديني ( ولكنني كنت صاحب حق اقتراع ) .
- 8- لم يكن حق الاقتراع ( أقل من 18 عام ) .
- 9- لم أصوت لسبب آخر ، أكره .

- 49- لأي مرشح لرسائة الحكومة صوتت في انتخابات 1999 .
- يهود براك .

- 1- بنيامين نتنياهو .
- 2- ورقة فارغة . لم أصوت ( كنت صاحب حق اقتراع ) .
- 3- لم أصوت ( كنت حق اقتراع ) .

- 4- لم أكن حق اقتراع ( لم أبلغ أنك 18 عاماً ) .  
5- أرفض الأجابة .

50- هل أنت عضو في حزب ما ؟

- 1- نعم .  
2- لا ( لا تجب علي السؤال التالي ) .

51- إذا كان الجواب نعم ، أي حزب أنت عضوبه؟

- 1- القائمة العربية الموحدة ( الحزب الديمقراطي العربي ، الحركة الإسلامية وهاشم محاميد ) .  
2- الجبهة الديمقراطية ( الحزب الشيوعي الإسرائيلي ) .  
3- التجمع برئاسة عزمي بشارة .  
4- الحركة العربية للتغير برسالة أحمد طيبي .  
5- العمل ( أسرائيل واحدة ) .  
6- ميرتس .  
7- المركز .  
8- شينوي .  
9- عام أحاد .  
10- ليكود .  
11- شاس .  
12- مفدال .  
13- يهودوت هتورات .  
14- يسرائيل بعلبابة .  
15- يسرائيل بيتتو .  
16- أحود لينومي .  
17- حزب آخر .  
18- أرفض الأجابة .

52- ما هي ديانتك ؟

- 1- مسلم .  
2- مسيحي .  
3- درزي .

53- بالنسبة للمحافظة علي الدين هل تعتقد أنك اليوم؟

- 1- متدين جداً .  
2- متدين .  
3- متدين بقدر معين .  
4- غير متدين .

54- كم عمرك ؟ ( أكتب رقم السنوات بالعبرية )

55- حالتك الشخصية

- 1- متزوج / ة .
- 2- أرمل / ة .
- 3- أعزب / عزباء .
- 4- مطلق / ة .

56- ما هو الصف الأخير التي أنهيتها؟

- 1- لم أذهب إلي المدرسة .
- 2- تعلمت في الكتاب أو مدرسة ابتدائية أخرى لكنني لم أنه تعليمي .
- 3- تعلمت وأنهيت تعليمي في مدرسة ابتدائية .
- 4- تعلمت في مدرسة ثانوية ( نظري، مهني ، أو ديني ) لكنني لم أنه تعليمي .
- 5- أنهيت تعليمي الثانوي .
- 6- تعلمت في مدرسة ثانوية أو جامعه لكنني لم أنه تعليمي .
- 7- أنهيت تعليمي الجامعي وحصلت علي اللقب الأول (ب، أ) .
- 8- أنهيت تعليمي الجامعي وحصلت علي اللقب الثاني (م، أ) .
- 9- أنهيت تعليمي الجامعي وحصلت علي اللقب الثالث ( دكتور) .

57- ما هو عملك الأساسي .

- 1- عامل ( يشمل عامل مدني في الجيش أو جندي دائم في الجيش ) .
- 2- جندي في الخدمة الإجبارية .
- 3- لا أعمل ولكنني أبحث عن عمل .
- 4- لا أعمل ولا أبحث عن عمل .
- 5- متقاعد .
- 6- طالب جامعي ، طالب في معهد ديني ، طالب مدرسي ، شاب قبل الخدمة العسكرية ، متطوع .
- 7- ربة بيت

58 - كم عدد الأفراد في البيت الذي تسكنه؟  
( أكتب العدد باللغة العبرية ) .

59- معدل الدخل الشهري الصافي للعائلة العربية في إسرائيل هو "6500" ش.ج بالمقارنة مع هذا الدخل هل دخلك :

- 1- أعلي بكثير من المعدل .
- 2- أعلي بقليل من المعدل .
- 3- مثل المعدل .
- 4- أقل بقليل من المعدل .
- 5- أقل بكثير .

60- كيف تقيم صدق المعلومات العامة التي حصلت عليها من المقابل ؟

- 1- غير مرضية .
- 2- مرضية .
- 3- جيدة .

4- جيدة جداً .

61- الجنس :

1- ذكر .

2- أنثي.

62-مكان السكن : ( أكتب أسم البلدة باللغة العبرية ) .



## **Appendix D: English Translation of the Hebrew Questionnaire**

1. To what degree do you have trust in government?  
1 To a very large degree  
2 To a large degree  
3 To a moderate degree  
4 To a small degree  
5 Not at all  
99. No Answer
2. To what degree are you interested in politics and public affairs?  
1 To a very large degree  
2 To a large degree  
3 To a moderate degree  
4 To a small degree  
5 Not at all  
99. No answer
3. How often do you read a newspaper?  
1 Daily  
2 Several times a week  
3 Once a week  
4 Seldom  
5 Do not read  
99. No answer
4. To what degree do you agree with the statement: "Sometimes political and governmental matters are so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what is going on."  
1 To a very large degree  
2 To a large degree  
3 To a moderate degree  
4 To a small degree  
5 Not at all  
99. No answer
5. To what degree, in your opinion, does the government consider Arab citizens' opinion in its decision making?  
1 To a very large degree  
2 To a large degree  
3 To a moderate degree  
4 To a small degree  
5 Not at all  
99. No answer

6. And to what degree, in your opinion, does the government consider Jewish citizens' opinion in its decision making?
- 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
  - 99. No answer
7. Do you support or oppose the Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO?
- 1 Strongly support
  - 2 Support
  - 3 Oppose
  - 4 Strongly oppose
  - 99. No answer
8. (If answered "support or strongly support") How much do you accept the way the Oslo accords are implemented?
- 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
  - 99 No answer
9. To what extent do you support the participation of Arab parties in government coalitions?
- 1 Strongly support
  - 2 Support
  - 3 Oppose
  - 4 Strongly oppose
  - 99 No answer
10. To what degree do you feel close toward the Arab citizens in Israel?
- 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
  - 99 No answer
11. Culture is expressed in matters like music, food, language, and conceptions of right and wrong. To what degree are the cultures of Arabs and the Jews in Israel similar to each other?
- 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
  - 99 No answer

12. How are the relations, in your opinion, between Arab citizens and Jews in Israel today?
- 1 Very good
  - 2 Good
  - 3 Neither good nor bad
  - 4 Bad
  - 5 Very bad
  - 99 No answer
13. To what degree, in your opinion, do Arab citizens have influence on state affairs?
- 1 Too much influence
  - 2 Sufficient influence
  - 3 Little influence
  - 4 No influence at all
  - 99 No answer
14. To what degree, in your opinion, do Jewish citizens have influence on state affairs?
- 1 Too much influence
  - 2 Sufficient influence
  - 3 Little influence
  - 4 No influence at all
  - 99 No answer
15. To what degree, in your opinion, is there discrimination against Arab citizens in Israel?
- 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
  - 99 No answer
16. To what degree, in your opinion, is there discrimination against Mizrachim in Israel?
- 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
  - 99 No answer
17. To what degree have you personally been affected by discrimination against Mizrachim in Israel?
- 1 To a very large degree
  - 2 To a large degree
  - 3 To a moderate degree
  - 4 To a small degree
  - 5 Not at all
  - 99 No answer

18. To what degree, in your opinion, is there a gap in the achievements of Arab citizens and Jews?

- 1 To a very large degree
- 2 To a large degree
- 3 To a moderate degree
- 4 To a small degree
- 5 Not at all
- 99. No answer

19. To what degree, in your opinion, is there a gap in the achievements of Mizrachim and other Jews in Israel?

- 1 To a very large degree
- 2 To a large degree
- 3 To a moderate degree
- 4 To a small degree
- 5 Not at all
- 99 No answer

20. To what degree, in your opinion, is the Israeli government responsible for the gap in the achievements of Arab citizens and Jews?

- 1 To a very large degree
- 2 To a large degree
- 3 To a moderate degree
- 4 To a small degree
- 5 Not at all
- 99 No answer

21. To what degree, in your opinion, is the Israeli government responsible for the gap in the achievements of Mizrachim and other Jews?

- 1 To a very large degree
- 2 To a large degree
- 3 To a moderate degree
- 4 To a small degree
- 5 Not at all
- 99 No answer

22. During the election campaign, did you try to persuade certain people to vote for any party or candidate?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No (skip the next question)
- 99 No answer

23. If yes, whom did you try to persuade? 1-3 answers are possible

- 1 Family members
- 2 Close friends
- 3 Neighbors
- 4 Other persons
- 99 No answer

24. In how many legal protest actions such as demonstrations and marches have you participated in the past five years? \_\_\_\_\_ (if 0, skip the next question)

25. What issue did the most recent legal protest action you participated in address?
- 1 Peace
  - 2 Labor and economic issues
  - 3 State and religion, religious-secular disputes
  - 4 Environmental issues
  - 5 Other issues
  - 99 No answer
26. In how many illegal protest actions such as unlicensed demonstrations and violent marches have you participated in the past five years? \_\_\_\_\_ (two digits)
27. What are the chances that you will participate in the future in legal protest actions such as licensed demonstrations and marches?
- 1 Great chances
  - 2 Considerable chances
  - 3 Moderate chances
  - 4 Small chances
  - 5 No chances
  - 99 No answer
28. What are the chances that you will participate in the future in illegal protest actions such as unlicensed demonstrations and violent marches?
- 1 Great chances
  - 2 Considerable chances
  - 3 Moderate chances
  - 4 Small chances
  - 5 No chances
  - 99 No answer
29. Have you PERSONALLY been asked by someone to vote or to abstain from voting in the past five years?
- 1 Yes
  - 2 No (skip the next question)
30. If yes, by whom? 1-3 answers.
- 1 A family member
  - 2 A close friend
  - 3 A neighbor
  - 4 A superior in a job
  - 5 An active member of a political party
  - 6 A member of an organization or a voluntary association
  - 7 Other \_\_\_\_\_
31. Have you PERSONALLY been asked by someone to vote for or against a certain candidate or a certain party in the past five years?
- 1 Yes
  - 2 No (skip the next question)

32. If yes, by whom? 1-3 answers.  
 1 A family member  
 2 A close friend  
 3 A neighbor  
 4 A superior in a job  
 5 An active member of a political party  
 6 A member of an organization or a voluntary association  
 7 Other \_\_\_\_\_
33. Have you PERSONALLY been asked by someone to participate in a protest action such as a demonstration, a march or a petition in the past five years?  
 1 Yes  
 2 No (skip the next question)
34. If yes, by whom? 1-3 answers.  
 1 A family member  
 2 A close friend  
 3 A neighbor  
 4 A superior in a job  
 5 An active member of a political party  
 6 A member of an organization or a voluntary association

Now, I am going to read to you some statements, and I would like you to tell me if you agree or disagree with each one.

35. Israel can be a democracy and a Zionist Jewish state at the same time.  
 1 Strongly agree  
 2 Agree  
 3 Disagree  
 4 Strongly disagree  
 99 No answer
36. Israel must recognize Arabs as a minority with equal and full rights.  
 1 Strongly agree  
 2 Agree  
 3 Disagree  
 4 Strongly disagree  
 99 No answer
37. Despite its flaws, the Israeli regime offers Arab citizens more civil rights and political freedoms than what Arab states offer their citizens.  
 1 Strongly agree  
 2 Agree  
 3 Disagree  
 4 Strongly disagree  
 99 No answer

38. Voting in elections is one of the most efficient ways to achieve equality for Arabs in Israel.

- 1 Strongly agree
- 2 Agree
- 3 Disagree
- 4 Strongly disagree
- 99 No answer

39. For which party would you vote if elections for the Knesset were held today?

- 1 Labor (One Israel)
- 2 Meretz
- 3 The Center Party (Merkaz)
- 4 Shinui
- 5 Am Echad
- 6 Likud
- 7 Shas
- 8 Mafdal
- 9 Yahadut Hatorah
- 10 Yisrael Ba'aliya
- 11 Yisrael Betenu
- 12 Ha'ihud Ha'lumi
- 13 Other party
- 14 I haven't decided
- 15 I will not vote
- 16 Not willing to reply
- 17 Ra'am
- 18 Hadash
- 19 Balad (headed by Bishara)
- 20 Arab Movement for Renewal (headed by Tibi)
- 27 Blank ballot
- 28 Not eligible to vote

40. For which candidate for a Prime Minister will you vote in the coming elections?

- 1 Ehud Barak
- 2 Ariel Sharon
- 3 Blank ballot
- 4 Haven't decided
- 5 Will not vote
- 99 No answer

41. For which party did you vote in the Knesset elections in 1999?
- 1 Labor (One Israel)
  - 2 Meretz
  - 3 The Center Party (Merkaz)
  - 4 Shinui
  - 5 Am Echad
  - 6 Likud
  - 7 Shas
  - 8 Mafdal
  - 9 Yahadut Hatorah
  - 10 Yisrael Ba'aliya
  - 11 Yisrael Betenu
  - 12 Ha'ihud Ha'umi
  - 13 The Third Way
  - 14 The Women's Party
  - 15 Panina Rosenblum Party
  - 16 Hagimala'im Party
  - 17 The Casino Party headed by Tisona
  - 18 A'le Yarok
  - 19 Hayarukim
  - 20 The New Arab Party headed by Makhul
  - 21 Da'am (Democratic Labor Party)
  - 22 Other party
  - 23 I did not vote (although I had the right to vote)
  - 24 I was not eligible to vote
  - 25 Not willing to say
  - 26 Ra'am (The United Arab List :Arab Democratic Party, Islamic Movement and Mahamid)
  - 27 Hadash (Rakah)
  - 28 Balad and the Arab Renewal Party headed by Bishara and Tibie
42. Which candidate for a Prime Minister did you vote for in 1999?
- 1 Ehud Barak
  - 2 Benyamin Netanyahu
  - 3 Blank ballot
  - 4 I did not vote (although I had the right to vote)
  - 5 I was not eligible to vote
  - 6 Not willing to say
43. Are you a member of a political party?
- 1 Yes
  - 2 No (skip the next question)
  - 99 No answer



44. If yes, which party?
- 1 Labor (One Israel)
  - 2 Meretz
  - 3 The Center Party (Merkaz)
  - 4 Shinui
  - 5 Am Echad
  - 6 Likud
  - 7 Shas
  - 8 Mafdal
  - 9 Yahadut Hatorah
  - 10 Yisrael Ba'aliya
  - 11 Yisrael Betenu
  - 12 Ha'ihud Hal'umi
  - 13 Other party
  - 14 Not willing to say
  - 15 Ra'am (The United Arab List :Arab Democratic Party, Islamic Movement and Mahamid)
  - 16 Hadash (Rakah)
  - 17 Balad headed by Bishara
  - 18 The Arab Renewal Party headed by Tibi
45. With regard to ethnic origin, are you an Ashkenazi, Sephardic/Mizrahi, or mixed?
- 1 Ashkenazi
  - 2 Sephardic/Mizrahi
  - 3 Mixed
  - 99 No answer
46. Are you haredi, dati, masorti, or hiluni?
- 1 Haredi (Ultra-orthodox)
  - 2 Dati (religious)
  - 3 Masorti (traditional)
  - 4 Hiluni (secular)
  - 99 No answer
47. How old are you? (age in number of years)\_\_\_\_\_
48. Martial status
- 1 Single
  - 2 Married
  - 3 Widowed
  - 4 Divorced
  - 99 No answer

49. What is the last class you attended in school?
- 1 No schooling
  - 2 Incomplete primary
  - 3 Complete primary
  - 4 Incomplete secondary
  - 5 Complete secondary
  - 6 Post-secondary, incomplete higher
  - 7 Bachelor degree
  - 8 Master degree
  - 9 Doctoral degree
  - 99 No answer
50. What do you do in the main?
- 1 Employed (including a civilian in the army or a soldier in the professional army)
  - 2 A soldier in a compulsory service
  - 3 Not working but seeking work
  - 4 Neither working and nor seeking work
  - 5 Retired
  - 6 A university student, a Yeshiva student, another student, a youth before the draft, a volunteer
  - 7 A housewife
  - 99 No answer
51. The average net monthly income of a family in Israel is about 6,400 NIS. In comparison, the income of your family is:
- 1 Much above the average
  - 2 A bit above the average
  - 3 About the average
  - 4 A bit below the average
  - 5 Much below the average
  - 99 No answer
52. Gender
- 1 Man
  - 2 Woman
53. Place of residence: city
54. Classification of place of residence: area code
- 02 Jerusalem
  - 03 Tel Aviv and Dan district
  - 04 Haifa
  - 06 North
  - 07 South
  - 08 "Shfelah" (coastal strip from south of Tel Aviv to Ashkelon, including Rehovot, Ramle, Lod, Ashdod, Yavne, etc.)
  - 09 Sharon (coastal strip north of Tel Aviv to Hadera, including Herzlia, Kfar Sava, Netanya, Even Yehuda, etc.)

## Appendix E: The Hebrew Questionnaire

### השאלון ליהודים של שרי לורנס

פתיח:

שלום, מדבר/ת \_\_\_\_\_ מאוניברסיטת חיפה. אנו עורכים סקר בנושאים חברתיים. האם תוכל/י להקדיש לי מספר דקות? תודה.

1. באיזו מידה יש לך אמון בממשלה?
  1. במידה רבה מאוד
  2. במידה רבה
  3. במידה בינונית
  4. במידה מועטה
  5. כלל לא
2. באיזו מידה אתה מתעניין בפוליטיקה ובענייני ציבור?
  1. במידה רבה מאוד
  2. במידה רבה
  3. במידה בינונית
  4. במידה מועטה
  5. כלל לא
3. באיזו תכיפות אתה קורא עיתון?
  1. כל יום
  2. מספר פעמים בשבוע
  3. פעם בשבוע
  4. לעיתים רחוקות
  5. לא קורא

אקריא לך מספר משפטים. ציין/ני באיזו מידה את/ה מסכים/מה עם כל אחד מהם	במידה רבה מאוד	במידה רבה	במידה בינונית	במידה מועטה	כלל לא
4. לפעמים ענייני פוליטיקה וממשלה הם כה מסובכים שאדם כמוני לא יכול להבין מה קורה באמת	1	2	3	4	5
5. הממשלה מתחשבת בדעת האזרחים הערבים בקבלת החלטותיה	1	2	3	4	5
6. הממשלה מתחשבת בדעת האזרחים היהודים בקבלת החלטותיה	1	2	3	4	5
7. אתה מרגיש קרוב לאזרחים הערבים בישראל	1	2	3	4	5
8. קיימת אפליה נגד האזרחים הערבים בישראל	1	2	3	4	5
9. קיימת אפליה נגד המזרחיים בישראל	1	2	3	4	5
10. קיים פער בהישגים בין האזרחים הערבים והיהודים בישראל	1	2	3	4	5
11. קיים פער בין יהודים מזרחיים לשאר היהודים בישראל	1	2	3	4	5
12. הממשלה אחראית לפער בהישגים בין האזרחים הערבים והיהודים	1	2	3	4	5

5	4	3	2	1	13. הממשלה אחראית לפער בהישגים בין יהודים מזרחיים לשאר היהודים בישראל
5	4	3	2	1	14. באיזו מידה נפגעת מאפליה נגד המזרחיים בישראל
5	4	3	2	1	15. תרבות מתבטאת בתחומים כמו: מוסיקה, אוכל, שפה וערכים של טוב ורע. באיזו מידה התרבויות של ערבים ויהודים בישראל דומות זו לזו?

16. בנוגע להסכמי אוסלו בין ישראל לאש"ף, האם אתה:  
1. תומך מאוד 2. תומך 3. מתנגד 4. מתנגד מאוד
17. **(אם תומך)** באיזו מידה מקובל עליך אופן היישום שלהם?  
1. במידה רבה מאוד 2. במידה רבה 3. במידה בינונית 4. במידה  
מועטה 5. כלל לא
18. באיזו מידה אתה תומך בהשתתפות אפשרית של המפלגות הערביות  
בקואליציות?  
1. תומך מאוד 2. תומך 3. מתנגד 4. מתנגד מאוד
19. מצב היחסים בין האזרחים הערבים והיהודים בישראל היום הוא:  
1. טוב מאוד 2. טוב 3. בינוני 4. רע 5. רע  
מאוד
20. באיזו מידה יש לדעתך השפעה לאזרחים הערבים בישראל על ענייני  
המדינה?  
1. השפעה רבה מדי 2. השפעה מספקת 3. השפעה מועטה  
4. אין השפעה כלל
21. באיזו מידה יש לדעתך השפעה לאזרחים היהודים בישראל על ענייני  
המדינה?  
1. השפעה רבה מדי 2. השפעה מספקת 3. השפעה מועטה  
4. אין השפעה כלל
22. במהלך מערכת הבחירות הקודמות, האם נסית לשכנע אנשים מסוימים  
להצביע למפלגה או למועמד כלשהו? 1. כן 2. לא (דלג על  
השאלה הבאה)
23. **(אם כן)** את מי נסית לשכנע? **(ריבוי תשובות, עד 3 אפשרויות)**  
1. קרובי משפחה 2. חברים קרובים 3. שכנים 4. אנשים  
אחרים
24. בכמה פעולות מחאה חוקיות כמו הפגנות ותהלוכות השתתפת ב-5 השנים  
האחרונות? \_\_\_\_\_

25. **(אם השתתף בפעולה אחת לפחות)** באיזה עניין עסקה פעולת המחאה החוקית האחרונה בה השתתפת?  
 1. שלום 2. עבודה וכלכלה 3. דת ומדינה, דתיים/חילוניים  
 4. איכות הסביבה 5. אחר \_\_\_\_\_
26. בכמה פעולות מחאה לא חוקיות כמו הפגנות לא חוקיות ותהלוכות אלימות השתתפת ב-5 השנים האחרונות? \_\_\_\_\_
27. מה הסיכויים שתשתתף בעתיד בפעולות מחאה חוקיות כמו הפגנות ותהלוכות חוקיות?  
 1. גדולים מאוד 2. גדולים 3. בינוניים 4. קטנים 5. אין סיכוי
28. מה הסיכויים שתשתתף בעתיד בפעולות מחאה לא חוקיות כמו הפגנות ותהלוכות אלימות?  
 1. גדולים מאוד 2. גדולים 3. בינוניים 4. קטנים 5. אין סיכוי
29. האם התבקשת באופן אישי על-ידי מישו להצביע או להימנע מלהצביע ב-5 השנים האחרונות?  
 1. כן 2. לא (דלג על השאלה הבאה)
30. **(אם כן) על ידי מי? (ריבוי תשובות, עד 3 אפשרויות)**  
 1. קרוב משפחה 2. חבר קרוב 3. שכן 4. ממונה בעבודה  
 5. פעיל במפלגה 6. חבר ארגון או עמותה 7. אחר \_\_\_\_\_
31. האם התבקשת באופן אישי על-ידי מישו להצביע בעד או נגד מועמד מסוים או מפלגה מסוימת ב-5 השנים האחרונות?  
 1. כן 2. לא (דלג על השאלה הבאה)
32. **(אם כן) על ידי מי? (ריבוי תשובות, עד 3 אפשרויות)**  
 1. קרוב משפחה 2. חבר קרוב 3. שכן 4. ממונה בעבודה  
 5. פעיל במפלגה 6. חבר ארגון או עמותה 7. אחר \_\_\_\_\_
33. האם התבקשת באופן אישי על-ידי מישו להשתתף בפעולת מחאה כמו הפגנה, תהלוכה או עצומה?  
 1. כן 2. לא (דלג על השאלה הבאה)
34. **(אם כן) על ידי מי? (ריבוי תשובות, עד 3 אפשרויות)**  
 1. קרוב משפחה 2. חבר קרוב 3. שכן 4. ממונה

בעבודה  
5. פעיל במפלגה  
6. חבר ארגון או עמותה  
7. אחר\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_



48. לאיזה מועמד לראשות הממשלה הצבעת בבחירות הקודמות?  
 1. אהוד ברק 2. בנימין נתניהו 3. פתק לבן  
 4. לא הצבעתי אך הייתה לי זכות הצבעה 5. לא הייתה לי זכות הצבעה  
 6. לא מוכן להשיב
49. האם אתה חבר מפלגה? 1. כן 2. לא (דלג על השאלה הבאה)
50. (אם כן) איזו מפלגה? \_\_\_\_\_
51. ההכנסה הממוצעת למשפחה בישראל היא 6,400 ש"ח נטו לחודש.  
 בהשוואה לכך, האם ההכנסה של משפחתך היא:  
 1. הרבה מעל הממוצע 2. קצת מעל הממוצע 3. כמו הממוצע
4. קצת מתחת לממוצע 5. הרבה מתחת לממוצע
- תודה רבה לך על שיתוף הפעולה, שלום.
52. (למלא לאחר ניתוק השיחה) מין הנשאל: 1. זכר 2. נקבה
53. ישוב מגורים: \_\_\_\_\_
54. אזור חיוג: \_\_\_\_\_



## **Appendix F: Coding and Construction of Variables**

(all variable numbers as found in Arabic questionnaire)

### **System-Challenging Behavior (SCB)**

1.  $SCB = v20 + v22 + v23 + v24 + v25 + v26$

V20 (legal protest action): coded 1 for protest participation, 0 for none.

V22 (illegal protest action) coded 1 for protest participation, 0 for none.

V23 (Land Day): recoded to 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .33, .66, 1

V24 (Nakba Day): coded 1 for participation, 0 for none.

V25 (legal protest intent): scale reversed and recoded to 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1

V26: (illegal protest intent): scale reversed and recoded to 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1

For SCB, v20 – v26 as coded above averaged to create a single continuous SCB index on a 0 to 1 scale.

2. Protest Action = v20 + v22 as coded above and averaged to create a single index on a 0 to 1 scale.

3. Protest Intent = v25 + v26 as coded above and averaged to create a single index on a 0 to 1 scale.

4. National Action = v23 + v24 as coded above and averaged to create a single index on a 0 to 1 scale.

### **Grievance**

Grievance = v5 + v12 + v14 + v16 + v17

V5 (Arab opinion): recoded to a 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1.

V12 (Arab influence): recoded to a 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .33, .66, 1.

V14 (Discrimination): scale reversed and recoded to a 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1.

V16 (Arab-Jewish Gap): scale reversed and recoded to a 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1.

V17 (Blame for Gap): scale reversed and recoded to a 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1.

For grievance index, all five variables as coded above averaged to create a single index on a 0 to 1 scale.

Identity: v43, order recoded as follows:

1. Israeli
2. Israeli Arab
3. Arab
4. Israeli Palestinian
5. Palestinian in Israel
6. Palestinian Arab
7. Palestinian.

Recoded to 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .167, .333, .5, .667, .833, 1.

Political Engagement = v2 + v3

V2 (political interest): scale reversed and recoded to 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1.

V3 (newspaper consumption): scale reversed and recoded to 0 to 1 scale. Possible response values: 0, .25, .5, .75, 1.

For political engagement, the two variables were added to create a single index on a 0 to 2 scale.

Age = v54 (actual age coded)

Education = v56

Income = v59, scale reversed

Gender = v61, recoded female = 0, male = 1

Religion = v52, recoded to dummy variables. Reference category: Druze

Recruitment = v31, recoded no = 0, yes = 1

Mistrust = v1

PID = v44, recoded as follows:

1. Jewish right
2. Jewish left
3. The Front (Rakah/Communist party)
4. The United Arab List
5. Arab Renewal Party
6. Balad/Tajamu'

Party member = v50, recoded no = 0, yes = 1

Ethnic Distance = v9

Cultural Dissimilarity = v10

Personal Discrimination = v15, scale reversed.

## Appendix G: Summary Statistics

<b>Variable</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std.</b>
<b>Name</b>					<b>Deviation</b>
Mistrust	1190	1	5	3.91	1.09
Ethnic Distance	1182	1	5	3.33	.969
Cultural Dissimilarity	1181	1	5	3.43	.936
Personal Discrimination	1184	1	5	3.09	1.26
Recruitment	1184	0	1	.146	.353
PID	1110	1	6	3.86	1.45
Party Membership	1151	0	1	.120	.325
Age	1131	18	86	34.6	13.8
Education	1173	1	9	4.67	1.58
Income	1170	1	5	2.09	1.16
Gender	1200	0	1	.567	.496
Muslim	1201	0	1	.787	.410
Christian	1201	0	1	.122	.328
Political Engagement	1181	0	2	1.06	.528
Identity	1179	0	1	.518	.276
Grievance	1169	0	1	.743	.162
SCB	1092	0	1	.218	.243
Protest Action	1112	0	1	.181	.290
Protest Intent	1182	0	1	.253	.256
National Action	1177	0	1	.215	.314
Land Day	1184	0	1	.266	.355

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## **Vita**

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